Around the 22nd of August, Lt. Manfred von Richthofen with 15 Uhlans advanced into a woods near Virton, Belgium and when they got the other side of the woods, fell into a French ambush.
According to his account in his autobiography (pages 53-56), the horses of two of his Uhlans leaped the barricade blocking the path and and rode towards the French because the horses were in panic of the sound of all the gunfire.
His orderly’s horse was shot and fell down, trapping the orderly beneath it.
Richthofen and the rest of the Uhlans retreated back through the woods. The orderly returned two days later minus one of his boots, which was trapped under the horse. Richthofen claimed that there were about 100 rifles opposing them and they were firing from 50 to 100 yards. The orderly claims that “At least two squadrons of French cuirassiers had issued from the forest in order to plunder the fallen horses and brave Uhlans.”
This sentence gets my attention, as it tends to indicate that there were additional Prussian casualties besides the two men and horses who jumped the barricade and the orderly’s horse. As Richthofen’s autobiography was probably censored, it is possible that any reports of German killed might have been removed. Yet the sentence “…plunder the fallen horses and brave Uhlans” strongly indicates that there were indeed additional losses among the Uhlans and their horses that were not detailed in this book.
Has anyone examined this engagement in depth, checked the unit records, etc. and determined what actually occurred and what were the losses?
In 1917, Manfred Albrecht Baron von Richthofen (1892-1918), sometimes known as the Red Baron, wrote an autobiography. At that time he was Germany’s leading ace with 52 claimed kills. He later claimed 80 kills before he was shot down.
His autobiography was almost certainly reviewed and censored by German authorities, although to what extent is hard to say.
I was re-reading it recently (I last read it when I was a kid) and a few passages stood out to me. These all occurred while he was serving with the Uhlans first in Russia and then in France at the start of the war.
On pages 47-48 for their operations at the border village of Kieltze in Poland (part of the Russian Empire), probably around 2 August 1914, Richthofen writes:
What should I do in order not to be noticed by the villagers? My first idea was to lock up the “pope.” [Russian priest] We fetched him from his house, to his great surprise. I locked him up among the bells in the church tower, took away the ladder, and left him sitting up above. I assured him that he would be executed if the population should show any hostile inclinations. A sentinel placed on the tower observed the neighborhood.
and five days later, only Richthofen and one other man were in the village:
…for the street swarmed with Cossacks…Most of them had lanterns, and they acted very incautiously and were very noisy. I estimated that they were from twenty to thirty. One had left his horse and gone to the “pope. whom I had let off the day before. Immediately it flashed through my brain, “Of course we are betrayed!…After having rested a few hours, our visitors rode away.
It is not stated if the “pope” went away with the Cossacks or if anything was done after the Cossacks left.
On pages 52-53 while they were at Arlon, Belgium in August 1914 Richthofen writes:
At Arlon I climbed the steeple in accordance with the tactical principles which we had ben taught in peace time…When I came down again I was surrounded by a crowd of angry young men who made hostile eyes, and who talked threateningly in undertones. My bicycle had, of course, been punctured, and I had to go on foot for half an hour. This incident amused me. I should have been delighted had it come to a fight. I felt absolutely sure of myself with a pistol in my hand.
Later on I hear that the inhabitants had behave very treacherously several days previously toward our cavalry, and later on towards our ambulances. It had therefore been found necessary to place quite a number of these gentlemen against the wall.
I assume the most negative interpretation of “against the wall” is correct. According to Wikipedia on Arlon: “Arlon was one of the first victims of the German invasion in 1914 as 121 inhabitants were executed on 26 August, on the orders of Colonel Richard Karl von Tessmar.” and in the Wikipedia article on Tessmar: “On 26 August, 121 Belgian civilians were executed at Arlon railway station on his order.”
On page 57 while they on Virton on or after 22 August 1914 Richthofen writes:
So both Loen and I had quarters for ourselves and our men…The monks were extremely amiable. They gave us as much to eat and to drink as we cared to have, and we had a very good time…We settled down as if we were on manoeuvres, and as if we were in the house of a delightful host and friend. At the same time it should be observed that thee days later we hanged several of our hosts to the lanterns because they could not overcome their desire to take a hand in the war. But that evening they were really extremely amiable.
This last one is significant as there were several major war crimes conducted by the German Army in that area. Dinant with 674 executed by Saxon troops being the largest. According to Wikipedia article on Virton “On August 22, 1914, at the onset of World War I, hundreds of inhabitants were summarily executed by the invading German army…” This is worth looking at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rape_of_Belgium
So I assume I am correct in reading this account as an open admission that he knew of and participated in war crimes and then published them in a censored wartime autobiography?
I was recently reading Rickenbacker: An Autobiography by top American World War I ace Eddie Rickenbacker.
Before Rickenbacker became an ace, he was a successful race car driver, having driven at Indianapolis from 1911-1916. He won a number of races on the circuit (but not Indy) and had a reputation as “fast Eddie.” His book describes his first major win of 1914 at Sioux City Iowa on pages 58-61, except the account appears to have been garbled.
To start with it says it was 1913 (there was no race in 1913), then it recounts they were at the race with Duesenbergs (which would have been 1914), then they describe that his teammates were Tom Alley and Ralph Mulford. Tom Alley was his teammate in 1914 with the Duesenberg team while Ralph Mulford was his teammate in 1915 with the Maxwell team. It then describes the race, including his encounter with and the fatal crash of “T. C. Cox.” This crash occurred in the 1915 race and the driver killed was Charles C. Cox.
He then wins the race in a Duesenberg, which would have been in 1914. He won the race in 1915 in a Maxwell. He does have his mechanic Eddie O’Donnell knocked out by a chunk of the dirt track during the race. Eddie O’Donnell was his mechanic in 1914, and was a driver in the 1915 for the Duesenberg team and placed second. He then has Tom Alley, his teammate in 1914, coming in 3rd (Tom Alley came in 5th in 1914, but came in 3rd in 1915, still in a Duesenberg but was not longer his teammate).
It does appear that the writer garbled the two accounts of his win in 1914 and his subsequent win there in 1915. I gather this account was supposed to be the 1914 race. Perhaps Eddie Rickenbacker confused the two races he won, but as he was involved in a fatal crash in 1915, I find it hard to believe that he would.
It is a very well written 443-page book for a guy who did not complete 7th grade. I do wonder if he had to hire a ghostwriter or if his editor took a heavy hand to the early chapters. In the front of the book he does thank Booton Herndon for his editorial assistance. There is no indication that a ghost writer was used.
Col. General Wolfram Baron von Richthofen, 1942 (Bundesarchive Bild 101I-452-0985-36)
While there are 783 blog posts that I have made to the Mystics and Statistics blog, I do have seven other articles written on other sites, all in 2015 and 2016.
While I was writing this blog post a week ago, I noticed a message from nine months ago on the History New Network to this last article. It was from Dr. Andrew Arthy of Australia. Turns out he has a copy of the Wolfram von Richthofen’s notes from a discussion he had with Generaloberst Jeschonnek on 25 May 1943. So finally got confirmation that this was indeed a valid quote from David Iriving.
I do have a completed book of around 400 pages called Aces at Kursk: The Belgorod Offensive Air War. It is a book about the actual air battles, as opposed to yet another picture book. The air battles at Kursk were larger than the Battle of Britain, yet there is not a single comprehensive book addressing it.
I have contacted a number of publishers and am still waiting for a response from some of them. A couple of them made a counter offer than I do picture book. But, it is probably time to go out and look for other publishers. If someone knows a publisher that this book is a particularly good fit for please let me know. If a publisher has a strong interest in this book, please contact me directly.
Iran has admitted that an Iranian air defense system downed the Ukrainian airliner yesterday. Sadly, this is becoming an all too common occurrence. The major incidents like this include:
Ukrainian Airlines, 8 January 2020 – It was shot down by an Iranian missile (picture shown above). 176 people killed.
Malaysian Flight MH-17, 17 July 2014 – Shot down by a Russian air defense missile. Russian claims the Ukrainians shot it down, but not too many people outside of Russia believe this. 296 people killed.
Siberia Airlines Flight 1812, 4 October 2001 — A Russian airliner shot down over the Black Sea by Ukrainian air defense missile while conducting training exercise. 78 people killed.
Iran Air Flight 655, 3 July 1988 — An Iranian airliner going from Iran to Saudi Arabia was shot down by a missile from the USS Vincennes. Even though it was an accident, many in Iran still claim it was deliberate. The Iranian newspaper Tehran Times recently published a letter asking Captain Rogers, the former CO of the Vincennes, to “confess.” 290 people killed.
Korea Air Lines Flight 007, 1 September 1983 — Shot down by the Soviet Union. In this case, the plane made a navigation error and wandered into Soviet air space. The intercepting Soviet pilots had sight of the plane and were still ordered to shot it down. 269 people killed, including a U.S. congressman.
There are a lot more incidents than those. Just to list some of them (I do not know if this list is exhaustive):
20 April 2001………………..Cessna A185E…Peru…………….2…Peru Cessna A-37B
4 Oct 2001……Siberian 1812…Tu-154………Black Sea…….78…….Ukrainian S-200
22 Nov 2003…DHL OO-DLL….A300………..Iraq……………….0…….SAM
9 Jan 2007………………………….An-26……….Iraq………….34…Islamic Army missile?
23 Mar 2007…TransAVIA……..Il-76…………Somalia………….11…..Hizbul Islam 9K38?
17 July 2014…Malaysia MH-17…777……….Ukraine………..298..Russian 9M38 SA-11
8 Jan 2020…..Ukraine Flt 752….737………..Iran…………….176….Iran SA-15
Now….between 1938-1983 (45 years) there were 16 incidents resulting on the loss of 804 lives. Of these, 12 were caused by hostile aircraft (some firing air-to-air missiles), three by surface-to-air missiles and one possibly by an errant air-to-air missile. Two of the airliners shot down by missiles were clearly accidental. From 1985 to 2020 (45 years) there were 20 incidents resulting in the loss of 1,223 lives. Of these, two were caused by aircraft and 14 caused by surface-to-air missiles.
Yak-9 at war memorial, northwest of Yakovlevo, Belrorod-Oboyan road (1995)
The following is the list of chapters and estimated page count for the book I am finishing: Aces at Kursk: The Belgorod Offensive Air War
Front Matter: 12 pages
Acknowledgements: 4 pages
Prologue: 16 pages
.
Chapter One: The Strategic Air Campaign: 12 pages
Chapter Two: Both Sides Prepare: 23 pages
Chapter Three: The Strike at Dawn: 5 July 1943 (Monday): 18 pages
Chapter Four: The Fight for Air Superiority: 6-7 July 1943: 34 pages
Chapter Five: The Air War Continues: 8-9 July 1943: 18 pages
Chapter Six: A Less Intense Air War Continues: 10-18 July 1943: 34 pages
Chapter Seven: The Last Air Offensive: 15 pages
.
Appendix I: German and Soviet Terminology: 8 pages
Appendix II: Air Campaign Statistics: 77 pages
Appendix III: Commander Biographies: 9 pages
.
Photo Section 1: The Weapons of War: 28 pages
Photo Section 2: The Photo Reconnaissance 35 pages
Photo Section 3: Commanders and Pilots: 8 pages
.
Map Section 4 or 29 pages (depending on whether I include the 1:50000 1942 topo maps).
Bibliography: 12 pages
Index: 10 pages
Biography: 1
.
It comes in at around 378-403 pages, including 94 pages of new text. I am effectively done with the book and am now trying to line up a publisher for it. I usually finish my books before I go looking for a publisher.
As pointed out in my last two posts, it appears that the Soviet air force at Kursk (in the south) from 4 to 18 July 1943 claimed more eight times as many planes shot down as the Germans actually lost. This was in an air battle that was larger than the Battle of Britain. The graph above is from page 839 of my original Kursk book and is repeated on page 285 of my new Prokhorovka book. To quote (from page 840/286):
…the Soviet claims do not appear to have been related to the German casualties. Instead, if one compares Soviet losses to Soviet claims of German losses one does find a fit. The pattern is fairly clear, the Soviets always claimed more casualties than they lost. With the Soviets losing 658 planes, and claiming 928 German kills, we are looking at the Soviets claiming about 40 percent more kills than they lost. This over-claiming is fairly consistent from day to day, and as shown elsewhere [in the book], is not a problem unique to the Soviet air force [it was also the case for the Soviet Army].
A briefing based upon this data was presented to Col. Fyodor Sverdlov in October 1994, who was a staff officer for the Eleventh Guards Army at Kursk and later a professor at the Frunze Military Academy. After presenting the chart showing Soviet claims to German losses, Sverdlov stated that “the enemy always suffers 30% more losses than you.”
Colonel Sverdlov knew from his experiences in the war (and he was there from the Battle of Moscow to the end), that they regularly reported more German losses than they suffered. This was just standard procedure. I also did the same comparison in my books for Soviet claims of tanks killed compared to German losses, and found the same pattern (I may post about that at some point). Yet I regularly encounter passages in various books on the Eastern Front that quote Soviet claims of German losses without cross-checking these claims to the German records.
As discussed on my post on the Soviet 728th Fighter Regiment, the Soviet air force at Kursk (in the south) appears to claim more than eight times as many planes shot down as the Germans actually lost. The graph above is from page 839 of my original books and is repeated on page 285 of my new Prokhorovka book.
So how did the Germans do?
To quote from my books (pages 839, 840 and 844 in my Kursk book or pages 285, 286 and 290 in my Prokhorovka book):
The reverse tendency is not displayed by the Germans….This comes out to a total of 658 claimed kills by the VIII Air Corps compared to 658 actual losses by the Second and Seventeenth Air Armies. It would appear that at least for this two-week period, German reporting of air claims was reasonably accurate while the Soviet claims were outrageously high….This does bring into question the validity of all Soviet ace totals. On the other hand, the fact that German claims for 4 to 18 July were almost equal to Soviet losses during that time does provide some level of confidence in the accuracy of German claims. Still, one notes that the Luftwaffe claimed 220 planes shot down by air and 40 by antiaircraft on the 5th of July, when the Soviets reported losing 187, so one should not place too much reliance on the accuracy of these claims. Yet, based upon this limited sample, it does appear that the German ace claims are usually valid while the Soviet claims are clearly inflated, and possibly inflated by several times.
