Category Amphibious Warfare

As a result of discussions at the Third HAAC and two follow-up meetings with participants, I ended up making five posts last week on Chinese amphibious lift capacity and their ability to invade Taiwan, They are:

The Chinese amphibious lift capacity – The Dupuy Institute

The load on PLA Navy Amphibious Assault Ships – The Dupuy Institute

Other Chinese landing craft – The Dupuy Institute

The RoRo Ships – The Dupuy Institute

The Chinese fishing fleet as an amphibious asset – The Dupuy Institute

The final paragraph from the last post:

Anyhow, as we stated in our original post on this subject, “China has the ability to land over 20,000 soldiers on Tawain on the first wave.” They can supplement that capability by 1) Seizing a working port, 2) running a hundred old landing craft across 100 miles of sea, 3) enlisting China’s commercial fleet of RoRo ships, 4) enlisting their fishing fleet. We have addressed each of these issues in our posts and will probably continue to discuss some of these in the following weeks. Our original post concluded with the statement “It is clear, based upon their military capabilities, they currently have no real plans to invade Taiwan.”

We will be making further posts this week and subsequent weeks on China and Taiwan, many prepared by other members of our “HAAC community meetings” on the subject.

China has a collection of dozens of Roll-on, Roll-off (RoRo) commercial transports that have had their ramps reinforced to be able to use heavy equipment. This has led to a number of people counting them as Chinese amphibious assets. They have used some of them for training exercises with the Chinese marines.

The actual count of these is 40 or 63 or more (I have seen various figures). They are commercial ships and used regularly for commercial shipping. As such, at any given moment they are scattered across the world.

Now if China could gather dozens of these together, then they might be able to increase Chinese lift capacity by tens of thousands. There are some real problems with that.

1. They really can’t be used in the first wave. They usually require docks to unload at and cannot be used across the beach. As such, they really don’t increase the Chinese first wave capacity of around 20,000 troops.

Now, theoretically, they could load up with LCMs, LCUs and ZDP-05s and unload off shore at sea to contribute to a first wave. This is a difficult arrangement but could add 10-20K troops to the first wave. Still, it does not appear to be how they would be used.

2. They do require docks to unload at. This means China either have to take a port in the first couple of days of the operation or they would have to set up at sea docks. If Taiwan is properly defending, taking ports in the first week will be difficult. Furthermore, if they doing their job properly, once those ports are taken the dock areas should be difficult to use.

Now, China does have mobile docks, similar to the U.S. These are difficult to maintain in a hostile environment. They are difficult to maintain in the non-hostile environment. The U.S. recently deployed one in Gaza and had lots of problems. This was done in peacetime, in the Mediterranean (a more peaceful body of water than the South China Sea) and by the nominally most experience amphibious force on the planet.  So, China would be looking at setting up mobile docks on the first or second day of an invasion, which then would mostly likely become prime targets. The RoRo ships would need functional docks to unload.

3. They would have to be gathered from across the world and this would telegraph the blow by weeks if not months. These are commercial ships scattered across the world doing commercial transport. They would have to stop doing commerce, return to China and be readied for military operations. Hard to hide that. If Taiwan knows for weeks that China is coming, then they can start mobilizing. So, instead of facing over 100,000 deployed troops, they will face hundreds of thousands. Has China gained an advantage by doing this? 

In the end, people seem to believe that the RoRo ships gives China the lift capacity that it needs to invade Taiwan. It does not seem to do this. Furthermore, an amphibious operation would be greatly assisted by surprise, or at least limiting the warning to hours, vice days. Using RoRo’s does the opposite. They are not a first wave asset, and maybe not even a second or third wave asset. They are an asset after an attack as already been conducted, a port had been seized, it can be protected and is operational.  It is a supplemental capability to Chinese amphibious operations.  

Now China has a load of other smaller landing craft. These include (chart courtesy of Geoffrey Clark):

Now, the fifth column on this chart is the total count of vessels. The fourth column on this chart is the count of “active vessels” This is 99 vessels. The other vessels can be activated but they are currently in various states of disrepair or in some cases being used commercially as tugs and such. The sixth column is tonnage. The load capacity of these 99 “active” vessels is:

• 3 x 300
• 9 x 300
• 30 x 300
• 2 x 200
• 2 x 200
• 1 x 100
• 12 x 100
• 15 x 0
• 14 x 100
• 11 x 250

This is 18,850 people. 

These craft are mostly 1960s – 1980s construction. Note that Wikipedia states that all Type 079 landing ships have been decommissioned. 

But there are problems with these ships being used to directly invade Taiwan. First, they at best have a speed to 8 to 12 miles per hour. They have 80 to 100 miles of ocean to cross. If the weather is good, this is 10 to 12 hours at sea. This is a reach, especially in a hostile zone. It is also hard to achieve surprise with a hundred craft sailing for a half a day. While Taiwanese ground forces have 105,000 active ground forces and marines, they have a reserve component of 2.3 million. If China cannot achieve surprise in its initial wave, then they will be facing considerably more forces when they arrive.

Then China has a large collection of amphibious fighting vehicles, primarily the ZBD-05 infantry fighting vehicle and the ZTD-05 assault vehicle.  The 26.5-ton IFV carries 8 passengers. Their amphibious speed in 18 MPH. The PLA Ground Force had at least 750 ZBD-05s and 750 ZTD-05s. The PLA Marine Corps has at least 240 ZBD-05 and 80 ZTD-05s. Assuming they are not among the hundreds of vehicles landing in the first wave, then theoretically the 990 ZBD-05s can add another 7,920 troops to the operation. Sailing loaded LCM and LCU across the straits is a reach. This is beyond that.

Now, Taiwan controls multiple islands between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan. This includes the archipelagos of Penghu (90 islands), Kinmen (dozens), Matsu (36 islands), Wuqiu (2 islands), Pratis atoll, and two island in the Spratly chain. Most of these islands are a few miles from the Chinese mainland. These are probably of objectives of troops carried in these craft. They will probably not be used initially for an invasion of Taiwan. 

More to come.

We state is our post yesterday that “China has the ability land over 20,000 soldiers on Taiwan on the first wave.” Now three different people in our conference on 13 November independently did counts. They all ended up in the 20,000 to 25,000 range. Here is my count:

• 4 landing ship dock
  • 28 helicopters each
  • 800 troops each
• 12 amphibious transport docks
  • 8 Yuzhao class (25,000 tons)
    • 800 troops each
• 32 landing ships tanks
  • 15 Yuting III class (4,800 tons)
    • 250 troops or 10 armored vehicles
  • 10 or 11 Yuting II class (4,800 tons)
    • 250 troops or 10 armored vehicles
  • 3 Yukan class (4,170 tons)
    • 250 troops or 10 armored vehicles
  • 33 landing ship medium
    • 10 Yunshu class (2,000 tons)
      • 500 troops or 5 to 10 tanks
    • 1 Yudeng class (1,850 tons)
      • One platoon and 4 tanks
    • 11 Yubei class (700 tons)
      • 250 troops
    • 12 Yuhai class (700 tons)
      • 350 troops or 2 tanks
    • 1 Yulu class (800 tons)
      • 200 troops

Some math:

• People: 21,750
  • 4 x 800 = 3,200
  • 8 x 800 = 6,400
  • 10 x 500 = 5,000
  • 11 x 250 = 2,750
  • 12 x 350 = 4,200
  • 1 x 200 = 200
• Vehicles: 284
  • 15 x 10 = 150
  • 10 x 10 = 100
  • 3 x 10 = 30
  • 1 x 4 = 4

Now, carrying vehicles versus personnel is an either-or proposition. You could choose to carry more people and less vehicles. It is a tradeoff. I made some assumptions, as modern armies don’t like to go to war without vehicles.

Now, all these calculations are too high. You will also want to land supplies and support material in the initial wave. This is not an insignificant portion of the load. In some operations, it has made up to half the load of the initial wave. So, the figure of 20,000 is an upper limit. If they actually did it, the real figures will probably be lower. 

This also assumes that the initial landing wave is not intercepted, attrited, or otherwise seriously attacked. This is hard to do in the current intelligence environment, especially with U.S. support. It is hard to believe that a hostile incoming amphibious wave would not be hit by volleys of missiles and drones.

Further posts will address the rest of the PLA’s amphibious assets.

During the Third HAAC a discussion developed over what is the amphibious lift capacity of the armed forces of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). This is, of course, directly related to the issue of whether China can successfully invade and conquer Taiwan. We then held follow-up discussions with some the HAAC attendees on the subject.  This is going to generate some new posts to the blog detailing out what we explored. But, let me summarize the tentative conclusions of the discussion here.

First, China has the ability to land over 20,000 soldiers on Taiwan on the first wave. This is not much considering the defending Taiwanese ground forces consist of over 100,000 active troops. China maybe be able to supplement that with 10,000 airmobile troops, but this is risky in a strong anti-air environment. They may be able to add other troops by use of commercial shipping and other means, but this is pretty uncertain.

Obviously on subsequent days, they can land another 20,000 or more troops, but we are looking at a week to build up an army capable to fully engaging the Taiwanese Army. In the meantime, Taiwan can mobilize hundreds of thousands of reserves. Added to that, Chinese reinforcements and resupply are subject to interdiction. While China has a lot of aircraft and missiles, so too does Taiwan if it is properly backed up by the United States. This invasion does not appear to be an “iffy” proposition, it appears to be one that will most likely fail.

Now, if China can directly seize a port and/or an airfield, then possibilities develop, but if Taiwan properly defends these locales, this is also a long shot. 

To successfully invade Taiwan China will need to be able to land a whole lot more troops on the first and subsequent waves. Nominally it has that capability with a large number of 50-year old landing craft. These are mostly not active and some are in civilian use as tugs and ferries. Furthermore these small landing craft have to traverse 100 miles of ocean at a speed of 8-12 miles per hour in a hostile environment. This is not promising. There are other options, like using merchant ships (and running them aground?), fishing fleets, etc. None of these are particularly promising for a modern mechanized army. 

Now China does have dozens of large roll-on, roll-off ferry ships that could be used to supplement their amphibious operations, but, they usually need a dock to unload at. This implies that any amphibious operation will have to start by seizing a port, which can be defended, and if taken, can be denied immediate use. These are really not first wave assets. Nominally they can provide additional over-the-beach lift capacity for an initial wave by loading them up with small landing craft and unloading the small craft offshore at sea, but there are still two limitations here: 1) they need small landing craft or amphibious vehicles, and 2) because they are in commercial use, activating them will give Taiwan weeks, if not months of notice. Taiwan’s reserves are 2.3 million people. See: China’s Secret Weapon in the Invasion of Taiwan: RoRo Ferries

It is clear that while China has maintained a modern Marine force with amphibious capability, they had not maintained the amphibious capability to invade Taiwan. Their Marine force is structured for use elsewhere, not Taiwan. It is clear, based upon their military capabilities, that they currently have no real plans to invade Taiwan.

This, of course, can change if the United States does not continue to support Taiwan or if Taiwan loses the desire to defend itself, but right now, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is not really practical given the limited Chinese first wave lift capacity.

We will be discussing the details of this on subsequent days: 

• Tues: The load on PLA Navy Amphibious Assault Ships
• Wed: Other Chinese landing craft
• Thu: The RoRo Ships
• Fri: The Chinese fishing fleet as an amphibious asset