Well, it looks like 1420 is back in action and posting on YouTube. It is a Moscow based site where the young adult (Daniil Orain) who ran it did street interviews in Moscow about current events. He later expanded the interview to other cities, towns and villages. It was interesting to hear the responses of the man-on-the-street and how their willingness to openly express opinions changed from 2022 through 2024. He finally quit doing interviews in early 2024 because he wanted to move on and then last month Russian shut down YouTube.
The Battle of Kursk (1943) was the largest battle of World War II. I have three books out on the subject (the big book, The Battle of Prokhorovka and Aces at Kursk). There are two more planned (The Battle of Tolstoye Woods and The Tank Fields of Prokhorovka). I also have one book out in the war in Ukraine (The Battle for Kyiv), one that we are about to submit another to the publisher (The Siege of Mariupol) and several more planned. I have also done a couple of hundred blog posts on the Russo-Ukrainian War. So, I guess as measured by page count, I am kind of an expert. Still, this doesn’t mean that I have any unique knowledge or understanding as to what is going on right now in Ukraine; but let me take a shot at it.
Now, this Second Battle of Kursk is nowhere near the size of the first one, but like the first one, it is also really not at Kursk. In fact, this seems to be a fairly small affair, involving elements of two Ukrainian brigades and so far no significant Russian forces. The area involved is the size of Fairfax County. Ukraine has taken around 1,000 square kilometers. This is not particularly significant, making up less than 0.002% of Russia. It is not a region of any particular economic value. The population of the main village in the occupied area, Sudzha, is last reported as 5,127. The whole Sudzha district (which is 996 sq. kilometers) is 26,964 (2010 census and is now probably less).
courtesy @War_Mapper
This operation is just a classic case of hitting them where they ain’t. There was a reason Russia was not defending this border area. Ukraine also does not directly defend large parts of its border areas. What I assume both sides do (and this is an assumption) is to hold a couple of regiments or brigades back in central locations, ready to move towards the border if need be. So far, it does not appear that Russia is doing even that. I suspect Ukraine is, and it may have been some of those forces around Sumy that were used to conduct this operation. So a large extended masking operation probably was not needed, the forces used were already nearby. But, neither side has a continued fortified border to the northwest of Kharkiv, so these little land grabs are possible by either of them. They are relatively meaningless militarily.
But, it could result in an expansion of the front. Right now, the front has been effectively 700 kilometers in length (see: The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long – rev. 1 – The Dupuy Institute). This excludes all that area to the northwest of Kharkiv, including Sumy to Chernihiv. It also excludes the Kakhovka Reservoir and the part of the Dnipro River going down from there to Kherson. So, it is possible, by expanding the front to include the entire border between Ukraine and Russia, that we could end up with a 1,200 kilometer front line. Who benefits from that?
Right now Russian has about 450,000 troops located in Ukraine (Ukrainian estimate, Putin says 617,000). I am guessing that Ukraine has 300,000 to 400,000 opposite them and engaged with them. Ukraine supposedly has more than 700,000 mobilized, but I gather many are still training and holding down inactive or rear areas (like, for example Sumy and Chernihiv). The Russian Army, according to Wikipedia (IISS estimate for 2024 is the source) consists of the “Ground Forces” of 500,000 (including 100,000 conscripts) and the airborne forces of 45,000 (2023, source TASS). Their naval infantry are 12,000. So, 557,000 ground troops. There are also air force, navy and rocket forces for a total armed forces strength of 1,320,000 (December 2023, AP). Also see: Density of Deployment in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute. Theoretically, if Ukraine has 700,000 mobilized (as the president was claiming in 2023), then Ukraine could gain an advantage by stretching out the front line. I really don’t think that is the case.
So what is the Ukrainian objectives? Are they going to set up a Kursk Peoples Republic or hold the territory? I doubt it. I assume over the next week or two, Russia will build up its force in the area, and I suspect the most likely answer is that Ukraine will declare victory and go home, withdrawing from the area as the pressure increases.
The problem is that if you hold this Fairfax County-size piece of property inside of Russia, you not only have to commit one or two or three brigades to holding the area, but you have to also secure the left and right flanks of this area with ground troops. This is at least a brigade on each flank. So now, we are talking about 3 to 5 or more brigades committed to this effort. The Ukrainian army is only around 40 to 60 or so brigades active (I have not attempted to do a count in over a year). Are they really going to commit 10% of their ground forces to hold this little area. I doubt it.
So, I suspect Ukraine will withdraw. Still, the operation does three things for them:
Propaganda value.
They have captured over 100 Russian prisoners which they can later exchange. Ukraine had thousands captured in 2022 and have never held enough Russian prisoners to exchange for all the people Russia holds. This helps.
They force the Russians to more seriously protect these border regions, which they obviously were not doing. This ties down more forces from a ground army of 557K that has 450K in Ukraine.
Anyhow, this was a clever move by Ukraine, but hardly a brilliant piece of operational art, as quite simply, no significant Russian forces were enveloped and destroyed. In the end, winning large extended conventional wars is usually done by destroying armies. This does not do that. Its impact has probably been overrated by many commentators.
Just saw some great graphics from @War_Mapper that is worth repeating (dating goes from Feb. 2022 to July 2024).
His map as of 1 August is here:
Now, he is saying that for the month of July there was a net gain of around 177 square kilometers (68 square miles). This is kind of like taking an area the size of 17% of Fairfax County or almost all of Washington DC.
A numerical count is provided here:
This from November 2023 to July 2024 totals 776.59 square kilometers (300 square miles). This is almost 75% of the area of Fairfax County. Or, to match it up to a state, it is almost 0.2% of the state of California or 12% of the state of Delaware. Not earth shaking, but nibbling. As it is, Russian currently controls 17.72% of Ukraine.
For the record, @War_Mapper provided a number of maps that were used in my book The Battle for Kyiv and provided one map for our upcoming book The Siege of Mariupol.
With the help of some volunteer labor, we have produced a more precise set of front-line traces. I have done a couple of quick and dirty estimates before, but I never took the time to measuring it up right. Now we have done something a little more exacting. The google maps with the borders that we used is here: Google Earth. Clicking on the left hand menu will allow one to see how the border was measured. This was the work of Jack Flairty.
1. Length of the front line on 1 January 2014: This is land border with Russia.
1,974 kilometers
1,227 miles
2. Length of the front line 2016-2021: The border of the LPR and DPR and Ukraine.
336 kilometers
227 miles
3. Length of the front line 24 February 2022: This includes 1) part of the border with Belarus that is used by Russia, 2) part of the border with Russia from Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy to Kharkiv, 3) the border of the LPR and DPR, 4) the border with Crimea.
1,706 kilometers
1,060 miles
4. Length of the front line 1 March 2022: This includes 1) part of the border with Belarus that is used by Russia (they did expand it), 2) the front line trace from Kyiv to Chernihiv, to Sumy, to Kharkhiv down to Izyum, 3) the front line trace down to Mariupol. 4) the front line trace through Zaporizhzhia and Kherson province.
3,011 kilometers
1,871 miles
5. Length of the front line 1 April 2022.
2,333 kilometers
1,450 miles
6. Length of the front line 1 May 2022: This no longer includes Belarus.
The Aces at Kursk book is listed on Amazon.com (U.S.) as being available as of 25 July. Do not have confirmation of that yet. It was available in the UK as of 9 July.
It may not feel that way to a lot of the participants, but the Russo-Ukrainian War is still a limited war. It is not like WWI or WWII and is not likely the opening shots in WWIII. It is a limited war over limited territorial objectives. For Ukraine, it is nominally a war for national survival, but it is not for Russia.
The economic commitment of two sides is limited. In 2023, Russia committed only 4.1% of its economy to defense spending. I gather it is now about 7% for 2024. Ukraine in 2023 was committing a stated 37% to defense. In a full scale war you would expect to see 25% or more. For the Ukrainian allies, it is a lot less. In all cases, their percent of aid to Ukraine is less than 1% (Estonia provided 1.4% of its GDP in 2022). In most cases, it is well less than 1%. Their actual total defense spending of our NATO allies varies between 1.2 and 3%, with the U.S. spending 3.47% on defense in 2022. The latest U.S. aid package of $61 billion was 0.2 percent of our economy (our GDP is almost 29 Trillion). To put it in dollars and sense terms, if your income was $60,000 a year, it would be like contributing $127 to Ukraine.
And then there is mobilization. The Russian Armed Forces are 1,320,000 or 0.9% of their population of 146 million. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are 1,250,000+ or 3.7% of their population of 33 million. These are not particularly high mobilization figures for Russia and not maximized mobilization for Ukraine. For example, Ukraine is not drafting people under 25. I remember we were sending a lot of 18-year olds to Vietnam (and my older brother did get his draft number). For the record, the U.S. Armed Forces is 1,328,000 or 0.4% of our population of 334 million.
Now the actual size of the forces deployed forward are much smaller. We are estimating 450-617K for the Russians and 300-400K for the Ukrainians.
Although it was clear that the Russian objectives in 2022 were to eliminate Zelenskyy and occupy Kyiv, they have considerably reduced their objectives (thanks to failure of their operations in 2022 and the stiff defense put up by the Ukrainians). Now their objectives are four provinces (Lugansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson) in addition to continuing to hold onto Crimea and Sevastopol. Of those four provinces, Russian currently controls almost all of one and the majority of the territory in the other three. It does not control the capital city or the majority of the population in two of those three provinces. It claims all four and have officially annexed them. Russia has stated that turning over control of these four provinces are the conditions for peace. It will be a while before we see peace there.
Finally, losses are not at WWI and WWII levels. Ukrainian combat killed is at least 30,000 and probably at least twice that. Russian killed is at least 60,000 and probably higher. Ukrainian civilian deaths are at least 10,000 and probably higher. Total military deaths in WWI were over 9 million. Total military deaths killed in WWII was over 24 million and civilian deaths maybe 49 million. Total killed in Korea was 2-3 million of which 33,686 were U.S. killed and 7,586 were U.S. missing (almost certainly all were killed). Total killed in the Vietnam War was 1 to 2 million, of which 58,281 were U.S. killed and 1,584 are still missing in action. These last two are considered limited wars.
So yes, the Russo-Ukrainian War is a limited war. It is also a war of national survival for Ukraine, for if they negotiate at a loss (i.e. surrender Lugansk or Donetsk provinces, or conduct a cease fire in place), then there is a high probability that this will not be the last Russo-Ukrainian War.
It appears that both sides have deployed between 300,000 to 617,000 troops in this war. Putin claimed 617,000 deployed in mid-December. To quote “The front line is over 2,000 kilometers long, there are 617,000 people in the conflict zone.” See: Putin Says Over 600K Russian Servicemen in Ukraine – The Moscow Times. Ukraine shortly afterwards stated it was 450,00. I tend to lean towards the lower figures. As Russian advances over the last six months have been fairly limited, I am guessing that Ukraniain deployment is at least 300,000. It is probably closer to 400,00. They have put out a few figures noticeably higher than this, but if this was the case (and they were deployed forward), then we probably would not be seeing many advances by the Russians. So most likely the deployed figures for both sides are between 300,000 to 450,000. Let’s just use the figure 450,000 for the sake of simplicity.
The effective front line of Ukraine is around 700 kilometers. See: The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long – rev. 1 – The Dupuy Institute. Ukraine obviously has to maintain troops in mobile positions from Chernihiv to Sumy, but there are probably forces still being stood up and trained, with their defense being supplemented by National Guard and Territorial Defense Forces, to be stood up as needed. There is also the area opposite of the Khakhovka Reservoir, which is only light held by both sides. Then there is the area from the Dnipro River down to Kherson. This is an inactive front, because of the logistics issues caused by the river. While this does have to be held by forces on both sides, they basically have done no major operations since November 2022. That will almost certainly be the case going forward. So, the active front is only around 700 kilometers (435 miles)
S0, 450,000 divided by 700 km equals 643 troops per kilometer. This would be 429 per kilometer if there were only 300,000 troops. Obviously, they are not equally distributed across those 700 kilometers, but they really can’t leave large parts of the line seriously undermanned.
So, how does this compare to the last war in Ukraine (1941-1944)?
During World War II, on the Western Front, the troops were often deployed to a density of 2,000 troops per kilometer of front line. On the Eastern Front in World War II, it was often over 1,000 troops per kilometer. Now we do have a division-level database of 752 cases. Of those, 267 are from the Eastern Front 1943-1945. Let’s take a look at some examples from that:
For example, before the start of the Battle of Kursk the density of the front was (@ 1800, 4 July 1943):
57th ID: 684 vs 683
255th ID: 467 vs 495
48th PzC (-): 2,458 vs 651
11th PzD+: 1,976 vs 1,038
LSSAH GzGrD: 3,763 vs 1,261
DR SS PzGrD: 5,207 vs 899
T SS PzGrD: 2,416 vs 940
6th PzD+: 2,282 vs 1,168
19th PzD+: 6,086 vs 3,104
7th PzD+: 2,766 vs 558
106th ID: 2,419 vs 511
320th ID: 2,572 vs 540
Just before the Battle of Prokhorovka we have the densities at (@1800, 11 July 1943):
57th ID: 395 vs 483
255th ID: 482 vs 399
332nd ID+: 504 vs 463
48th PZC (-): 1,694 vs 1,353
11th PzD+: 1,669 vs 3,373
167th ID: 725 vs 917
T SS PzGrD: 1,371 vs 782
LSSAH PzGrD: 2,904 vs 1,692
DR SS PrGrD: 1,851 vs 1,291
168th ID: 1,430 vs 282
19th PzD: 1,084 vs 195
6th PzD: 2,077 vs 1,348
7th PzD: 3,701 vs 1,743
198th ID: 1,779 vs 669
106th ID: 1,690 vs 1,658
320th ID: 1,302 vs 1,032
Now, we do have engagements from the fighting around Kharkov in February, March and August of 1943. Some sample cases (again keying of the German unit:
15 February 1943:
GD ID: 888 vs 1,143
DR SS: 800 vs 1,794
12 March 1943:
LSSAH D: 753 vs 473
DR SS D: 2,205 vs 450
T SS D: 306 vs 2
11th PzD: 914 vs 498
22 August 1943:
106th ID: 1,341 vs 875
320th ID: 1,007 vs 1,210
Now World War I was a lot more dense, especially on the western front. For example:
Br 8th Division, 1 July 1916: 8,071 vs 2000 (Battle of the Somme)
Dr. Fourth Army (-), 14 July 1916: 10,000 vs 3,333 (Somme)
U.S. 4th Bde (+), 6 June 1918: 2,145 vs 1,463 (Belleau Wood)
U.S. 3rd Bde, 1 July 1918: 7,118 vs 5,754
U.S. 2nd Bde (+), 12 September 1918: 11,007 vs 1,742.
U.S. 2nd Div (+), 3 October 1918: 4,063 vs 2,031
U.S. 36th Div, 8 October 1918: 4,500 vs 2,500
During the Arab-Israeli Wars we see a lower deployment density, for example, in the 16 engagements in our division-level database from the 1967 war, the densities (for offense) range from 813 to 3,567 men per kilometer (with four exceptions, Mitla Pass, Zaoura-Kala, Jerin and Kabtiya). In the 1973 war we have 32 division-level engagements. The densities (for offense) range from 444 to 4,900. There are no outliers.
In the 1991 Gulf War, we also see a lower deployment density. In the 15 engagements in our division-level database we have the densities ranging from 89 to 1,200 men per kilometer.
Keep in mind this is a single dimension measurement of a two-dimensional construct. The units also deploy in depth. So, there is not one man standing there every two meters, any more than with a WWII density of 2,000 there are people standing shoulder-to-shoulder across the front line. The minority of troops deployed are shooters.
The main point is that the density is around a fourth of the typical density on the Western Front in WWII. And again, that is in one dimension.
I will leave this blog post without a conclusion, as I am not sure what it should be. For now, this is just an observation.
Lot’s of people throw out the figure that the front line is 1,200 kilometers long. Not really. The length of the border of Ukraine (pre-2014) with Russia is 1,974 kilometers (1,227 miles). This is the land border. The length of the border with Belarus (which I do not think is going to re-enter this contest) is 891 kilometers (554 miles). The entire coastline of Ukraine is 3,783 kilometers (2,351 miles). I think this last figure includes Crimea.
(courtesy of @War_Mapper)
But, they really are not fighting from Chernihiv to Sumy and have not done so since April 2022. This is a large portion of that 1,200 kilometer figure. They do share a border with Russia so Ukraine obviously has to protect these areas, but there really has not been any fighting in these areas for over two years. We do not expect that will change.
Second, they really cannot do major operations along the Dnipro River from Kherson up to the Kakhovka Reservoir. There was, in the best of times only three bridges across this river, and I gather that number is three less now. This creates supply issues and with all the drones, missiles and air support, hard to see how this is corrected. No one has yet to do any major military operations across the Kakhovka Reservoir. This takes a significant chunk of miles off any active front.
Therefore, for all practical purposes the active front runs from the western border of Kharkiv province over to Kupyansk, down through the Donbas and then through Zaporizhzhia Oblast to the Kakhovka Reservoir. This is about 700 kilometers, vice 1,200.
Here are the measurements we currently have for the front line trace (someone, please check us):
Distance along Kharkiv Oblast border (To Kupyansk): 252.6 kilometers From Kupyansk to Bakhmut: 153.09 kilometers From Bakhmut to Vuhledar: 133.64 kilometers
From Vuhledar to Reservoir: 160.97 kilometers
Total = 700.03 kilometers
One kilometer is 0.62 miles. Therefore an active front of roughly 700 kilometers or around 435 miles.
