Mystics & Statistics

The London Plague of 1665

Completely irrelevant to modern warfare (we hope), but they have confirmed that the plague that hit London in 1664 was the bubonic plague. I was not aware that there was much question about this. Still interesting stuff based upon DNA:

DNA Confirms Cause of 1665 London’s Great Plague

DNA from Ancient Skeletons Reveals Cause of London’s Great Plague

A few notes:

  1. Plague killed nearly a quarter of the city.
  2. Killed more than 75,000 people in the space of a year.
  3. Caused 8,000 deaths were week at its peak in September 1665.
  4. Black Death killed an estimated 50 million people during the 14th century.
  5. More than 780 cases of the plague were reported in 2013, including 126 deaths (mainly in Africa).
  6. They are still examining to the DNA to see if the disease has changed over time.

Also related (but older articles):

Scientists fine DNA of first-ever bubonic plague, warn of new outbreaks

  1. Justinian’s plague (541-542 AD) was bubonic plague.
  2. Around 2,000 people a year get affected globally.
  3. When rapidly diagnosed and treated, it reduces mortality rate from 60 percent to less than 15 percent.
  4. Strains of the Yersina pestis bacterium in the first plague are different than later plagues.
  5. “These results show that rodent species worldwide represent important reservoirs for the repeated emergence of diverse lineages of Y pestis into human populations”
  6. “New sophisticated strains of the disease…could break out in the future.”

In Ancient DNA, Evidence of Plague Much Earlier than Previously Known

  1. The bacterium was infecting people as long as 5,000 years ago.

 

Retaking Mosul

Nothing new here, just a nice summary article: Retaking Mosul from ISIS

A few notes:

  1. As many as 1 1/2 million residents could be affected by the battle (and thee is a link the to the U.N. report on the subject).
    1. There has been 90,000 displaced people since June
    2. One camp houses more than 36,000 people in a camp with tents for around 10,000.
  2. We will be providing air support
  3. We have 5,000 troops in Iraq
  4. There is a slide show: Slideshow

 

Quoting David Irving

denial_2016_film

There is a new movie being released this month called Denial. It is about the libel lawsuit pursued by controversial historian David Irving against U.S. academic historian Deborah Lipstadt. David Irving was a British historian who specialized in the military history of the Third Reich. His writings downplayed the Holocaust and made the claim that there was no evidence that Hitler knew about it. She took David Irving to task in her 1993 book, Denying the Holocaust. David Irving took her to court in the UK, where their libel laws place the burden of proof on her. She had the legal requirement to prove that the Holocaust actually occurred and that Hitler ordered it.

Spoiler alert: He lost.

I did reference David Irving’s work twice in my book Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka. I was well aware of this controversy. On 4 May 1943 there was a meeting called by Adolf Hitler and attended by Colonel General Heinz Guderian, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, Colonel General Hans Jeschonnek and many others. This rather famous meeting, part of the German planning for the Battle of Kursk, has been discussed in most books on Kursk.

The problem is that there are only three accounts of the meeting. There is a detailed account of the meeting in Heinz Guderian’s book, Panzer Leader, which provides a three-page narrative of the meeting. There is only a brief discussion in Manstein’s book, Lost Victories, which mentions the meeting but provides no details. These are the two sources that most people have used. Many historians have just accepted the Guderian account. One Kursk book started with the narrative of this meeting based upon Guderian’s account.

But there is third source. This is an entry in Field Marshal Wolfram Baron von Richthofen’s diary based upon a conversation he had with General Jeschonnek, the Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe. It stated:

“[On 27 April] General Model declared he was not strong enough and would probably get bogged down or take too long. The Fuehrer took the view that the attack must be punched through without fail in shortest time possible. [Early in May] General Guderian offered to furnish enough tank units within six weeks to guarantee this. The Fuehrer thus decided on a postponement of six weeks. To get the blessing of all sides on this decision, he called a conference [on 4 May] with Field Marshals von Kluge and von Manstein. At first they agreed on a postponement; but when they heard that the Fuehrer had already made his mind up to that effect, they spoke out for an immediate opening of the attack—apparently in order to avoid the odium of being blamed for the postponement themselves.”

This account directly contradicts the Guderian account. The problem is that this reference to the diary entry and its translation from German was done by David Irving in his controversial book, Hitler’s War, originally published in 1977. Wolfram von Richthofen was a cousin of the famous World War I ace Manfred von Richthofen, the highest scoring ace in World War I with 80 claimed kills. Wolfram Richthofen served with the German air unit, the Condor Legion, in the Spanish Civil War and planned the bombing of Guernica. He had led a number of German air formations throughout the war and in May 1943 was the commander of the VIII Air Corps which was to participate in the Battle of Kursk. The command of this air corps was to be taken over by General Jeschonnek for the upcoming battle (this never happened). Richthofen’s diary has been quoted from extensively by David Irving. To date, I do not know of anyone else that has translated it.

So, before I used the quote, I wrote to David Irving in 2002. I specifically asked him about the diary and where it was located. It noted this in the footnote to this passage:

“David Irving, page 514 (or pages 583–584 in his 2001 version of the book that is available on the web). According to emails received from David Irving in 2002 and 2008, this passage is a directly translated quote from the diary, and the diary was stored at the Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt at Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany. A xerox of the page in question is stored in the Irving Collection at the Institut fur Zeitgeschechte in Munich, Germany. We have not checked these files and cannot confirm the translation.”

 So, I could access the files. It was possible to see the diary and check the translation. This was considered. Of course, to do so would have required me to travel to Germany, with a translator, to examine the diary. This would have taken at least a week of my time and cost a few thousand dollars. For fairly obvious reasons, I choose not to do this. Instead, I stated in the footnote that we had not confirmed the translation.

As David Irving headed to trial, I continued to wonder about this passage. There was no reason to assume that it was faked, or deliberately grossly mistranslated. On the other hand, it was something I was not 100% sure of. But, there was also no reason to assume that Guderian’s or Manstein’s account was 100% correct either, and people had freely used them without much question. So, do I build my narrative on those two well-known first-person accounts and ignore the contradictory second-hand account from Richthofen’s dairy just because it came from David Irving? I decided that all accounts needed to be presented and I left it to the reader to decide which they believed.

As I noted in my book (on page 69):

As no stenogram exists of this conference, one is left only with the memoirs of two generals and the diary of a person who did not participate. There also are what appear to be the Inspector General of Armored Troops’ notes for the meeting for 3 May. These notes clearly show the beneficial effects on tank strength of a six-week delay in the offensive. Guderian’s memoirs are quite explicit as to what happened at the conference but appear to be confused as to attendees and dates. Manstein mentions the conference and the issues in a very general sense. The Richthofen entry contradicts the other two memoirs, claiming that Guderian was the source of the six-week delay and that Manstein and Kluge supported the delay. It is impossible to resolve these differences.

The problem is that both Guderian’s and Manstein’s memoirs were written after the war. It is hard to say what passages may have been self-serving or written with an eye towards future historians. The story by Jeschonnek was recorded at the time by Richthofen. Jeschonnek committed suicide in August 1943 and Richthofen died from a brain tumor in July 1945. Which account is more “real?”

The Uncongenial Lessons of Past Conflicts

Williamson Murray, professor emeritus of history at Ohio State University, on the notion that military failures can be traced to an overemphasis on the lessons of the last war:

It is a myth that military organizations tend to do badly in each new war because they have studied too closely the last one; nothing could be farther from the truth. The fact is that military organizations, for the most part, study what makes them feel comfortable about themselves, not the uncongenial lessons of past conflicts. The result is that more often than not, militaries have to relearn in combat—and usually at a heavy cost—lessons that were readily apparent at the end of the last conflict.

[Williamson Murray, “Thinking About Innovation,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2001, 122-123. This passage was cited in a recent essay by LTG H.R. McMaster, “Continuity and Change: The Army Operating Concept and Clear Thinking About Future War,” Military Review, March-April 2015. I recommend reading both.]

Islamic State Loses Border Area with Turkey

Nice summary of the situation: IS loss of border area with Turkey sharply harms group

A few highlights:

  1. ISIL has been expelled from the last area it controlled on the Turkish border. This effectively cuts it supply lines to the outside world.
  2. People fighting ISIL include:
    1. United States
    2. Turkey
    3. Iran
    4. Russia
    5. Iraqi government troops
    6. Popular Mobilization Forces (Iraqi Shiite militia)
    7. Syrian government troops
    8. Hezbollah (from Lebanon)
    9. Kurdish-led Syria Democratic Forces
    10. Kurdish Peshmerga fighters in Iraq
    11. Sunni tribesmen (Iraq)
    12. Sultan Murad (Syria)
    13. Mountain Hawks (Syria)
    14. Shamiya Front (Syria)
    15. Liberation Army (Syria)
    16. And probably a few others.
  3. In Syria, ISIL killed 4,401 people since June 2014, including 2,369 civilians
  4. In Iraq, ISIL has killed thousands.
  5. Archeological sites damaged/destroyed
    1. Temple of Bel, Palmyra
    2. Temple of Baalshamin, Palymyra
    3. Nimrod in Iraq
    4. Hatra in Iraq
    5. and probably a few others.

Will This Weapon Change Infantry Warfare Forever? [UPDATE]

XM-25 Counter-Defilade Engagement SystemIt appears that the Army’s XM-25 Counter-Defilade Target Engagement System, a shoulder-fired 25mm grenade launcher, may not get the opportunity to fulfill its destiny as the Weapon That Will Change Infantry Warfare Forever after all.

Military.com reports that the Department of Defense’s Inspector General’s Office has recommended that the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, Katrina McFarland, “determine whether to proceed with or cancel the XM25 program after reviewing the results of the 2016 Governmental testing,” which will be completed this fall. The Army has indicated that it concurs with the recommendation.

The Army delayed acquisition funding and extended the XM-25’s development phase in 2014 in response to problems encountered during field testing and critiques of the weapon by the 75th Ranger Regiment and the Army’s Maneuver Center of Excellence. During a live-fire exercise in 2013, an XM-25 “experienced a double feed and an unintentional primer ignition of one of the 25mm high explosive rounds,” which fortunately, caused only minor injuries to the soldier testing it, but potentially could have been much worse.

More consequentially for the XM-25 program, the Rangers found that infantry squad soldiers assigned to wield it could not also carry a rifle due to the extra weight. This limited the ability of the XM-25 bearer to perform battle drills and deprived the squad of a rifle in close range combat. The XM-25 also quickly depleted all of its 36 rounds in action. As a result, the Rangers declined to use an XM-25 in an assault on a fortified compound in Afghanistan in 2013, on the grounds that the weapon’s limited utility did not justify leaving out an M4A1 carbine.

The DOD IG criticized the Army for not specifying the exact costs of the extended development and for declining to state how many XM-25s it is considering initially procuring. Stay tuned…

Russia’s Strategy in Ukraine

"Russian Build-Up In and Around Ukraine: August 12, 2016," Institute for the Study of WarOver at Foreign Policy, Michael Kofman, a research scientist at CNA Corp. and fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, has analyzed recent Russian troop deployments on Ukraine’s border peripheries and what they imply about the strategic goals of the Russian government in the mid-term. He concludes that the Russians are not massing for a possible invasion in the short-term. Instead, the shifting of forces suggests sustainable, long-term deployments at strategically important locations along the border. The mid-term objective of this is to secure the current status-quo.

The Russian General Staff is not only repositioning these units back where they were before 2009, it’s also rebuilding a capable combat grouping on Crimea — albeit one that’s largely defensive in nature… It also secures the Russian vision for how this conflict ends: In a hypothetical future where the Minsk agreement is actually implemented, Russian forces may withdraw from the separatist enclaves in the Donbass. If the deal fails to hold or Kiev reneges on the terms, Russian divisions ringing the country from its north to very southeast (not including Crimea) would be poised to counter any Ukrainian moves by striking from several directions.

Kofman also sees this strategy as seeking to maintain Russia’s political dominance over Ukraine in the longer term.

The string of divisions, airbases, and brigades will be able to effect conventional deterrence or compellence for years to come… Russia will retain escalation dominance over Ukraine for the foreseeable future. By the end of 2017, its forces will be better positioned to conduct an incursion or threaten regime change in Kiev than they ever were in 2014.

Kofman recommends that the U.S. and its allies carefully think through the implications of this strategy. He believes it will take Ukraine five to 10 years to rebuild an effective military, but even if successful, the future correlation of forces and the aggressive positioning of Russian forces could make the situation more unstable rather than less so.

U.S. policymakers should think about the medium to long term — a timeline that is admittedly not our strong suit. If this conflict is not placed on stable footing by the time both countries feel themselves capable of engaging in a larger fight, it may well result in a conventional war that would dwarf the small set-piece battles we’ve seen so far. Beyond imposing a ceasefire on the current fighting, the West should think about what a rematch might look like several years from now.