Category Russia

The “Eastern Front” is driven by the weather conditions. Kharkov is almost on the 50 degree latitude. The majority of the population of Canada lives below that line. The extended western part of border between the U.S. and Canada is on the 49th latitude line. Winters are kind of cold there. Bad time for campaigning (as the Russians demonstrated in February 2022).

And then at the end of winter the snow melts and everything gets very muddy. It also rains a lot during their “spring.” This is called Pasputitsa (see: Rasputitsa – Wikipedia). These muddy seasons are infamous, effectively stopping all serious military operations. In the case of the battles between Kharkov and Belgorod in 1943, the Germans continued advancing north towards Belgorod until around 21 March, when they had to halt because of the weather. They were not able to consider renewing their offensive operations until after the middle of May. So, the general rule of thumb is that you really can’t do anything in April or most of May. In the case of the Ukrainian offensive last year, they waited until the first week of June to initiate operations. They were also further to the south.

So, right now, everyone is saying that the spring/summer of 2024 is going to open with a Russian offensive. Have no idea of how big or how serious it is going to be. Their last offensive operation, the Battle of Avdiivka (10 October 2023 – 17 February 2024), was overall successful (they took Avdiivka), even if the objective had more political value than military (see: Battle of Avdiivka (2023–2024) – Wikipedia). It did take them a while. It is expected that they will continue offensive operations once the ground dries out.

So, I get weather reports on my iPhone. On Tuesday (when this is going to be posted) the weather is expected to range from 49 (9 Celsius) to a high of 72 (22 Celsius). There was precipitation on Monday but nothing until next Sunday. Precipitation over the next 24 hour is estimated to be 0.15″, which is pretty light. It is unusually dry and moderate. Now, my weather app does not report surface trafficability. There is probably some website that does but I have not found it. The question is: is the ground now dry enough to drive tanks and AFVs across, so everyone is not road bound? I doubt it.

Most likely, we will not see the rumored Russian offensive until the second half of May or later.

Well, Zelenskyy got my attention with his claim on Sunday that Ukraine has lost 31,000 killed in action since the start of the war. He also claimed that the Russians have lost 180,000. See: Zelenskyy says 31,000 Ukrainian soldiers killed since Russia invaded 2 years ago | CBC News).

Several issues here:

First, who makes up those 31,000 killed? If Zelenskyy has thrown out a figure for the first time since the summer of 2022, I am guessing it is based upon something. These figures probably do not include missing. Now we do not have a count of the missing. We do know that as of 30 June 2022 Russia claimed that there were at least 6,000 Ukrainians captured (see Battle for Kyiv, Chapter 20). In early July 2022, the Ukrainian missing person commissioner stated on TV that more than 7,000 people are missing, including soldiers, national guardsmen, border guards and intelligence officers. When on the defense and retreating, the missing can add up, sometimes exceeding the number reported as killed. This is shown by the Russian First Guards Tank Army reports for 24 February to 15 March 2022 (even though they were on the offiense), the missing outnumbered the killed (See: Tank Losses and Crew Casualties in the Russo-Ukrainian War | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and The Russian First Tank Army Report from 24 February – 15 March 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)). 

But, I am not sure that is all that is missing. Are Ukrainian National Guard included? The Ukrainian National Guard includes units such as the Azov Battalion. They are not organizationally part of the Ukrainian Army. Then there is the Territorial Defense Forces. These often ad hoc organizations are officially part of the Ukrainian Army, but not sure that their losses are being counted among the army losses. So, actually Ukrainian losses are clearly higher than 31,000.

The last time Zelenskyy gave an estimate was on 21 August of 2022. He said at the time that their losses were around 9,000. Two months earlier (11 June), there were reports that Ukraine was saying that their losses were 10,000. So they have a 1,000 less losses two months later? A presidential aide put Ukrainian losses as of 1 December 2022 at 10,000 – 13,000. So, we have 13,000 losses in the first 9 months of the war, and another 18,000 losses in the last 15 months? 

Now, in my last estimate of Ukrainian losses, I put Ukrainian losses at least at 60,000 killed. I am not sure I am ready to back away from that: See: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 699 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Part of the reason for my higher totals is that I don’t think there is a wide disparency between Ukrainian and Russian losses. Yet, Zelenskyy is saying there is an exchange rate of almost 6-to-1. How does that happen? Supposedly Russian has an artillery advantage, Ukraine has a shell shortage (which is part of the reason they are claiming for the loss of Avdiivka), and Russia is firing like three times to ten times the rounds per day as Ukraine is. Now, in a modern conventional war (modern in this case is defined as 1904 and later), the majority of casualties are taken by artillery and other high explosive weapons. If Russia has a significant artillery advantage, then how in the hell are they taking six times the losses of the Ukrainians? This simply defies logic. 

So, either the Ukrainian claims of losses is too low (which is probably the case) or the Ukrainian claims of Russian losses are simply too high (which is also probably the case). I will stick with my previous estimates (repeated liink): The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 699 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Now, the last report from the Ukrainian defense ministry was that Russian losses were over 400,000 killed (409,820 as of 25 February 2024). This number had been batted around without comment by a lot of people on twitter (now known as X – which sucks as an App name). Clearly, Zelenskyy is now repudiating his defense ministry’s own claims by providing a figure that is less than half of that. Are all those people on twitter who have accepted these previous Ukrainian claims lock, stock and barrel going to scale back to the lower figures? I am tempted to call them out by name, but I prefer to find the truth, not get into arguments with people. There has been a lot of really light-weight bullshit casualty figures put out there by people who should know better.

So let us say that Russia does have an artillery advantage and has been firing more shells (see: The West is underestimating Ukraine’s artillery needs – Defense One). That would argue for higher Ukrainian losses than Russian losses. Now, I gather the nature of their artillery shells are not the same. Russia is firing lots of “dumb” munitions. That is certainly the case with the stuff they are getting from North Korea. I gather the percent of rounds that are smart munitions is higher (much higher?) for the Ukrainians than for Russia. So, less firepower but more accuracy. Does that generate a more favorable exchange ratio for Ukraine? Could be. Does in generate a 6-to-1 exchange ratio? Probably not.

Now, for all practical purposes, Ukraine has really not been on the offensive since November 2022. The little attack that they did in early June 2023 was “offensive light” and called off before the casualties got too high. They really have not done anything since then. On the other hand, Russia has had two extended furious offensives, at Bakhmut in early 2023, where they clearly took losses (and threw people away in penal units) and now Avdiivka. Do these two offensives add up to another 150,000 killed above and beyond what Ukraine has lost? I seriously doubt it. I do not rule out that it did run up Russian losses to be higher than Ukrainian losses, which is part of the reason I potentially put Ukrainian losses at only 75% of Russian losses. This a very different than a 6-to-1 exchange ratio.

So, for now I am sticking with my estimates as outlines in the post (repeated link): The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 699 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The count of Russian losses by Mediazona is now 44,654 (as of 15 February 2024). If I double that, then we are looking at potentially 89,308 killed. This is about half of what Zelenskyy is saying. Now, the Ukrainian Book of Remembrance for the Fallen for Ukraine had 22,224 names listed of the end of August 2023, while Mediazone has 30,698 Russian names listed as of 24 August 2023 (this is 72%). If we take 75% of Russia’s casualties, then we end up with 66,981. Is this a valid Ukrainian casualty estimate? If so, that puts Ukrainian losses at over twice what Zelenskyy is saying.

Is it possible in the middle of a war that a politician running one side could claim their losses are half of what they actually suffered while doubling their enemy’s losses? Distinctly possible.

Referenced this report in this blog post: Tank Losses and Crew Casualties in the Russo-Ukrainian War | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The actual six pages of the report here, for those who can work in Russian (this is mostly a list of names and then equipment losses):

One of our more popular blog posts is this one:
U.S. Tank Losses and Crew Casualties in World War II | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Now we were able to do a similar comparison of the personnel losses to tank losses for the Russian First Guards Tank Army from 24 February to 15 March 2022. This came from a captured document released by Ukrainian intelligence. The two pages from that report included below.

What I say in my book, The Battle for Kyiv, page 129-131, is:

The Russian 1st Guards Tank Army was deployed across a wide area of the front from around Sumy to north of Kharkiv. They seemed to achieve rather limited results considering this was largest army and the premier army in Russia. The 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division was involved in the movements past Sumy and Konotop, before being stopped east of Pryluky, 75 miles (121km) east of Kyiv.15 Its losses as of 15 March were reported to be16 killed, 43 wounded, 2 missing and 54 captured for a total of 115 casualties. Its tank losses were considerably higher, with 45 T72B3Ms lost. It lost 85 other vehicles. This division ended up with a wounded-to-killed ratio of 2.69-to-1.

The 4th Guards Tank Division was involved in the attack on Okhtyrka and operations north of Kharkiv. Its losses as of 15 March were reported to be 25 killed, 92 wounded, 18 missing, 21 captured for a total of 156 casualties. The tanks losses between its 2 tank regiments were 62 T-80Us and T-80UEs. It lost 58 other vehicles. This division ended up with a wounded-to-killed ratio of 3.68-to-1. It was stopped at Okhtyrka, but this obviously was not with high personnel losses, although the tank and vehicle losses were notable.

The 47th Guards Tank Division was involved in operations north of Kharkiv. The 26th Tank Regiment losses as of 15 March were 4 killed and 13 wounded. Its tank losses were only 8 T-72B3Ms and T-72 B3M2s. The division lost 9 other vehicles. The 7th Reconnaissance Battalion lost 5 killed, 13 wounded, 2 missing and 1 captured. These are not high losses. The division ended up with a wounded-to-killed ratio of 2.88-to-1. These appear to be the only two combat units that made up 47th Guards Tank Division.

The 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, which appears to have operated around Sumy, had 7 killed, 28 wounded, 14 missing and 14 captured. The brigade lost 9 T-90s and 21 other vehicles. It had a wounded to killed ratio of 4.00-to-1.

Other army troop losses were 4 killed, 18 wounded, 8 missing and 6 captured along with 15 vehicles lost. Overall losses of the 1st Guards Tank Army, drawn from a captured Russian report released by Ukraine, were only 408 in 3 weeks of fighting. This included 61 killed, 207 wounded, 44 missing and 96 surrendered. This is a wounded-to-killed ratio of 3.39-to-1. There were also two sanitary losses from 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division due to illness. Their total equipment losses were 115 tanks and 197 other vehicles lost for a total of 312. This is 0.86 people killed or wounded for every vehicle lost. There is no strong reason to the doubt this report.

One cannot help but make a few observations about this report. First, personnel losses are lower than one would expect, considering their actions, the Ukrainian claims and their heavy armor losses. It would appear that they did not make much active use of their infantry in combat. Second, the armor losses are significant. Of the 115 tanks lost, it is not known how many were broken down, abandoned or captured. In the Oryx count of tanks lost, around one-third were abandoned or captured. Probably some of these were broken down. One does note that there is less than one person killed or wounded per vehicle lost. Third, the number of people missing and captured is high for the overall casualties. They make up 34% of their casualties. These are not the figures that one would expect to see from a force on the offense. At the Battle of Kursk in 1943, units with that high of losses of missing and captured tended to be defenders who were dislodged and partly overrun. These high missing and captured figures from 1st Guards Tank Army indicates poor morale and mishandling of the units. One wonders if the fearsome 1st Guards Tank Army was still somewhat lacking in capability. It was probably made up of a mix of contract soldiers and conscripts, with perhaps the third battalion in each regiment or brigade being conscripts. As such, most of them would not have been sent into Ukraine because of Russian policies. In the end, the 1st Guards Tank Army ended up taking no significant cities, not even Sumy, only 25 miles (40km) from the border, and never got within 100km of Kyiv.

Their opposition appeared to include the Ukrainian 58th Motorized Brigade in addition to National Guard forces and perhaps other Ukrainian regular forces.

Now. I was intending to include parts of this report in my picture section, was limited as to how many photos I could provide (photo 63):

and (photo 64):

The Battle for Kyiv has been released today in the U.S.

It is intended to be the first book in a series. Currently working on finishing up the second book of the series, The Siege of Mariupol. It is co-authored with Stefan Korshak. He is here: Stefan Korshak – Medium

The third book of the series will be The Battle for the Donbas, also co-authored with Stefan Korshak. That might be published before the end of 2024, depending.

The long-term plan is to either eventually issue out a second edition of The Battle for Kyiv at some point, and combine all these smaller books into one really large book (because I like big books: Did I Just Write the Largest History Book Ever? | History News Network).

The release date in the U.S. for The Battle for Kyiv is 18 January 2024. It was already released in the UK as of 28 November 2023.

Some people overseas have been reading it. One recent twitter post on the book has received over 563K hits and 323 retweets. See: John Helin on X. I do not know John Helin but do want to thank him for his tweet. If I am ever in Finland, I will certainly owe him a beer or two.

The book is available on the U.S. Amazon: The Battle for Kyiv: The Fight for Ukraine’s Capital: Lawrence, Christopher A: Amazon.com: Books; from Barnes and Nobles The Battle for Kyiv: The Fight for Ukraine’s Capital by Christopher A Lawrence, Hardcover | Barnes & Noble® (barnesandnoble.com); other books sellers (The Battle for Kyiv – Casemate Publishers US; and maybe Aberdeen: Home (aberdeenbookstore.com)). I gather it will be bookstores.

It looks like this: