Mystics & Statistics

So, the question is, what are we really looking at for an invasion of Taiwan?

A few caveats: 1) I am no China expert, 2) I have never been involved in gaming or analyzing the defense of Taiwan, and 3) I have no real “insider” knowledge of the subject at hand.

The armed forces of Taiwan consist of (according to Wikipedia) 163,000 active personnel and 1,657,000 reserve personnel. Their defense budget is $13.1 billion in 2020 and that makes up 2.3% of their GDP. That last figure is very interesting, for the United States spends 3.4% of our GDP on defense (2019). So, if there is a imminent threat of invasion (like in the next six years). then why are they not spending more? Does Taiwan discount this threat or are some people outside of Taiwan overrating the possibility of it occurring? Do some people sitting in the United States understand the threat and possibility of it occurring better than the people sitting in Taiwan?

Now, Taiwan is 81 miles off the coast of China at the narrowest part. There are also a few smaller islands controlled by Taiwan in between them.  So, what we are looking at is:

1. Operations to seize some of these outlying lslands like Kinmen (Quemoy), Wucious and Matsu. Kinmen (Quemoy) is only 1.5 miles off the coast of Red China. 
2. Some fifth column or hybrid warfare arrangement to seize the main island. Unless there is some large armed fifth column currently located in Taiwan that is strong enough to seize port facilities, etc., I don’t think this is a practical possibility.
3. An amphibious invasion of Taiwan across the 80+ miles of the Taiwan Strait.

Needless to say, China is probably not interest is taking the economic hit for taking a couple of small islands and I don’t think any form of warfare less than an actual amphibious invasion will actually take the main island… so, I think the scenario we are looking at is invariably a “hot war” scenario of a conventional amphibious invasion.

So, how big would such an invasion force have to be?

Well, the Taiwanese Army is around 130,000. It is estimated that 80% is located on Taiwan, while the rest are stationed on the various smaller island. The forces consist of 4 armor brigades, 5 mechanized infantry brigades, 3 air cavalry brigades, 9 active infantry Brigades, and 24 reserve brigades (to be activated in time of war), and lots of other odds and ends and support troops. This is a modern, well-developed armed force. It does not have any combat experience, but neither does the Red Chinese Army (unless you count getting your ass handed to you by the Vietnamese Army in 1979). 

Now, the Taiwanese armor and offensive assets are significant. I gather their plan includes counterattacking any establish beachheads with their armor forces. This forces included 460 M60A3s, 450 CM-11s, 100 CM-12s, 50 M48A, and even around a hundred M41s. Some of these are with reserve forces. They also have 414 CM-32 IFVS, 300 V-150s and a spare thousand M-113s. This is a pretty significant force. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_equipment_of_the_Republic_of_China_Army

Their supporting helicopters included 29 AH-64 Apaches, and 62 AH-1 Supercobras. So, mixed in with 9 armored and mechanized brigades and 3 air cavalry brigades, there is some real offensive punch here.

So, how big of a force would Red China have to send across? Well, I think it would have to be a well-sported force of tens of thousands to initially establish a beachhead. On D-day (6 June 1944) the Americans, British and Canadians landed 156,115 men. This is the largest invasion in history. So, we are looking at something here of at least 20,000 to 40,000 on the first day, and having to be reinforced heavily over the next few days. It will have to be a force capable of defeating the fully mobilized 1.8 million man Taiwanese Army. This is a major undertaking. 

Now… invading is one thing, but invasion forces have to be sustained. They will have to build up an army of 100,000 or more across the straits. Each person needs at least 10 to 20 pounds of food, water and fuel a day. If it is a mechanized force, it will be more. So, probably a thousand or more tons of supply that have to be transported across the strait every single day. The ships carrying these are targets. This can be intercepted by air or sea forces.

So, there is the Taiwanese air force. Their main fighter force consists of 113 F-16s, 46 Mirage 2000, 103 AIDC F-CK-1 (their own multirole fighter made in Taiwan). So, 262 fighters, plus trainers (another 62 fighters) and support aircraft.

This air force I assume will be supported by the U.S. Navy and the U. S. Air Force. That is some 40 to 60 fighters per carrier committed (I am guessing at least three) and however many fighters we choose to fly over there (we have around 1,700 fighters). Of course the Chinese have a load of fighters also, around 1,300 but lot of them are J-7, which are Chinese variants of very obsolete Mig-21s. Their more modern fighters include around 700 planes, most of them being J-10s and J-11/16. They are certainly not superior to the planes used by Taiwan or the United States. So we are looking at an air battle of maybe on the Taiwanese side of 262 + 62 + 180 (carriers) + 200 (USAF) = 704 vs 700 Chinese fighters. So this will certainly be a contested air fight and the U.S//Taiwanese aircraft will probably have the advantage. I recall only one amphibious invasion that occurred during an extended contested air fight (Falklands). I can’t recall any successful amphibious invasions that occurred where the defender had air superiority. Will the Chinese be able to establish air superiority? Will Taiwan and the U.S. be able to establish air superiority?

Needless to say, the air situation is not particularly positive for mainland China and argues against them attempting such an invasion…and that is before looking at the naval assets.

Naval assets are pretty one-sided. The Taiwanese fleet consists of 26 frigates and destroyer and 4 subs. I assume it would be supported by the U.S. Navy, which is in whole different league in size and seriousness. I don’t even need to do a “net assessment” comparison here on this one, the data is below, and it is pretty lopsided.

See: The Size of Fleets in the South China Sea, Part 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

And: Size of Fleets around the South China Sea, Part 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The U.S. Navy is here: U.S. Navy Compared to Russian Navy | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

This does not address any support provided by the U.S. allies in the region, Japan, South Korea, Australia, etc. They may well provide additional air and naval assets.

Finally, if this did grow into a “hot war” scenario then the United States would certainly maintain control of the seas away from the Chinese coast. So in addition to being able to intercept almost all seaborne trade and oil going to and from China, they could easily take control of Chinese facilities and bases at the Spratley islands. Nothing China could do about that. So, any “hot war” scenario would include a loss of 60-80% of their trade, a loss of 60% of their oil, the loss of the Spratly Islands (perhaps handed back to the Philippines and Vietnam) and the other resulting long term economic impact. This is not a cheap or convenient effort. It is not the same as Russia taking Crimea.

Now, there are some relevant links I can point you too. They are below. Some of these I question. Mainland China can certainly get a significant force across the straits, but may not be able to maintain air superiority and may not be able to maintain control of the Taiwan Straights. Nothing like sending a 100,000 people across the straights and not being able to feed them. I do find the idea that mainland China will invade Taiwan in the next 6 years to be somewhat loopy.

For mainland China to seriously consider invading Taiwan, it is going to take another decade of two of serious development of their air force and particular their fighter arm. They only have about 50 modern “stealth fighters.” It will also need to have a naval force at least capable of securing the Taiwan Straights. Can’t envision they will have a naval force in the next 20 years large enough to protect the Spratley Islands from the U.S. or secure their overseas trade and oil.

 

——-Other Articles and blog posts———–

https://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2020/08/17/the_scary_war_game_over_taiwan_that_the_us_loses_again_and_again_124836.html

http://theglitteringeye.com/wargaming-a-china-u-s-war/

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2020/09/01/what-war-with-china-could-look-like/

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/can-america-successfully-repel-chinese-invasion-taiwan-166350

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2020/12/09/if-china-invades-taiwan-taipei-plans-to-throw-a-thousand-tanks-at-the-beachhead/?sh=be8a96a6f93b

https://nypost.com/2021/03/11/us-war-games-over-china-threat-warn-of-likely-defeat-report/

https://topics.amcham.com.tw/2021/04/taiwan-defense-asymmetric-indigenous-capabilities/

https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1217.html

Last month Admiral Phillip Davidson, Indo-Pacific Command, said that “I worry that they’re [China] accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States and our leadership role in the rules-based international order. They’ve long said they want to do that by 2050, I’m worried about them moving that target closer. Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before that, and I think the threat is manifest during this decade. In fact, in the next six years.”

Now, I don’t know exactly what he meant by that statement, but I now see some buzz about China invading Taiwan in the next six years. For example: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7TbBZlCTdg. Note that Gen. Jack Keene does not actually say that they will be invading Taiwan in six years.

Also see:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/10/china-could-invade-taiwan-in-next-six-years-top-us-admiral-warns

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/23/taiwan-china-threat-admiral-john-aquilino

Note that Admiral John Aquilino “…disagreed with the outgoing Indo-Pacom commander Adm Philip Davidson’s recent comments that China could attempt to attack and take over Taiwan as soon as six years from now.”

Anyhow, is this really likely? I am going to briefly discuss the subject in two posts, this post focused on the “wherefores and why” of such an operation and a later post on the doing an actual invasion. 

A few caveats: 1) I am no China expert, 2) I have never been involved is gaming or analyzing the defense of Taiwan, 3) I have no real “insider” knowledge of the subject at hand, and 4) I am not an economist. 

I do find it a little difficult to believe that the Chinese, whose economy is heavily dependent on trade, is going to do something that would seriously disrupt this trade. The economy is 20 percent dependent on “Exports of good and services.” Their five major trading partners are the U.S., EU. Japan, S. Korea and Taiwan (!!!). The 2018 figures show total trade of 4,107.1 billion. Of that the U.S. makes up 583.3 (14%), the EU makes up 573.08 (14%), Japan makes up 303.0 (7%), Hong Kong makes up 286.5 (7%), South Korea makes up 280.2 (7%), Taiwan makes 199.9 (5%), Australia makes up 136.4 (3%) and Vietnam makes up 121.9 (3%). Other trade partners account for around 40% percent of the total. Almost all of it must be transported by sea or air. Overland trading partners to China are limited primarily to Russia (84.2), North Korea and Mongolia, and places like Vietnam (121.9), Laos, Thailand, Burma, Thailand, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and nominally Afghanistan and of course, the subcontinent of Pakistan, India and Nepal via Tibet (India is 84.3). Only three of these places is listed as among their top 20 trading partners (Vietnam, India and Russia, which make up 7% of their trade, assuming they were doing it all overland).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_largest_trading_partners_of_China

Now, the question is whether or not their would be a full economic blockade. The international response was tepid when Russia seized Crimea. But seizing Taiwan is a whole lot bigger bite (24 million vice 2.4 million). Certainly they will loose the trade with Taiwan and the trade with the U.S., and maybe South Korea, Japan and EU. As taking Taiwan is almost invariably a “hot war” scenario, hard to see how things would continue as business as normal. Added to that, the U.S. Navy has absolutely superiority in the deep seas, so the U.S. could establish an effective blockade (See: U.S. Fleet versus Chinese Fleet | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org))

So as a minimum, we are probably looking at China losing 60% to 80% of its trade. This is at least 12-16% of its economy. As things in economies tend to ripple (like local consumer spending and services) then the potential economic impact on China is very significant.  

Are they really looking to destroy their trade in the next six years? It will have a big impact on their economy. Trade embargoes tend to drag on for a while. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the trade embargoes were limited, and by the mid-1990s China there was no clear long-term impact. But, the trade impact of directly invading Taiwan would probably be worse than Tianamen Square, and it would involve direct military engagement with one or more of its major trading partners.

Added to that, around 60% of their oil is imported. This is done by sea. We could also interdict that. Now, their neighbor Russia does have oil, so this can be partially compensated for over time.

So, by embargo and even more effectively, by naval interdiction (which is certainly within our capability), we could possibly temporarily shut down 80% of their trade and 60% of their oil. If that was the case, then we are probably looking at something more like a 30-40% decline in their GDP. This depressed economy that could continue for several years.

When economies stagnate or decline, governments often get overthrown. Is this something they are willing to risk for the sake of taking Taiwan?

So the big question is: Is taking Taiwan so important to the current leadership of China that they were willing to take the hit and the risk that goes with it?