Category Russia

Day 846 – So how goes the war?

First, no major Russian offensive has appeared. At this point, half way through June, I do not think we are going to see a summer offensive. It is a stagnated war, with the armies nibbling at various parts of the line, but nothing really major happening. Russia is still on the offensive, but their advances to the north of Kharkiv never got past Vovchansk. That front has been static for a week. Russia continues taking some little bits of not-very-significant terrain in the Donbas.

According to @War_Mapper, Russia occupies 17.57% of Ukraine, including Crimea. For the month of May they gained 201 square kilometers of territory. On 1 June the Russian Defense Minister stated that since the start of 2024, they have taken 880 square kilometers. ISW has assessed that it is actually only 752 square kilometers. Fairfax County (where I live) is 1,050 square kilometers. So it is like if they took 71-84% of the Fairfax County in five months, adding in 19% of Fairfax County in the last month. This is not the story of a great military campaign. To put it in national terms, it is as if they took up to 14% of the state of Delaware in the first five months of this year.

It is clear that Russia has hunkered down and is waiting for time, attrition, and U.S. national elections to change the situation politically, and then they can negotiate at an advantage. Putin already thrown out his negotiating terms, which includes that Ukraine cedes four provinces and Crimea and Sevastopol. He holds almost 100% of Lugansk province, and around 60-75% of the other three. In two of these provinces, Ukraine holds the capital cities and majority of the population. So, obviously this is a non-starter for negotiations, but this is kind of how the Soviet Union/Russia has traditionally negotiated. At this point, this war is about land.

There certainly won’t be any negotiated settlement until after November. One of the two main candidates in the U.S. presidential election clearly does not support Ukraine. So this has to play out. After that, there still may not be any serious negotiations. Russia has what it wants for now. They are not likely to compromise. Ukraine does not want to surrender their territory, so they are not likely to compromise. So the war will continue, probably through 2025 and perhaps longer.

Anyhow, my previous relevant post on this subject: There may not be a major Russian spring/summer offensive – The Dupuy Institute

The RMA podcast is out

The RMA podcast by Amos Fox is out. I am the interviewee. I have not listened to it and am afraid to do so. Never completely happy with my interviews (or my books, or my reports, or my blog posts).

Anyhow, it is here:

https://shows.acast.com/650105b75a8d440011ecd53c/666f739ffb889700139c5124

The end of the flat tax in Russia

Russia is one of those few places on the planet that implemented a flat-tax system, a darling idea of the American neo-conservative movement in the 1980s that never really did pass the smell test (forgive me for getting a little political). But, by one of the accidents of nature, several U.S. conservative economic advisors got the ear of the people managing and mismanaging the Russian economy in the 1990s and convinced them to establish a flat tax there. This was before Putin was in charge.

As the Russian economy grew through the booming oil and gas industries, Russian tax revenues from those sources boomed, to the point where over half of the government income came from the revenues from the oil and gas industry. Therefore, they were able to maintain their 13% flax tax system throughout Putin’s regime. This was odd, but it has been the case there for around three decades. It was one of the 26 countries/entities (including Transnistria and South Ossetia) on the planet able to live with a flat tax (which includes Ukraine (19.5%) and four NATO countries: Bulgaria (10%), Romania (10%), Hungary (15%) and Estonia (20%)).

This is no longer the case. In 2021 they imposed a slightly higher tax rate of 15% on those making more than 5 million rubles a year. (1 dollar = 89 rubles, $56K a year). They kept the flat tax rate at 13% for the rest. This was before there was a war in Ukraine.

The war in Ukraine did mess up the Russian government budget, as they were collecting less money from the oil industry because of sanctions and sometimes lower oil prices, while their own expenditures grew. This has finally caused the system to crack, resulting in them raising taxes. See: Russia Is Preparing New Tax Hikes. Here’s Why. – The Moscow Times

This well done article provides for the following tax rates:

less the 2.4 million a year – taxes at 13%
2.4 million to 5 million rubles — taxed at 15%
5 million to 20 million rubles — taxed at 18%
20 million to 50 million rubles — taxed at 20%
50 million rubles or higher — taxed at 22%

The average annual income in Russia is around 900,000 rubles a year ($9,960). 50 million rubles is an annual income of around 562,000 dollars. This is still considerably lower than U.S. tax rates.

Most Russians are not affected by this tax increase. They expect around 2 million people, or about 3% of their population, will be affected by this tax increase. The majority of those higher income earners live in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and the majority of the people in those two central cities do not support Putin. So, political impact has been (deliberately) minimized.

The Russian corporate tax rate is rising from 20% to 25%. The current U.S. corporate tax rate is 21%.

Anyhow, it is worth reading the entire article.

Putin releases captured figures

Christopher A. Lawrence
June 7, 2024

Update on the number of captured: “At a meeting in St. Petersburg on Wednesday, Putin told the heads of several international news agencies that there are 1,348 Russian troops and officers in captivity in Ukraine compared to the 6,465 Ukrainians in Russian detention.” See: Putin makes rare claim on Ukraine war casualties (msn.com)

Now, I find these figures to be entirely believable. The Russian Defense Ministry claimed as of 30 June 2022 to be holding 6,000 Ukrainians soldiers in captivity. This was partly confirmed in July 2022 when the Ukrainian missing person commissioner stated on TV that more than 7,000 people were missing, including soldiers, National Guardsmen, border guards and intelligence officers. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy stated on 19 September that the Russians held more prisoners than Ukraine did (see: The Battle for Kyiv, page 185). There were maybe 2,439 that surrendered at Mariupol in late May 2022. There have been other people captured in the two years since then. The prisoner exchanges have traded at least 2,800 Russians soldiers and civilians for 3,001 Ukrainians soldiers and 145 civilians. Plus there were some Ukrainians who died while captivity. Anyhow, it all seems to add up, although it could be on the high side, and the figure of 6,465 probably includes some civilians.

On the other hand, his assertion that he has lost in combat only one Russian for five Ukrainians is absurd. It is as absurd as some of the bizarrely lopsided casualties claims that Ukraine is exchanging casualties at a 3-to-1 to 5-to-1 ratio in their favor.

Casualty estimation Eastern Europe Russia

The Russian march tables for Kyiv

What has been released by Ukrainian intelligence is the Russian march tables for the forces coming down from Belarus and down to Kyiv. It was only the first page, so was not complete.

The units are listed down the left and the locations they are supposed to be at are listed across the top. The times are all the numbers on the chart.

Now, a few things can be derived from this.

First, it gives us a partial order of battle. They list 19 units on this chart, and we gather there is a second page that lists the rest. Listed are the 5th Guards Tank Brigade and the 76th Air Assault Division.

Second, that order of battle does not include the third battalion of any of the air assault regiments. So they list 1/104th, 2/104th, 1/234th, 2/234th, 1/237th and 2/237th… but no 3rd battalion for any of these regiments. This is because, we believe the 3rd battalion were manned by conscripts and according to Russian law, they cannot be deployed outside of Russia. Therefore, they are not. We believe that this is the case for all air assault units. This is partly the reason why these air assault forces have not played a larger role in this campaign. An air assault division does not have an armor battalion, so if their third battalion in each regiment remains at home, then a division at best fields six maneuver battalions. A number of the divisions (98th and 106th) have only two regiments. Therefore, they field only 4 maneuver battalions. Most Ukrainian brigades field at least 4 maneuver battalions.

Third, it is clear from their planning that they intended to be on the outskirts of Kyiv the afternoon of the 24th in force in three separate locations.

Fourth, this is not what happened. They did all get to their final destinations, but almost 24 hours later. So, their carefully calculated march tables turned out to be too fast by a factor of two, meaning it took them two days to get to their objectives when they were planning on one.

Fifth, this, of course, is a classic case of Clausewitzian friction in action.

Sixth, the fact that it took them two days, when they were planning on one, gave the Ukrainians time to organize a defense.

Seventh, once their got to their destinations, they really did not do much after that, because the routes were now well defended.

One does wonder if the “Ukrainians” got hold of this march order before or after the 24th of February.

Eighth, this does raise an issue related to the captured of Hostomel airport. Some accounts have claimed that the Ukrainians had seized the entire airport in the counterattack and then held it. Yet, these forces continue on their march as if that never happened. Furthermore, some of these forces were marching right by the airport. If the Ukrainians had seized the airport, then you think some of these forces would have been diverted. It does not appear that they were. Therefore, we concluded that Ukraine did not seize and hold Hostomel Airport for any extended period of time. They clearly counter attacked there, but the extent of that attack is not really known. It was probably not as successful as some have claimed.

As I note in my book (page 104) “Between 2000 and 2200 Kyiv time [24 February 2022], it was reported that the Ukrainians had retaken the airport, but this may not have been entirely the case. It does appear that they made some progress in closing with the Russian defenders and neutralizing the airstrip. By 1400 the next day, Russia declared that it had control of the airport. The airport and the neighboring town of Hostomel (population 17,534) now appeared to be in Russian hands.”

Ninth: March route was between 186 to 223 kilometers.

Tenth: The number of vehicles was 495. Imagine that in a line. These are long columns winding their way down two-line highways. There were additional units to these.

A translation of this table is provided here. It was translated by Sasho Todorov, who originally brought this chart to my attention: Transcribed Time Table 5th Tank Bde and 76th VDV Div

The Russian First Tank Army Report from 24 February – 15 March 2022 – The Dupuy Institute

Tank Losses and Crew Casualties in the Russo-Ukrainian War – The Dupuy Institute

Russia withdraws from Kharkiv province?

Christopher A. Lawrence
May 28, 2024

It appears that Ukraine has retaken parts of Kharkiv province: Zelenskiy Confirms Ukrainian Forces Regain Control Over Kharkiv Border Amid Russian Offensive (msn.com). The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelelskyy, announced on Friday (24 May) that Ukraine had retaken control over the border areas. Russia is still claiming to control half of Vovchansk, which is 3 miles (5 km) inside the Ukrainian border.

Map of Vovchansk area (courtesy of @War_Mapper).

My conclusion is that this Kharkiv attack was a diversion. Not sure I believe the claims of high Russian losses.

There is still fighting around Kupiansk and in the Pokrovsk sector (in the center of front in the Donbas region, to the west of Bakhmut, Donetsk and Avdiivka). See: General Staff: Most Combat Engagements Recorded In Pokrovsk Sector (menafn.com) and Ukrainian defenders hit 16 clusters of Russian military personnel – General Staff (msn.com). There is fighting around Ocehretyne, which is less than 10 miles (16 kilometers) NW of Avdiivka (which is just NW of Donetsk).

(courtesy of @War_Mapper).

I am beginning to think I might actually be right about this: There may not be a major Russian spring/summer offensive – The Dupuy Institute

There is a Rusi article on the subject that I am not sure of: In Ukraine, Russia is Beginning to Compound Advantages | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org)

First, where does the figure of 510,000 troops come from?

Then the is the issue of the length of the front. They are saying 1,200 kilometers. That is really not a properly representative figure. If Kharkiv province is back of list of contested areas west of Kupyansk, then we are really looking at a front from Kupyansk to Kakhovka Reservoir of maybe 400-500 kilometers (250 – 300 miles). This is the action front. Vovchansk is around 80 kilometers from Kupyansk. See: The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long – The Dupuy Institute

In the end nibbling is not the same as a major offensive.

Eastern Europe Russia

The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long

Lot’s of people throw out the figure that the front line is 1,200 kilometers long. Not really. The length of the border of Ukraine (pre-2014) with Russia is 1,974 kilometers (1,227 miles). This is the land border. The length of the border with Belarus (which I do not think is going to re-enter this contest) is 891 kilometers (554 miles). The entire coastline of Ukraine is 3,783 kilometers (2,351 miles). I think this last figure includes Crimea.

(courtesy of @War_Mapper, map dated 18 May 2024)

But, they really are not fighting from Chernihiv to Sumy and have not done so since April 2022. This is a large portion of that 1,200 kilometer figure. They do share a border with Russia so Ukraine obviously has to protect these areas, but there really has not been any fighting in these areas for over two years. We do not expect that will change.

Second, they really cannot do major operations along the Dnipro River from Kherson up to the Kakhovka Reservoir. There was, in the best of times only three bridges across this river, and I gather that number is three less now. This creates supply issues and with all the drones, missiles and air support, hard to see how this is corrected. No one has yet to do any major military operations across the Kakhovka Reservoir. This takes a significant chunk of miles off any active front.

Therefore, for all practical purposes the front runs from the western border of Kharkiv province over to Kupyansk, down through the Donbas and then through Zaporizhzhia Oblast to the Kakhovka Reservoir. This is about 800 kilometers, vice 1,200.

Slightly more precise measurement using Google Earth:

Distance along Kharkiv Oblast border (To Kupyansk): 225 kilometers
From Kupyansk to Bakhmut: 124 kilometers
From Bakhmut to Vuhledar: 107 kilometers
From Vuhledar to Reservoir: 144 kilometers
Total = 600 kilometers
Multiply by 1.25 (a little figure borrowed from Napoleon): 750

If it was measured more precisely the front might be a little longer.

One kilometer is 0.62 miles. Therefore an active front of roughly 800 kilometers or roughly 500 miles.

There may not be a major Russian spring/summer offensive

There may not be an actual major spring/summer Russian offensive. Let’s look at the scenario for a moment:

1. They are aware that their deployed strength is similar to the Ukraniain strength. They have at best a 1.5-to-1 advantage and may have less. See: Overview of the War in Ukraine going into the Spring/Summer Offensive Season – The Dupuy Institute

2. They are aware that they are not outspending their opponent. See: Dueling Defense Budgets – The Dupuy Institute

3. While they have not achieved the objectives initially set for this campaign, they still hold territory. They may have decided that holding that territory is the best they can do and they are satisfied with that.

4. They may be warring to improve their position at the negotiating table.

Let us take a look for a moment at that. They have conducted a few limited offensive efforts in recent times. The most significant was the attacking and taking of Avdiivka (10 October 2023 – 17 February 2024). This was the town closest to the city of Donetsk, capital of DPR. In fact, it was only 9 miles (14 kilometers) away from it. They have taken that, and then expanded their control beyond this. This is all part of Donetsk province, which Russia has annexed as of 30 September 2022.

Now, they are doing a limited advance in Kharkiv province to set up buffer zones according to them. They have advanced up to 6 miles (10 kilometers) into Kharkiv province taking some rural areas and small towns and taking parts of Vovchansk (pop. 17,459 2022 est,). Maybe we should take them at their word that this is not a major offensive, but instead are just them creating buffer zones.

(courtesy of @War_Mapper)

They have made marginal advances in a few other areas, including around Kupyansk, towns around Bakhmut (Bilohorivka and Chasiv Yar), the areas to the west and northwest of Donetsk and some very limited advances in Zaporizhhia province.

Right now they hold the majority of Donetsk and Lugansk provinces. There are still two major cities from Donetsk province not in their hands (Slovyansk and Kramatorsk). They tried to take them during the summer of 2022, but could not. They hold all of Crimea and Sevastopol. They hold a minority of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia provinces and in neither case hold the main city/capital, although they have annexed both provinces. In the case of the part of Kherson province that they hold, it is naturally well defended by the Dnipro River and the Kakhovka Reservoir. Holding these two areas gives them overland access to Crimea and secures their water supply there (this was an issue before). They also have control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station since March 2022.

Their air and missile campaign is focused (once again) on shutting down the Ukranian power grid. They are having some success. This may all be an attempt to force Ukraine to the negotiating table.

Perhaps their focus is on 1) taking as much territory that they can easily grab, 2) setting up a buffer zone north and east of Kharkiv, 3) increasing the pain on the Ukrainians, 4) and holding what they have until they can force Ukraine to the negotiating table. This might be victory for now for them,

Are we looking at no major Russian offensive this spring and summer?

Overview of the War in Ukraine going into the Spring/Summer Offensive Season

I am being told by “advisors” to start blogging again about the war in Ukraine. “That is what everyone really cares about, not the little things that you have been posting about.”

Anyhow, my last direct blog post on the war was day 699: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 699 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). A more detailed post was done for day 589: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 589 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Since then, I have not blogged extensively about the war. In part, because the changes and shifts over time were incremental and in part because I was busy getting a book done on The Siege of Mariupol. It is now day 811 of this war (or 2.2 years or over 70 million seconds).

So, let’s look at the war at the moment:

Ukrainian Forces Deployed: At least 300,000 are deployed along the front line. Last year Zelenskyy was saying that they have over 700,000 troops mobilized. There is a difference between people mobilized and people deployed. There is a difference between regular army and reserves and militia. What is actually deployed is a wild-eyed guess. We actually don’t know, and the people that do know are not saying.

Russian Forces Deployed: Probably about 400,000 or more. Putin said 617K and was immediately contradicted by Ukraine intelligence, which said 450K. I tend to believe the latter figure, except I suspect the tendency of the intel people is to overestimate. So, “more than 400,000” become the SWAG figure I used.

So, Russia may have a 1.5-to-1 force ratio advantage (say 450K to 300K) or it may be roughly closer to 1-to-1 (say 400K to 400K). Not sure. Either way, this does not seem decisive: Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – fourth and final continuation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). In particular look at Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – continued | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Now what are Russia’s advantages:

Artillery ammunition
Air support *

Note that Russia still has 2,000+ aircraft and has maintained around 500 or so in the theater. This is more than enough to counteract the handful of F-16s that the Ukrainians have received.

What are Ukraine’s advantages:

Artillery (once ammunition issue is resolved)
Air Support with Drones?
Observation/Intelligence ?
Morale
Training
Doctrine ?

Each of these is a long discussion. I may get to them later. These points are covered in three slides of my updated briefing I am doing on Force Ratios at HADSS in UK in July Schedule for HADSS 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and at HAAC in October: Next Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

But Russia has been advancing. They have over the last few months taken Avdiivka (Battle of Avdiivka is dated 10 October 2023 to 17 February 2024). They have pushed out a little beyond that. This is not militarily significant terrain, but it is of political value, as Avdiivka is near the non-operational Donetsk International Airport, and has been in Ukrainian hands since 2014. So, it has some importance if the Russian political objective is to seize the rest of Donetsk province before the start of peace negotiations.

Now, the Russians have been advancing along the border next to Kharkiv. Kharkiv is a significant objective, being the second largest city in Ukraine and the largest Russian-speaking city in Ukraine. So, far, they have been advancing just along the border, it is not certain that these areas were even defended. This is either preparatory advances in anticipation of a major offensive, is an intended distraction, or is just taking some local territory because they can. So far, we have not seen what I would call a major offensive. Probably conditions are not quite right to start such: When does the campaign season start? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Still, regardless of army size, it does appear that both sides are spending roughly equally on this war: Dueling Defense Budgets | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

All evidence points to this war being stalemated, but for the last few months, Russia has been slowly advancing.

Is this because Russian gained an advantage due to a proper build up of its armed forces over 2023/24, unlike what it did in 2022/23? This has probably helped.
Is this because Ukraine failed to properly mobilize over 2023/24, taking its eye off the ball, to use a sports analogy? Maybe. This is what some people claim: Russia is exploiting Ukraine’s lack of manpower to thin out the front line and seek a breakthrough, military expert says (msn.com).
Is this because Russian had an abundance of artillery shells (thanks to North Korea) and were outshooting the Ukrainians 5-to-1 or 10-to-1 according to Ukrainians sources (which I was never able to verify). Maybe. Theoretically, over time, this Russian advantage will disappear and may turn into a Ukrainian advantage. U.S. shell production was 25,000 a month and is now being ramped up to 125K a month. Europe has similarly ramped up its shell production. Once this is up to speed, then this may turn from a Russian advantage to a Ukrainian one.
Is this because the U.S. congress held up the $61 Billion dollar aid package for six months? It may have had an impact. This is, of course, what many of the people opposed to the delay were saying. Have no idea how true that is. It is the nature of the political discourse that the effects of not doing something get overstated. For example, the delay in getting F-16s and 300km range ATACMs. So, don’t know how vulnerable the U.S. delays in the aid package made Ukraine, especially as there were no such delays in the European aid or Ukraine’s own defense expenditures. Still, the delay was hard to justify.

So, Russia may hold a slight advantage for now. I suspect that advantage does not result in any major breakthroughs. Over time, I suspect that the Russian advantages will disappear, and things will stabilize. After that, it will be up to Ukraine to see if they can develop any advantages that allow them to move forward. Needless to say, if Ukraine can start to steadily advance, this war will go in their favor. On the other hand, if Russia can get one significant breakthrough operations this spring/summer, it could be a very different story. We will have to see as it is hard to predict.

Territory Fought Over:

It appears that the fighting will be stretched from Sumy or Kharkiv down to Zaporizhzhia. This is a long line. It does not appear that it will include Kyiv (except for missile attacks). It does not appear that it will include Odessa, which is now well behind Ukrainian defensive positions. It does appear that Ukraine has won the Battle for the western Black Sea. Not only has it deprived Russia access to that area after sinking Russia’s largest ship on the Black Sea, and damaging several others, but it is now regularly moving tankers and cargo transports from the Bosporus Strait to Odessa and back. Russia is not intercepting these. Added to that Russia has replaced the admiral in charge. This does happen when you lose the largest warship on the Black Sea (the cruiser Moskva) in addition to losing control of the western half of the Black Sea.

It also does not appear that Kherson and Kherson province is a major theater. The Dnieper or Dnipro River divides that province, with Kherson and the Ukrainian Army on the north bank and the Russian army on the south bank. And then there is large Kakhovka Reservoir to the east of that the cuts off a significant section of front (see map). It does appear the effective front starts to the east of the reservoir (near Zaporizhzhia).