Category Russia

There may not be a major Russian spring/summer offensive

There may not be an actual major spring/summer Russian offensive. Let’s look at the scenario for a moment:

1. They are aware that their deployed strength is similar to the Ukraniain strength. They have at best a 1.5-to-1 advantage and may have less. See: Overview of the War in Ukraine going into the Spring/Summer Offensive Season – The Dupuy Institute

2. They are aware that they are not outspending their opponent. See: Dueling Defense Budgets – The Dupuy Institute

3. While they have not achieved the objectives initially set for this campaign, they still hold territory. They may have decided that holding that territory is the best they can do and they are satisfied with that.

4. They may be warring to improve their position at the negotiating table.

Let us take a look for a moment at that. They have conducted a few limited offensive efforts in recent times. The most significant was the attacking and taking of Avdiivka (10 October 2023 – 17 February 2024). This was the town closest to the city of Donetsk, capital of DPR. In fact, it was only 9 miles (14 kilometers) away from it. They have taken that, and then expanded their control beyond this. This is all part of Donetsk province, which Russia has annexed as of 30 September 2022.

Now, they are doing a limited advance in Kharkiv province to set up buffer zones according to them. They have advanced up to 6 miles (10 kilometers) into Kharkiv province taking some rural areas and small towns and taking parts of Vovchansk (pop. 17,459 2022 est,). Maybe we should take them at their word that this is not a major offensive, but instead are just them creating buffer zones.

(courtesy of @War_Mapper)

They have made marginal advances in a few other areas, including around Kupyansk, towns around Bakhmut (Bilohorivka and Chasiv Yar), the areas to the west and northwest of Donetsk and some very limited advances in  Zaporizhhia province.

Right now they hold the majority of Donetsk and Lugansk provinces. There are still two major cities from Donetsk province not in their hands (Slovyansk and Kramatorsk). They tried to take them during the summer of 2022, but could not. They hold all of Crimea and Sevastopol. They hold a minority of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia provinces and in neither case hold the main city/capital, although they have annexed both provinces. In the case of the part of Kherson province that they hold, it is naturally well defended by the Dnipro River and the Kakhovka Reservoir. Holding these two areas gives them overland access to Crimea and secures their water supply there (this was an issue before). They also have control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station since March 2022.



Their air and missile campaign is focused (once again) on shutting down the Ukranian power grid. They are having some success. This may all be an attempt to force Ukraine to the negotiating table.

Perhaps their focus is on 1) taking as much territory that they can easily grab, 2) setting up a buffer zone north and east of Kharkiv, 3) increasing the pain on the Ukrainians, 4) and holding what they have until they can force Ukraine to the negotiating table. This might be victory for now for them,

Are we looking at no major Russian offensive this spring and summer?

 

Overview of the War in Ukraine going into the Spring/Summer Offensive Season

I am being told by “advisors” to start blogging again about the war in Ukraine. “That is what everyone really cares about, not the little things that you have been posting about.”

Anyhow, my last direct blog post on the war was day 699: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 699 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). A more detailed post was done for day 589: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 589 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Since then, I have not blogged extensively about the war. In part, because the changes and shifts over time were incremental and in part because I was busy getting a book done on The Siege of Mariupol. It is now day 811 of this war (or 2.2 years or over 70 million seconds). 

So, let’s look at the war at the moment:

Ukrainian Forces Deployed: At least 300,000 are deployed along the front line. Last year Zelenskyy was saying that they have over 700,000 troops mobilized. There is a difference between people mobilized and people deployed. There is a difference between regular army and reserves and militia. What is actually deployed is a wild-eyed guess. We actually don’t know, and the people that do know are not saying.

Russian Forces Deployed: Probably about 400,000 or more. Putin said 617K and was immediately contradicted by Ukraine intelligence, which said 450K. I tend to believe the latter figure, except I suspect the tendency of the intel people is to overestimate. So, “more than 400,000” become the SWAG figure I used. 

So, Russia may have a 1.5-to-1 force ratio advantage (say 450K to 300K) or it may be roughly closer to 1-to-1 (say 400K to 400K). Not sure. Either way, this does not seem decisive: Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – fourth and final continuation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). In particular look at Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – continued | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Now what are Russia’s advantages:

  1. Artillery ammunition
  2. Air support *
  • Note that Russia still has 2,000+ aircraft and has maintained around 500 or so in the theater. This is more than enough to counteract the handful of F-16s that the Ukrainians have received. 

What are Ukraine’s advantages:

  1. Artillery (once ammunition issue is resolved)
  2. Air Support with Drones?
  3. Observation/Intelligence ?
  4. Morale
  5. Training
  6. Doctrine ?

Each of these is a long discussion. I may get to them later. These points are covered in three slides of my updated briefing I am doing on Force Ratios at HADSS in UK in July Schedule for HADSS 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and at HAAC in October: Next Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

But Russia has been advancing. They have over the last few months taken Avdiivka (Battle of Avdiivka is dated 10 October 2023 to 17 February 2024). They have pushed out a little beyond that. This is not militarily significant terrain, but it is of political value, as Avdiivka is near the non-operational Donetsk International Airport, and has been in Ukrainian hands since 2014. So, it has some importance if the Russian political objective is to seize the rest of Donetsk province before the start of peace negotiations.

Now, the Russians have been advancing along the border next to Kharkiv. Kharkiv is a significant objective, being the second largest city in Ukraine and the largest Russian-speaking city in Ukraine. So, far, they have been advancing just along the border, it is not certain that these areas were even defended. This is either preparatory advances in anticipation of a major offensive, is an intended distraction, or is just taking some local territory because they can. So far, we have not seen what I would call a major offensive. Probably conditions are not quite right to start such: When does the campaign season start? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Still, regardless of army size, it does appear that both sides are spending roughly equally on this war: Dueling Defense Budgets | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

All evidence points to this war being stalemated, but for the last few months, Russia has been slowly advancing.

  1. Is this because Russian gained an advantage due to a proper build up of its armed forces over 2023/24, unlike what it did in 2022/23? This has probably helped.
  2. Is this because Ukraine failed to properly mobilize over 2023/24, taking its eye off the ball, to use a sports analogy? Maybe. This is what some people claim: Russia is exploiting Ukraine’s lack of manpower to thin out the front line and seek a breakthrough, military expert says (msn.com).
  3. Is this because Russian had an abundance of artillery shells (thanks to North Korea) and were outshooting the Ukrainians 5-to-1 or 10-to-1 according to Ukrainians sources (which I was never able to verify). Maybe. Theoretically, over time, this Russian advantage will disappear and may turn into a Ukrainian advantage. U.S. shell production was 25,000 a month and is now being ramped up to 125K a month. Europe has similarly ramped up its shell production. Once this is up to speed, then this may turn from a Russian advantage to a Ukrainian one.
  4. Is this because the U.S. congress held up the $61 Billion dollar aid package for six months? It may have had an impact. This is, of course, what many of the people opposed to the delay were saying. Have no idea how true that is. It is the nature of the political discourse that the effects of not doing something get overstated. For example, the delay in getting F-16s and 300km range ATACMs. So, don’t know how vulnerable the U.S. delays in the aid package made Ukraine, especially as there were no such delays in the European aid or Ukraine’s own defense expenditures. Still, the delay was hard to justify.

So, Russia may hold a slight advantage for now. I suspect that advantage does not result in any major breakthroughs. Over time, I suspect that the Russian advantages will disappear, and things will stabilize. After that, it will be up to Ukraine to see if they can develop any advantages that allow them to move forward. Needless to say, if Ukraine can start to steadily advance, this war will go in their favor. On the other hand, if Russia can get one significant breakthrough operations this spring/summer, it could be a very different story. We will have to see as it is hard to predict.

Territory Fought Over:

It appears that the fighting will be stretched from Sumy or Kharkiv down to Zaporizhzhia. This is a long line. It does not appear that it will include Kyiv (except for missile attacks). It does not appear that it will include Odessa, which is now well behind Ukrainian defensive positions. It does appear that Ukraine has won the Battle for the western Black Sea. Not only has it deprived Russia access to that area after sinking Russia’s largest ship on the Black Sea, and damaging several others, but it is now regularly moving tankers and cargo transports from the Bosporus Strait to Odessa and back. Russia is not intercepting these. Added to that Russia has replaced the admiral in charge. This does happen when you lose the largest warship on the Black Sea (the cruiser Moskva) in addition to losing control of the western half of the Black Sea. 

It also does not appear that Kherson and Kherson province is a major theater. The Dnieper or Dnipro River divides that province, with Kherson and the Ukrainian Army on the north bank and the Russian army on the south bank. And then there is large Kakhovka Reservoir to the east of that the cuts off a significant section of front (see map). It does appear the effective front starts to the east of the reservoir (near Zaporizhzhia).

The 1420 YouTube site decided to quit doing street interviews

Turns out the lead of the 1420 site decided to quit doing street interviews because after four years of doing this, he wanted to move on to other things. His new site is here: (1) Daniil Orain – YouTube

His explanatory video is here: Why I stopped doing the street interviews (youtube.com)

The interviews are archived here: (1) Archives of 1420 by Daniil Orain – YouTube

The previous article on 1420 is here: It looks like 1420 may have quit broadcasting | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

French Estimate of Russian Killed in Ukraine

Seems like everyone in and out of NATO has their own estimate of Russian losses. The current French estimate, according to their foreign minister, is 150,000 Russian soldiers killed and a total of 500,000 casualties. See: France’s Shocking Estimation: 150,000 Russian Soldiers Dead in Ukraine War (msn.com)

First reality check: Wounded-to-killed ratios. 500,000 – 150,000 = 350,000 wounded. Wounded-to-killed ratio of 2.33-to-1. The Soviet Army mostly on the attack in the southern salient of the Battle of Kursk from 12-18 July 1943 had a wounded-to-killed ratio of 2.68-to-1 (see Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka, page 1374, this is also in Chapter 15 of War by Numbers).

Are they saying the Russian medical care is worse now than in 1943, before they had penicillin, or in many cases no painkillers other than Vodka? They also had in 1943 a shortage of trained doctors, the rear hospitals were not brought forward that spring to be near the front, and they had a poor medical evacuation system.

Anyhow, another estimate to ignore. What data are these estimates actually based upon?

It looks like 1420 may have quit broadcasting

One of my favorite channels on YouTube to watch has been a site called “1420.” I did mention it yesterday during the question and answer period of my podcast on The Battle for Kyiv

It is a series of street interviews done in Moscow, St. Petersburg and at other locales across Russia asking people some irreverent questions and sometimes very pointed political questions. It is useful to get a feel of the opinions and range of opinions among the Russians. Hard to do so otherwise with limited independent polling and rather stacked elections.

They appear to have quit adding new interviews. Don’t know why. Their newest street interview is now one month old and they are now listed under “Archives of 1420”. See: Archives of 1420 by Daniil Orain – YouTube

My past references to this site on my blog are here:

  1. 1420 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
  2. 1420 – second posting | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
  3. 1420 – third posting | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
  4. 1420 – fourth posting | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
  5. 1420 – fifth posting | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
  6. CBC on 1420 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
  7. 1420 – sixth posting | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
  8. Presidential Elections – 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – fourth and final continuation

This is the fourth and final continuation of our previous four posts: Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – continued | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – second continuation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – third continuation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).  It is a part of a briefing on forces ratios I will be giving at HADSS in UK: Schedule for HADSS 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and at HAAC near DC: Next Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

All of this analysis of the CaDB was for a reason, it was to determine if odds (force ratios) play out difference at higher level of operations (meaning army level). Are they different at the operational level vice the tactical level of warfare. The answer appears to be no. I do not know of anyone who has actually specifically explored this issue before, so I am not sure there is an existing or countervailing opinions out there.

Of course, my real interesting in looking at this (which I did last year) was because of the war in Ukraine and the upcoming Ukranian spring/summer offensive in 2023. I did brief this at the Second HAAC (October 2023) and in Norway (November 2023). The question I had was does a minor advantage in force ratios or combat power ratios lead to a bigger advantage at the operational level of combat. The answer appears to be no, as this was reinforced by limited movement of the front line in Russo-Ukrainian War since the fall of 2022. 

My final slide in the briefing was “Does this relate to the fighting in Ukraine?” I then asked two questions:

  1. What are the odds?
    1. What is the strength of the deployed Ukrainian Army?
    2. What is the strength of the Russian Army deployed in Ukraine?
  2. What other advantages does the Ukrainian attacker have?
    1. Artillery
    2. Air Support? (Drones?)
    3. Observations/Intelligence
    4. Morale
    5. Training

Now, as it appears that Russia will be on the offensive this spring/summer, then I may need to restructure this slide and also add another point “artillery ammunition supply.”

 

I am probably going to do some more blog posts on this subject, looking at other levels of combat.

 

Podcast on The Battle for Kyiv

I will be doing a Podcast on 2 PM (EST), 7 PM (UK time), on The Battle for Kyiv: The Battle for Kyiv by Christopher A Lawrence Tickets, Tue 7 May 2024 at 19:00 | Eventbrite

It is free to attend.

I will be speaking for about 40 minutes and then there will be 20 minutes of questions. I suspect I will talk extemporaneous about the process and need to write to write a book while the conflict is going on and what are some of the sources available.

Dueling Defense Budgets

The cold hard reality is that in the long run $$$ = combat power. This is a obvious little relationship that is often ignored. This was demonstrated in spades when Japan attacked a country in 1941 that had an economy more than ten times their size. Good luck with that one. It was also ignored by the leader of Germany, who somehow or the other believed that superior willpower go overcome the overwhelming coalition arrayed against them. He could not. In the long run, warfare is decided by the golden rule: he who has the gold – rules. So, let us take a moment and look at the defense budget of Russia vs Ukraine. 

Russia defense budget in 2023, according to Wikipedia, was $86.4B. Source was the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from back in the days when Sweden was neutral. Now maybe this should be adjusted by PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) to account for lower labor costs, lower food costs, etc.  The PPP multiplier for the GDP is 2.66. Meaning that their real value of the budget is somewhere between 86.4 to 229.8. Hard to say how much of military expenditures should be under PPP, especially when one is talking about all the high-tech equipment that makes up a modern army. The 2024 budget is higher, that is discussed below. Their 2023 budget only make of 4.1% of the GDP, so there is room to grow. Russia is receiving no significant outside aid to support this war (they have to pay for the material from Iran, China and North Korea). 

Ukraine on the other hand is receiving lots of outside aid. At least $110B a year. This includes over $50 billion from the EU & UK, and at least $61B from the U.S. Much of this is spent in their home countries for equipment, so is not directly comparable to the PPP adjusted Russian figures. On the other hand, in 2024 Ukraine is spending $66.2 billion of its own money on the war (source: Ministry of Finance of Ukraine). This is 18% of their GDP. Sort of gives you some idea of what Russia might be capable of if the political will was there (so I guess willpower does matter). One of course, has to ask, why is the political will not there? What is the dynamics where Ukraine has spent 18% of their national income on the war while Russia, which initiated this war, is only spending 4%. What is the Kremlin afraid of? Their own people?

Anyhow, $66B that Ukraine is spending also needs to be adjusted by PPP. Their multiplier is 2.73. So that $66B turns into $180.2. So 180 vs 230. 1-to-1.28 ratio of expenditures. But to that Ukraine adds a least $111B in Western money. So, 181 + 111 vs 230 or a 1.27-to-1. This is of course assuming that PPP is a fully valid measurement and none of the western aid is influenced by PPP. Neither of these are quite the case. If it was a simple nominal expense comparison it would be 66 + 111 vs 86 or a ratio of 2.06-to-1.

From a practical point of view, it appears that Ukraine with western aid is outspending Russian by at least 50%. Of course, I am comparing here Ukrainian 2024 figures to Russian 2023 figures. In the long run, that means that Ukraine will win. More than likely, it will force Russia to increase it defenses expenditures by at least 50%, up to 6% or more of GDP. This is sustainable. 

Now, the linked article below shows that Russia’s 2024 defense expenditure is 40% (or 39% in another article) of their national budget, which 391.2 x .4 = 156.48. They say it is a 70% increase from 2023 (86.4 x 1.7 = 146.88). Anyhow, they are having to increase their budget significantly. See: Putin approves big military spending hikes for Russia’s budget | Reuters

So, 146.88 x 2.66 (PPP multiplier) = 391. So 181 + 111 vs 391 is a 1-to1.34 ratio based upon PPP for both Russia and Ukraine. Or… 66 + 111 vs 147 is a 1.20-to-1 ratio in favor of Ukraine based upon nominal costs. So it does appear that for 2024 the two sides expenditures appear to be roughly equal. This would imply that a rough stalemate is going to be the outcome in 2024.

Now, this is a rough back-of-the-envelope calculation banged out this morning. Something more rigorous could be developed by someone. I am not sure it would tell a different story.

The House passed the aid bill for Ukraine

The House passed the aid bill for Ukraine. This was the hold up. It will now go to the Senate, which will approve and then to the President who will sign it. I assume it will be a done deal next week.

The final vote was 311-112 (7 not voting and five unfilled seats). So ,72% voted for it. Of those 210 were Democrats and 112 were Republicans. The House current sits 217 Republicans and 213 Democrats. So, this ends up being a bi-partisan foreign aid bill.

So, 99% of the House Democrats and 52% of the House Republicans voted for it. Note that the foreign aid bill advanced yesterday with 165 Democratic votes and 151 Republican votes. That is 70% of the House Republicans advancing the bill. 

The total bill was for $95.3 Billion, or which $61 billion was for Ukraine. Around $16 B was aid to Israel and over $9 B was humanitarian assistance for Gaza. Another $8 B was for the Indo-Pacific region.

Related post: Size of aid bill versus Russian defense budget | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

 

The 3-to-1 rule and the War in Ukraine

There is a 3-to-1 rule that some people quote from somewhere. We have discussed this before: Trevor Dupuy and the 3-1 Rule | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and The 3-to-1 Rule in Histories | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and The 3-to-1 Rule in Recent History Books | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Trevor Dupuy’s argument was always that it took a combat power advantage to advance (attack successfully). This combat power calculations considers weapons, terrain, posture, air support, human factors, etc. Because of the current artillery shell shortages for the Ukrainian Army, logistics may also be a factor.

This combat power advantage often happens at 1.5-to-1 or 2-to-1. Usually is happens by around 2-to-1 (my conclusions – see War by Numbers). For example, here is my chart of force ratios for division-level combat in the European Theater of Operation (ETO) in 1944 from page 10 of War by Numbers:

FORCE RATIO…………………..RESULT……………..PERCENTAGE OF FAILURE………NUMBER OF CASES

0.55 TO 1.01-TO-1.00…………ATTACK FAILS………………………….100……………………………………5

1.15 TO 1.88-TO-1.00…………ATTACK USUALLY SUCCEEDS………21…………………………………..48

1.95 TO 2.56-TO-1.00…………ATTACK USUALLY SUCCEEDS………10…………………………………..21

2.71 TO 1.00 AND HIGHER….ATTACK ADVANCES……………………..0…………………………………..42

 

Notice that the attacker succeeds at force ratios between 1.15-to-1 to 1.88-to-1 in 79% of the 48 cases of division-level combat. It gets better from there. The book also has force ratios from other theaters and campaigns. Some of this has been discussed here before: More Combat Results Tables from War by Numbers | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Force Ratios at Kharkov and Kursk, 1943 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Force Ratios in the Arab-Israeli Wars (1956-1973) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

A rigidly defined 3-to-1 rule tends to create an officer corps of McLellan’s. This rule-of-thumb is doing more damage than good as constructed.

What got my attention is that some people are trying to apply some 3-to-1 rule in Ukraine, and then come to the conclusion that one or the other side cannot advance because they don’t have a 3-to-1 force ratio. Yet, people have been advancing. In fall of 2022 Ukraine re-took Kherson and surrounding areas (see: 2022 Kherson counteroffensive – Wikipedia) and achieved a breakthrough at Balakliya that took back a significant portion of Donetsk province (see: Battle of Balakliia – Wikipedia) and conducted a successful offensive around Kharkiv (see: 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive – Wikipedia). In 2023 Russia did advance on Bakhmut and took it (see: Battle of Bakhmut – Wikipedia) and in 2023/2024 Russia did advance on Avdiivka and took it (see: Battle of Avdiivka (2023–2024) – Wikipedia). I think in three for those five cases the attacker did not have anything approaching a 3-to-1 advantage. Of course, I have no reliable manpower statistics for either side in any of these five battles, so this is sort of a guess, as is most of the analysis and expert opinions on this war. 

I do not know how many troops Ukraine currently has. I am guessing at least 300,000 deployed. Some people throw out figures in the 600-700,000 range. I have no idea if that are total mobilized estimates or total deployed estimates. The same with Russia, where figures of 600-700,000 are also thrown out, but not sure that is what is actually deployed in Ukraine. I am guessing some number closer to 300,000. Don’t really know, and don’t know who does for certain (see the “Force Involved’ section of this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 699 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)).

Anyhow, I gather the two sides are somewhere near parity in force size. They can certainly concentrate forces to get a local advantage. With current modern intelligence gathering capabilities, concentrating forces is often seen while it is happening and opposing side can respond promptly. So not sure where anyone can get their 3-to-1 advantage.

I did do a test recently, comparing the force ratios in a database over 700 division-level combat engagements to the force-ratios in over 100 Army-level operations. The question was whether force ratios and the success from those force ratios was different at division-level vice army-level. My tentative conclusions were that force ratios for army level campaigns had the “Same patterns as for division-level combat.”

Now, I have not written this effort up. I did brief it last year at the Second HAAC and did brief it in Norway. I will be briefing it again on Thursday, July 11 at HADSS in York (see:  Historical Analysis for Defence and Security Symposiums (HADSS), 8 – 11 July in York, England | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)) and for one last time at the Third HAAC (see: Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8-10 October 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)). After that, I may write it up, either as a blog post or as a chapter in a book called More War By Numbers, which will probably be delayed until 2026 (see: Current book release schedule | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org), which I probably need to update).

Anyhow, the point is, anyone doing analysis for the situation in Ukraine based upon some 3-to-1 rule probably needs to reconsider their analysis.