Mystics & Statistics

Betting On The Future: The Third Offset Strategy

Image by Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA).
Image by Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA).

In several recent posts, I have alluded to something called the Third Offset Strategy without going into any detail as to what it is. Fortunately for us all, Timothy A. Walton, a Fellow in the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, wrote an excellent summary and primer on what it as all about in the current edition of Joint Forces Quarterly.

The Third Offset Strategy emerged from Defense Strategic Guidance issued by the President and Secretary of Defense in 2012 and from the results of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. As Walton outlined,

The Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) articulated 10 missions the [U.S.] joint force must accomplish in the future. These missions include the ability to:

– deter and defeat aggression

– project power despite antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) challenges

– operate effectively in cyberspace and space.

The follow-on 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review confirmed the importance of these missions and called for the joint force to “project power and win decisively” in spite of “increasingly sophisticated adversaries who could employ advanced warfighting capabilities.”

In these documents, U.S. policy-makers identified that the primary strategic challenge to securing the goals is that “capable adversaries are adopting potent A2/AD strategies that are challenging U.S. ability to ensure operational access.” These adversaries include China, Russia, and Iran.

The Third Offset Strategy was devised to address this primary strategic challenge.

In November 2014, then–Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced a new Defense Innovation Initiative, which included the Third Offset Strategy. The initiative seeks to maintain U.S. military superiority over capable adversaries through the development of novel capabilities and concepts. Secretary Hagel modeled his approach on the First Offset Strategy of the 1950s, in which President Dwight D. Eisenhower countered the Soviet Union’s conventional numerical superiority through the buildup of America’s nuclear deterrent, and on the Second Offset Strategy of the 1970s, in which Secretary of Defense Harold Brown shepherded the development of precision-guided munitions, stealth, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems to counter the numerical superiority and improving technical capability of Warsaw Pact forces along the Central Front in Europe.

Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has built on Hagel’s vision of the Third Offset Strategy, and the proposed fiscal year 2017 budget is the first major public manifestation of the strategy: approximately $3.6 billion in research and development funding dedicated to Third Offset Strategy pursuits. As explained by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, the budget seeks to conduct numerous small bets on advanced capability research and demonstrations, and to work with Congress and the Services to craft new operational concepts so that the next administration can determine “what are the key bets we’re going to make.”

As Walton puts it, “the next Secretary of Defense will have the opportunity to make those big bets.” The keys to making the correct bets will be selecting the most appropriate scenarios to plan around, accurately assessing the performance of the U.S. joint force that will be programmed and budgeted for, and identifying the right priorities for new investment.

It is in this context that Walton recommended reviving campaign-level combat modeling at the Defense Department level, as part an overall reform of analytical processes informing force planning decisions.

Walton concludes by identifying the major obstacles in carrying out the Third Offset Strategy, some of which will be institutional and political in nature. However, he quickly passes over what might perhaps be the biggest problem with the Third Offset strategy, which is that it might be based on the wrong premises.

Lastly, the next Secretary of Defense will face numerous other, important defense challenges that will threaten to engross his or her attention, ranging from leading U.S. forces in Afghanistan, to countering Chinese, Russian, and Islamic State aggression, to reforming Goldwater-Nichols, military compensation, and base structure.

The ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq show no sign of abating anytime soon, yet they constitute “lesser includeds” in the Third Offset Strategy. Are we sure enough to bet that the A2/AD threat is the most important strategic challenge the U.S. will face in the near future?

Walton’s piece is worth reading and thinking about.

 

Mosul Strength Estimates

A series of articles over the last week or so that seems to have bits and pieces as to what are the strength of forces around Mosul. They are:

http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/16/politics/us-troops-mosul-base/index.html

http://time.com/4485212/iraq-mosul-isis-baghdadi-united-nations/

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37353081

The estimates they provide include:

  1. Could began next month (October)
  2. There are 3,000 to 4,5000 ISIS fighters in Mosul.
  3. Their forces are estimated at between 3,000 and 9,000
  4. “…20,000 to 30,000 Iraqi troops expected to be used in the campaign….”
  5. “…could take another two months.”
  6. And there is the Pershmerga (Kurdish forces)
  7. “…but might not enter central districts to avoid aggravating political sensitivities.”
  8. And perhaps Shiite militias (the Hashid Shaabi)
  9. The Peshmerga general has 23,000 men under his command

So….40,000 to 60,000 or more Iraqi, Peshmerga and Hashid Shaabi versus 3,000 to 9,000 ISIL fighters.

Our previous posts on the subject, dating back to July, include the following estimates (check the category “Iraq”)

  1. The U.S. has 5,000 troops in Iraq.
  2. 5,000 or so fighters inside Mosul.
  3. There are also ISIL fighters outside of Mosul.
  4. The Islamic States has roughly 19,000 to 25,000 fighters, about half in Iraq and half in Syria.
  5. Most of the 10,000 to 12,000 in Iraq are concentrated around Mosul, in the Tal Afar area, and elsewhere in Nineveh Province.
  6. The Anbar Sunnis can contribute at most 10,000 soldiers to the Mosul effort.
  7. IS fighters in Mosul vary from a few thousand to not more than 10,000.
  8. Retaking Mosul would require 80,000 men, of whom 15,000 are expect to come from Shiite militias.
  9. Might happen in October
  10. Campaign needs 20,000 to 30,000 troops
  11. A few thousand police and 15,000 local fighters to hold land after assault.
  12. Up to 10,000 jihadists are in the city.

I guess that is the best we can do from open sources right now.

 

Should Defense Department Campaign-Level Combat Modeling Be Reinstated?

Airmen of the New York Air National Guard’s 152nd Air Operations Group man their stations during Virtual Flag, a computer wargame held Feb. 18-26 from Hancock Field Air National Guard Base. The computer hookup allowed the air war planners of the 152nd to interact with other Air Force units around the country and in Europe. U.S. Air National Guard photo by Master Sgt. Eric Miller
Airmen of the New York Air National Guard’s 152nd Air Operations Group man their stations during Virtual Flag, a computer wargame held Feb. 18-26 from Hancock Field Air National Guard Base. The computer hookup allowed the air war planners of the 152nd to interact with other Air Force units around the country and in Europe. U.S. Air National Guard photo by Master Sgt. Eric Miller

In 2011, the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) disbanded its campaign-level modeling capabilities and reduced its role in the Department of Defense’s strategic analysis activity (SSA) process. CAPE, which was originally created in 1961 as the Office of Systems Analysis, “reports directly to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, providing independent analytic advice on all aspects of the defense program, including alternative weapon systems and force structures, the development and evaluation of defense program alternatives, and the cost-effectiveness of defense systems.”

According to RAND’s Paul K. Davis, CAPE’s decision was controversial within DOD, and due in no small part to general dissatisfaction with the overall quality of strategic analysis supporting decision-making.

CAPE’s decision reflected a conclusion, accepted by the Secretary of Defense and some other senior leaders, that the SSA process had not helped decisionmakers confront their most-difficult problems. The activity had previously been criticized for having been mired in traditional analysis of kinetic wars rather than counterterrorism, intervention, and other “soft” problems. The actual criticism was broader: Critics found SSA’s traditional analysis to be slow, manpower-intensive, opaque, difficult to explain because of its dependence on complex models, inflexible, and weak in dealing with uncertainty. They also concluded that SSA’s campaign-analysis focus was distracting from more-pressing issues requiring mission-level analysis (e.g., how to defeat or avoid integrated air defenses, how to defend aircraft carriers, and how to secure nuclear weapons in a chaotic situation).

CAPE took the criticism to heart.

CAPE felt that the focus on analytic baselines was reducing its ability to provide independent analysis to the secretary. The campaign-modeling activity was disbanded, and CAPE stopped developing the corresponding detailed analytic baselines that illustrated, in detail, how forces could be employed to execute a defense-planning scenario that represented strategy.

However, CAPE’s solution to the problem may have created another. “During the secretary’s reviews for fiscal years 2012 and 2014, CAPE instead used extrapolated versions of combatant commander plans as a starting point for evaluating strategy and programs.”

As Davis, related, there were many who disagreed with CAPE’s decision at the time because of the service-independent perspective it provided.

Some senior officials believed from personal experience that SSA had been very useful for behind-the-scenes infrastructure (e.g., a source of expertise and analytic capability) and essential for supporting DoD’s strategic planning (i.e., in assessing the executability of force-sizing strategy). These officials saw the loss of joint campaign-analysis capability as hindering the ability and willingness of the services to work jointly. The officials also disagreed with using combatant commander plans instead of scenarios as starting points for review of midterm programs, because such plans are too strongly tied to present-day thinking. (Emphasis added)

Five years later, as DOD gears up to implement the new Third Offset Strategy, it appears that the changes implemented in SSA in 2011 have not necessarily improved the quality of strategic analysis. DOD’s lack of an independent joint, campaign-level modeling capability is apparently hampering the ability of senior decision-makers to critically evaluate analysis provided to them by the services and combatant commanders.

In the current edition of Joint Forces Quarterly, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s military and security studies journal, Timothy A. Walton, a Fellow in the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, recommended that in support of “the Third Offset Strategy, the next Secretary of Defense should reform analytical processes informing force planning decisions.” He pointed suggested that “Efforts to shape assumptions in unrealistic or imprudent ways that favor outcomes for particular Services should be repudiated.”

As part of the reforms, Walton made a strong and detailed case for reinstating CAPE’s campaign-level combat modeling.

In terms of assessments, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to reinstate the ability to conduct OSD campaign-level modeling, which was eliminated in 2011. Campaign-level modeling consists of the use of large-scale computer simulations to examine the performance of a full fielded military in planning scenarios. It takes the results of focused DOD wargaming activities, as well as inputs from more detailed tactical modeling, to better represent the effects of large-scale forces on a battlefield. Campaign-level modeling is essential in developing insights on the performance of the entire joint force and in revealing key dynamic relationships and interdependencies. These insights are instrumental in properly analyzing complex factors necessary to judge the adequacy of the joint force to meet capacity requirements, such as the two-war construct, and to make sensible, informed trades between solutions. Campaign-level modeling is essential to the force planning process, and although the Services have their own campaign-level modeling capabilities, OSD should once more be able to conduct its own analysis to provide objective, transparent assessments to senior decisionmakers. (Emphasis added)

So, it appears that DOD can’t quit combat modeling. But that raises the question, if CAPE does resume such activities, will it pick up where it left off in 2011 or do it differently? I will explore that in a future post.

Count of Russian Combat Troops in Ukraine

An interesting article from Forbes: Russian Combat Medals

Forbes articles tend to be pretty negative on Russia, but it is no secret that Russia had moved into Ukraine its troops, or its contractors, or Russian volunteers (a word that has had interesting connotations in Soviet history).

A few points:

  1. According to one source, 167 regular troops killed, 187 MIA (missing in action), with 305 mercenaries killed and 796 MIA. Most MIA are likely KIA. So maybe 1,455 Russians killed in fighting in Ukraine. I gather this is a pretty reliable listing of people.
  2. Society of Russian Mothers (this organization has been around for a while) says up to 3,500 KIA.
  3. Malaysian airlines flight MH17 was shot down by a BUK missile system operated by a Russian crew (is there really any other reasonable interpretation of this event?).
  4. 4,300 medals awarded “For Distinction in Combat” between 11 July 2014 and February 2016, over 10,000 medals for bravery awarded.
  5. If there are five troops per every one that receives a medal, then one could guesstimate 50,000 Russian troops having served in Ukraine between July 2014 and February 2016.

Anyhow, I have not checked all the various estimates on Russian intervention in Ukraine, and compared and contrasted them, so no sense of how accurate this is. I do note that this is 1,455 killed out of 50,000 involved or almost 3%. This is pretty high. When you add in wounded then you are looking an overall casualty figure that may be as high as 10,000. Of course, the “tooth-to-tail” ratio is very skewed, as most of the support troops would be just across the border in Russia. Anyone have better estimates?

XM-25 “Punisher”: Not Dead Yet

"Bring out your dead!" Monty Python and the Holy Grail (1975)
“Bring out your dead!” Monty Python and the Holy Grail (1975)

As I mentioned recently, the U.S. Army is in the process of deciding whether or not to proceed with the XM-25 Counter Defilade Target Engagement System, a precision targeted, shoulder-fired 25mm grenade launcher. The Defense Department’s Inspector General’s office released a pointedly critical evaluation of the weapon nicknamed “the Punisher” in August. Among the negative reviews the report cited was one from the Army Capabilities and Integration Center, directed by Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster. McMaster’s office has had a change of heart about the XM-25 since that evaluation, however.

“My initial assessment from 2013 did not reflect 30 additional months of testing and improvements to the XM25 Counter Defilade Target Engagement System,” McMaster told Military.com in an email.

“The Army has worked closely with the system’s prime contractor to address the safety issues on the XM25 through engineering design changes and improvements to the system. Prototypes employed during two Forward Operational Assessments allowed the Army to learn from and correct system shortcomings, and feedback has been positive.”

The XM25 is not a simple grenade launcher, McMaster maintains. The sight has an integrated day/thermal sight, a laser range finder, and a ballistic computer working in unison to allow the shooter to effectively engage enemy targets under cover.

The weapon is semi-automatic with a five-round magazine that ensures effective fires and rapid re-engagement, as necessary, in all operational environments — jungle, urban, day/night, woodland, subterranean and desert, McMaster said.

“Worldwide urbanization, coupled with the extensive proliferation of rocket propelled grenades and machine guns, allowed our enemies to exploit our desire to end engagements with minimal collateral damage,” McMaster said.

“The XM25 provides an innovative capability that mitigates this vulnerability and minimizes operational risks facing our soldiers, limiting collateral damage in the surrounding area while allowing our dismounted squads to decisively end firefights.”

The Army has indicated that it will make a determination on the XM-25’s future by the end of September.

War by Numbers is in UK

War by Numbers is available in the UK for pre-order through Casemate: War by Numbers

I gather this is where the European customers can order the book. There is some restrictions as to who can sell where.

Interesting marketing blurb. Parts were pulled from the intro to my book and parts from the conclusions. Still no book cover picture, although I have seen a draft. Has a tank on the cover (tanks always sell).

U.S. pre-order sales are here: War by Numbers (U.S.)

Do Senior Decisionmakers Understand the Models and Analyses That Guide Their Choices?

Group of English gentlemen and soldiers of the 25th London Cyclist Regiment playing the newest form of wargame strategy simulation called “Bellum” at the regimental HQ. (Google LIFE Magazine archive.)
Group of English gentlemen and soldiers of the 25th London Cyclist Regiment playing the newest form of wargame strategy simulation called “Bellum” at the regimental HQ. (Google LIFE Magazine archive.)

Over at Tom Ricks’ Best Defense blog, Brigadier General John Scales (U.S. Army, ret.) relates a personal story about the use and misuse of combat modeling. Scales’ tale took place over 20 years ago and he refers to it as “cautionary.”

I am mindful of a time more than twenty years ago when I was very much involved in the analyses leading up to some significant force structure decisions.

A key tool in these analyses was a complex computer model that handled detailed force-on-force scenarios with tens of thousands of troops on either side. The scenarios generally had U.S. Amy forces defending against a much larger modern army. As I analyzed results from various runs that employed different force structures and weapons, I noticed some peculiar results. It seemed that certain sensors dominated the battlefield, while others were useless or nearly so. Among those “useless” sensors were the [Long Range Surveillance (LRS)] teams placed well behind enemy lines. Curious as to why that might be so, I dug deeper and deeper into the model. After a fair amount of work, the answer became clear. The LRS teams were coded, understandably, as “infantry”. According to model logic, direct fire combat arms units were assumed to open fire on an approaching enemy when within range and visibility. So, in essence, as I dug deeply into the logic it became obvious that the model’s LRS teams were compelled to conduct immediate suicidal attacks. No wonder they failed to be effective!

Conversely, the “Firefinder” radars were very effective in targeting the enemy’s artillery. Even better, they were wizards of survivability, almost never being knocked out. Somewhat skeptical by this point, I dug some more. Lo and behold, the “vulnerable area” for Firefinders was given in the input database as “0”. They could not be killed!

Armed with all this information, I confronted the senior system analysts. My LRS concerns were dismissed. This was a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command-approved model run by the Field Artillery School, so infantry stuff was important to them only in terms of loss exchange ratios and the like. The Infantry School could look out for its own. Bringing up the invulnerability of the Firefinder elicited a different response, though. No one wanted to directly address this and the analysts found fascinating objects to look at on the other side of the room. Finally, the senior guy looked at me and said, “If we let the Firefinders be killed, the model results are uninteresting.” Translation: None of their force structure, weapons mix, or munition choices had much effect on the overall model results unless the divisional Firefinders survived. We always lost in a big way. [Emphasis added]

Scales relates his story in the context of the recent decision by the U.S. Army to deactivate all nine Army and Army National Guard LRS companies. These companies, composed of 15 six-man teams led by staff sergeants, were used to collect tactical intelligence from forward locations. This mission will henceforth be conducted by technological platforms (i.e. drones). Scales makes it clear that he has no personal stake in the decision and he does not indicate what role combat modeling and analyses based on it may have played in the Army’s decision.

The plural of anecdote is not data, but anyone familiar with Defense Department combat modeling will likely have similar stories of their own to relate. All combat models are based on theories or concepts of combat. Very few of these models make clear what these are, a scientific and technological phenomenon known as “black boxing.” A number of them still use Lanchester equations to adjudicate combat attrition results despite the fact that no one has been able to demonstrate that these equations can replicate historical combat experience. The lack of empirical knowledge backing these combat theories and concepts was identified as the “base of sand” problem and was originally pointed out by Trevor Dupuy, among others, a long time ago. The Military Conflict Institute (TMCI) was created in 1979 to address this issue, but it persists to this day.

Last year, Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work called on the Defense Department to revitalize its wargaming capabilities to provide analytical support for development of the Third Offset Strategy. Despite its acknowledged pitfalls, wargaming can undoubtedly provide crucial insights into the validity of concepts behind this new strategy. Whether or not Work is also aware of the base of sand problem and its potential impact on the new wargaming endeavor is not known, but combat modeling continues to be widely used to support crucial national security decisionmaking.

Armata Tank vs M-1 Abrams and TOW: Who Wins?

vdayrehearsal05052016-24_0

Nice four page article from the National Interest: Russia’s Armata Tank vs America’s M-1 Abrams and TOW Missile: Who Wins?

A few points:

  1. The Russia’s Armata family of armored combat vehicles (Tank, IFV and SP Artillery) sort of takes the approach we were using with the Future Combat System (FCS)…(which we did some work on for Boeing, oddly enough using Kursk data).
  2. The Armata has an unmanned turret (it really does help to be able to stick your head out and look around).
  3. They then compare it to the M-1 (still on page 1)
  4. “The tank that sees the enemy first almost always wins the fight”
  5. “Further, there is the question of whether the T-14 can be produced in numbers….given the state of Russia’s economy.”
  6. They then compare it to the U.S. TOW missiles (early on page 2 and covers the rest of the article)….and the Javelin.
  7. Syrian FSA rebels have TOW missiles (but not Javelins).
  8. TOW-2A is wire guided and probably can be defeated by the Armata.
  9. “If only the notorious F-35 could boast a similar record.” (to tie this article back to a previous posting).
  10. TOW-2B can probably defeat an Armata, because of its top attack capability.
  11. I am guessing that so to can the Javelin (they actually don’t address that).
  12. Right now, only 100 Armata’s are slated for production.

 

Lost Decade

russia1

Article in the “Business Insider” on Russia’s emergency fund: One of Russia’s biggest economic problems

Summary: The Russian reserve fund runs out in 2017.

Why this gets my attention: Russia has been maintaining its federal budget by draining their reserve fund. Their presidential election is in March 2018.

A few notes from the article:

  1. In 2014 the fund was 67 billion pounds.
  2. It is now 23 billion pounds ($30.6 billion)
  3. Federal budget was based upon a $50 a barrel price of oil.
  4. Average price in January-August has been only $42.70 a barrel (it is currently around $46).
  5. The budget assumed 1% GDP real growth this year (it has been in decline).
  6. Export duties on oil was 4% of GDP in 2011
    1. Was 2% last year
    2. Now is 1.1% for January-July
  7. Kicker summary: “With real GDP growth averaging only 0.3% since 2008….the Russian economy has already experienced a lost decade. It needs to implement radical changes if it is not to repeat weak performance in years to come.”

I suspect this “lost decade” is going to be very much a part of Putin’s legacy, where instead of actually growing the economy, the Russian leadership instead comfortably rested on the high oil prices to boost their economy and federal budget and let the rest of the economy languish. People were not that far from the mark when they referred to Russia as being “Nigeria with snow.” To date we have not seen any real efforts to change and adjust the economy, including eliminating the widespread corruption and matching the budget to reflect their revenue. Instead the government has been depleting its reserve fund to cover its budget shortfalls. This cannot last forever. It does remind me of the Soviet days, when they had a huge reserve of gold that had been built up over decades. By the end of the 1980s, they had exhausted this, much to everyone’s surprise.