Mystics & Statistics

Peter Perla on Prediction

Col. Trevor Nevitt Dupuy Arlington, Virginia, 2 June 1995 Photograph by Gary S. Schofield

Peter Perla has been around the industry a while, although I have never intersected with him. He was the keynote speaker at the Connections Wargaming Conference in 2017. His presentation was “Peter Perla on Prediction,” which has great alliteration. It is here: https://paxsims.files.wordpress.com/2017/12/connections-us-2017-wargaming-conference-proceedings.pdf

Early in his presentation he quotes Trevor Dupuy (on page 5 of his presentation). He states that he said to Trevor Dupuy “Good grief, Trevor, we can’t even predict the outcome of a Super Bowl game much less that of a battle!” Trevor Dupuy responded “Well, if that is true, what are we doing? What’s the point?”

He then quotes Jim Dunnigan as saying (on page 7): “If you want your wargame to predict the future, you better make sure it can predict the past.”

Of course, this last point is why The Dupuy Institute has developed databases on the Battle of the Bulge, Kursk, Battle of Britain, some 1200 battles since 1600, and over 100 post-WWII insurgencies.

Now, I do happen to agree with those two gentlemen. Dr. Perla presentation then goes on for a while (and I have gotten into the shameful habit of speed reading most things now) and finally concludes (on page 43) in response to the question “Why do we wargame?” with  “We do it to help us all make more accurate predictions by leveraging all our combined knowledge, experience and creativity, so that we can make more effective decisions in complex and uncertain situations.”

Let quote his entire paragraph, so I don’t look like I am just cherry-picking the phrases I want (as opposed to how some people our using our report The Historical Combat Effectiveness of Lighter-Weight Armored Forces):

We do it to help us all make more accurate predictions by leveraging all our combined knowledge, experience and creativity, so that we can make more effective decisions in complex and uncertain situations. We do it to question, to learn and to understand. We do it because Wargames entertain; they stir the imagination. Wargame engage; they stimulate the intellect. And Wargames enlighten; the create synthetic experience. And it is experience, both real and synthetic, that makes abstract risks tangible and effective planning possible.

And as Matt Caffrey has said on so many occasions, we do it because wargames save money, and most importantly, wargames saves lives. That’s why I have been doing this for forty years. I hope you all will continue to do it for forty more.

I gather this is different than what he used to state.

Anyhow, the next Connections Wargaming Conference is up in Carlisle, PA on 13-16 August, 2019. See: https://connections-wargaming.com/. I probably will not be attending. Still, this is a worthwhile effort that has been run for decades by Matt Caffrey, now of the Air Force Research Laboratory, along many others.

 

P.S. In Peter Perla’s presentation he uses this picture of Trevor Dupuy. The photograph was taken by Gary. S. Schofield on 2 June 1995.

No Action on Validation In the 2020 National Defense Act Authorization

Well, I got my hopes up that the Department of Defense modeling and simulation community was finally going to be forced, kicking-and-screaming, to move forward; ensuring that their models were properly validated, not build upon a “base of sand” and making sure they are not assembled like some “house of cards.” This was to come about through four paragraphs in the Senate’s initial markup of the National Defense Authorization Defense Act (NDAA) of 2020 that instructed DOD to assemble a team “..to assess the quality of these models and make recommendations…not later than December 31, 2020.”

The original four paragraphs are here:

U.S. Senate on Model Validation

Well, it looks like this is not going to happen !!!

According to a little research done by Shawn Woodford, it turns out that that modeling and simulation validation proposal in the original Senate Armed Services Committee report for the 2020 NDAA dated 11 June 2019 did not make it to the final Senate 2020 NDAA bill, passed on 2 July 2020. The proposal was also not included in the House version. The House and Senate versions are now being reconciled in committee and the final 2020 NDAA will probably be approved soon now that there is a general bi-partisan overall budget agreement. There will be a defense budget, but, it appears that it won’t address validation. There is a slim possibility this could change if it is added back in by committee at the last minute.

The 2020 NDAA SASC Report, 11 June 2019:
https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/srpt48/CRPT-116srpt48.pdf

The 2020 NDAA S. 1790 SASC final markup, 2 July 2019:
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1790/BILLS-116s1790es.pdf

The 2020 NDAA HR 2500 HASC final markup, 12 July 2019:
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2500/text

We would love to know who got those four paragraphs placed into the original Senate NDAA mark-up to start with; and afterwards, why they were then stripped out of the final bill. Clearly someone felt it was important enough to be put in there (as do we). We do not know who those “someone” are. And….who was it that stepped in from wherever and made sure those four paragraphs were removed?

If anyone knows anything further about this, please let us know.

P.S.

Source for 1991 RAND “Base of Sand” paper:                                                                 . https://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N3148.html

The phrase “house of cards” we used in a report we did on casualty estimation methodologies (Casualty Estimation Methodologies Studies, 25 July 2005, The Dupuy Institute, page 32). To quote:

In 1991, Paul Davis and Donald Blumenthal employed the term “base of sand” to describe the essential modeling problem of the day. They described one of the core problems as a lack of a vigorous military science.

Unfortunately, this was the responsibility of the operations research community. Understanding military science was part of what ORO [Operations Research Office] was attempting to do in its early days. It was the operations research community who proposed the models, felt they could develop models, sold them to the military, spent the budget and finally produced the models built upon a “base of sand.” As such, they are the community that needs to correct the problem and produce this theory of combat. They are the scientists.

Yet, the problem is bigger than a “base of sand.” This phrase implies that there is a shortfall of data to start with. Yet every complex model (and most of these models are complex) is built from a number of interrelationships within the model. This is even more so for hierarchy of model structures. Each of these inter-relationships, which are often model unique constructs, is often built upon “expert judgment.” Therefore, the “base of sand” does not just start at the bottom, but carries through to each individual function within a model. As such, what has been built upon this “base of sand” is a “house of cards.”

Deja Vu all over again

Afghan police in training, 5 October 2010 (taken by William A. Lawrence II)

Recent article on Afghan troop size: https://news.yahoo.com/afghan-troop-numbers-drop-sharply-040851162.html

A few points from the article:

  1. There are now 42,000 less troops reported for the Afghan security forces.
  2. U.S. has 14,000 troops there
    1. Of those, 9,000 involved in training, advising and assisting Afghan security forces.
  3. “The change was part of an effort by the United States and its partners to reduce opportunities for corrupt ANDSF officials to report ‘ghost’ (nonexistent) soldiers and police on personnel rolls in orders to pocket the salaries.”

A few observations:

  1. Didn’t we have the same issue in Vietnam (1965-1973) with the South Vietnamese Army?
  2. Our analysis of counterinsurgency efforts focused on force ratios and the political concept behind the insurgency. This does affect the force ratios (see America’s Modern Wars).
  3. It is good that we are correcting this, but we are in our 18th year of this war. What were we doing the previous 17?
  4. Does this again establish that: “The real lesson from history is that no one learns any lessons from history.”

Validation of Wargaming Simulation Models – Confusion !!

[Clinton Reilly has been a regular commentator on this blog. We present here a guest blog post from him]

Originally, I was heartened to read in your blog that the U.S. Congress is setting up a committee to oversee the validation of wargaming models, which were seen to be of doubtful validity. Validation is obviously a ‘good thing’ as it enhances models and so they produce more useful and reliable results. Your blog has put forward several articles to this effect.

I hastened to communicate this to a senior member of the Australian Defence Science and Technology (DST) group expecting an enthusiastic response, in anticipation of the Australian government following suit. However, much to my surprise, the said member addressed the MORS Modelling and Simulation Community of Practice (CoP) saying that this was a matter of some concern as the testing and validation may not be tailored to the objectives of the individual models. Members were asked to comment on this alarming prospect. There was no comment.

While this is a possibility, it seems to me that in such a rational field the logical argument that tests must be tailored to objectives would prevail. It seems hardly worth saying!

So, I replied with a more heartening email to CoP members that validation was only to be seen as a boon and should be welcomed and encouraged. Wargames would be improved. I also emailed the MORS Wargaming CoP with a similar message, again asking for comment on the posts in the MORS Modelling and Simulation CoP.

Now this is where the confusion sets in. In the weeks since the emails were sent no one has replied. There has been no direct comment to me either. Why I ask? In a military community where modelling and wargaming is a central activity – why has no one replied on either the validity of current models or the need for greater validation?

I am submitting this to your blog in the hope that someone in the worldwide wargaming community has an opinion. Is there a problem with extensive validation of existing models? Is a program of validation needed to improve a low level of validity?  Does anyone care about the standard of current models and their outputs?

Does anyone reading this blog have a comment?

Clinton Reilly

Managing Director

Computer Strategies Pty Ltd

Sydney, Australia

Status of Defense Act

A month ago, I flagged pages 253-254 of the report 116-48, supporting the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. This report is here: https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/srpt48/CRPT-116srpt48.pdf

This kicker was the statement that “The committee is concerned that…these models…has not been adequately validated….using real world data….[and] are simplistic by comparison…” The entire four paragraphs are quoted in this blog post:

U.S. Senate on Model Validation

The current text of the actual Defense Act, dated 6/27/19 is here: https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1790/BILLS-116s1790es.pdf

Now, I don’t know how these two 609- and 1726-page documents connect, but I gather the requirements still exist to have a team “..to assess the quality of these models and make recommendations…not later than December 31, 2020.”

Does anyone know anything further about this effort?

Comments on the Photo Recon Article

The actual article by Ben Wheatley of his analysis of the photo recon from 14-16 July 1943 is here: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16161262.2019.1606545

Shorter article by him is here: https://defenceindepth.co/2019/06/07/in-pursuit-of-prokhorovka/

I believe all my previous posts on Prokhorovka discuss the issues of tank loss counts to exhaustion, so I will not take the time to address his article point by point. Let me just highlight a couple of items.

It is a useful effort in that he identifies the four Pz IVs close to Hill 252.2 that are destroyed. These were almost certainly from Ribbentrop’s 6th Panzer Company. In Ribbentrop’s account he also states that four of the seven tanks in his company were lost (and his was damaged). It is always useful to have confirming evidence to an interview. Post-war interviews are not always the most reliable source. I did interview a veteran of the Spanish-American War (1898) once. That was an interesting experience.

He then makes the statement that “To the author, it seems impossible that any worthwhile publication or exhibition relating to the battle of Prokhorovka could not include the remarkable Luftwaffe photographs contained within this article.”

Well, as I did include the 32 of aerial photographs in my book….I guess that would qualify my book as worthwhile. On the other hand, he list four works in the previous paragraph (including Zetterling and Zamulin) but does not list my book. Nor it is referenced in his footnotes. Curious.

The article discusses the fight between the LSSAH Division and the XVIII and XXIX Tank Corps. It is clear he has defined the fight on the tank fields of Prokhorovka as a fight between those three units. As he stated in second paragraph of his article: “The chief protagonists of the battle of Prokhorovka, the 5th Guards Tank Army and the German SS Panzergrenadier Division ‘Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler’, fought over a battlefront of no more than 3km between the river Psel and the Storozhevoye Woods.”

He leaves out the involvement of Totenkopf and Das Reich in that fight, and the fact that Totenkopf engaged the XVIII Tank Corps to some degree and Das Reich clearly was engaged with significant parts of the XXIX Tank Corps, especially in and around the Storozhevoye Woods. This does distort the picture.

In addition he focuses on destroyed tanks. Clearly the Germans lost more tanks that five that day, but if you only count totally destroyed tanks, it does give a distorted figure.

So, in the end, he ends up with 5 tanks lost versus 200+. I ended up with an estimated 19 versus 155 for the same fight. This is not a big difference. We are quibbling over the details. But it would be nice to get these figures as close to real as possible. It is difficult as the locations and actions of many of the battalions this day are not exactly known. It was a large dramatic fight that people were too busy to document at the time.

There are lots of other things I could quibble about in his article, but I will pass on that for now. One thing he does that annoys me is refer to the “II SS Panzer Korps” on multiple occasions. Why the German spelling of Corps? He does not use the Russian spelling for their corps.

Summation of the Prokhorovka Blog Posts

Have just done a series of posts on Prokhorovka over this last week. As usual, I find it easier to write in bits and pieces then to put together one long (boring) article. Anyhow, the nine blog posts on Prokhorovka for this last week are (in order of posting):

Kursk Aerial Photos

Tank Losses on 12/13 July 1943

What About Totenkopf’s Losses?

And elements of the XXIX Tank Corps….

Damaged versus Destroyed Tanks

So What Tanks did LSSAH Lose on the 12th?

But it really wasn’t just a tank battle

The Importance of the Tank Ditch

One Final Note

There have also been a number of useful comments made to them. They are worth reading.

Tomorrow I will briefly discuss the Ben Wheatley article.

One Final Note

The German offensive at Kursk in the south went from the 4th through the 17th of July 1943. It involved 17 different German divisions. They then withdrew for the next seven days. This is more than 250 division-days of combat from the German perspective. The fight by the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Division was but one of those division days. Granted it was an important one, but it was not the bloodiest fight done by a German division. That “honor” is held by the 106th Infantry Division and 320th Infantry Division in their fights on the 5th of July. The 5th of July was the bloodiest day of fighting for the Germans. The LSSAH suffered an estimated 383 casualties on the 12th of July. The LSSAH suffered an estimated 645 casualties of the 5th of July. The 5th of July was the bloodiest day of battle for the LSSAH and the Das Reich SS (340 casualties). Totenkopf SS’s bloodiest day was the 11th of July (479 casualties). These casualty figures include DNBI (Disease and non-battle injuries, 9 to 20 a day depending on unit). On the 5th of July it is estimated that the 106th Infantry Division lost 1,183 men while the 320th Infantry Division went through a rather crippling 1,668 men! There are some books on Kursk that don’t even address their operations!

Also, while the exchange rate at Prokhorovka was lop-sided in favor of the Germans, the exchange ratio across the entire battlefield was no where near as one-sided. According to our count (based upon going through each division and corps unit records for each day), the Germans lost 1,536 tanks damaged and destroyed from 4 to 18 July, while the Soviets lost 2,471 tanks damaged and destroyed from 4 to 18 July. This is around a 1-to-1.61 exchange ratio in armor. This is more in line with the exchange rates of personnel, which were around 1-to-3.69 (see pages 1208-1210 or pages 560-562 in my smaller book).

This has been discussed before on this blog:

TDI Friday Read: Tank Combat at Kursk

Prokhorovka was an extreme case with an extreme result. Not every armor battle at Kursk was so badly handled, with the operations of the First Tank Army under Katukov being much better handled, and the operations of the II Guards Tank Corps under the unheralded Colonel Burdeinyii being particularly successful (and annoying).

In the end the armor operations under direct command of Generals Vatutin and Chistyakov (Sixth Guards Army) tended to sometimes be disastrous. This includes Vatutin’s counterattack on the 6th of July with the II Guards and V Guards Tank Corps. This attack, reinforced with the threat to shoot the V Guard Tank Corps commander if not obeyed, gutted that corps in one day, with 110 tanks lost. There was also a series of poorly conducted armor attacks on the 8th of July that were also a disaster. Finally, in the Voronezh Front’s third round of mass armor attacks, it included Prokhorovka. You don’t see the same type of attacks conducted by the units of the First Tank Army, even though they were facing a force similar in size to the SS Panzer Corps. There is a command failure, that is higher than Rotmistrov (V Guards Tanks Army commander) and that clearly includes Chistaykov (Sixth Army commander) and Vatutin (Voronezh Front commander). The Stavka representative in the south during the fighting was Marshal Aleksander Vasilevskii. The political commissar of the Voronezh Front was Nikita Khrushchev. He kind of became much more famous later.

The Importance of the Tank Ditch

Some of the accounts of the Battle of Prokhorovka get overly focused on the tank ditch that the Soviet XXIX Tank Corps hit. Part of this is because some accounts of this battle focus primarily on the attack of the Soviet XVIII Tank Corps and XXIX Tank Corps against the German LSSAH Division. As shown in the previous posts, the LSSAH did not fight alone and was supported on both flanks by the engaged Totenkopf SS and Das Reich SS Divisions. But even this expanded account is not the whole battle of the day, as the Soviet offensive also included attacks by the II Guards Tanks Corps and the II Tank Corps and a number of rifle divisions. The Totenkopf SS was engaged with the Fifth Guards Army, and elements of the 69th Army engaged the Das Reich SS and the German 167th Infantry Division.

But even this was not the Battle of Prokhorovka. By Soviet accounts, the battle includes all the fighting around Prokhorovka from the 12th and 13th, including Trufanov’s Detachments, the V Guards Mechanized Corps, all of the 69th Army and picking up the fighting against the III Panzer Corps (6th Panzer Division, 7th Panzer Division, 19th Panzer Division and 168th Infantry Division). This much larger definition, which also picks up elements of the 11th Panzer Division, is the standard definition used in Soviet sources (see Definition 2 on page 1324 of my Kursk book).

But, this is really not all that was happening on the 12th, as the Soviets were also engaged with the German XLVIII Panzer Corps with five tank and mechanized corps and actually achieved a significant penetration. Also the Soviet Seventh Guards Army unleashed attacks on the III Panzer Corps and Corps Raus.

So…..while the tank ditch was a major factor affecting the attack of one Soviet tank corps this day, it was one of ten engaged Soviet tank and mechanized corps this day along with at least 25 engaged Soviet guards rifle, airborne and rifle divisions. The significance of the tank ditch story shrinks when you zoom out and look at the entire battlefield.

But, as the tank ditch is such a good story, the story of Prokhorovka often focuses on the Soviet tank ditch from the 69th Army’s defensive system that was unknown to the attacking V Guards Tank Army. This story does seem to grow in the telling.

I do not know for certain how many tanks drove into or were destroyed in and around the tank ditch. The morning attack was conducted by two Soviet tank corps, the XVIII Tank Corps attacking on the right and the XXIX Tank Corps attacking on the left. The V Guards Mechanized Corps (which is larger and with more tanks than a tank corps) was in reserve in the rear.

The XVIII Tank Corps attack did not hit the tank ditch. Its attack was down the valley of the Pena River, along the border between the LSSAH Division and the Totenkopf SS Division. This attack was stopped by the combined fire from the two German divisions without the assistance of any surprises in the terrain.

The XXIX Tank Corps attacked with two brigades forward and one in second echelon. The right brigade, the 32nd Tank Brigade, was the one that rolled over the 6th panzer company (with 7 Pz IVs) commanded by Captain Rudolf von Ribbentrop (the eldest son of the infamous German foreign minister). This attack hit the tank ditch. As Ribbentrop describes (as he was on the Soviet side of the tank ditch): “Now obviously, the T-34s detected the tank ditch and tried to turn left and cross over the reconstructed bridge.” One notes that Ribbentrop, in his account, does not have any Soviet tanks driving into the tank ditch (see Kursk, page 938 or Prokhorovka, page 326). He does add “As the Russians were now crowded at the bridge and therefore were now flanked and could be killed much easier, the burning T-34s were driving upon one another and ramming one another.” I am not sure how accurate that last description was as later he says, “Now our tank was no longer combat ready and I decided to take it out of operations, i.e., to cross the bridge over the tank ditch and drive to the rear…”

The second source for the tank ditch story is from Sturmann Wilhelm Roes of the 7th panzer company. His interview indicates that he was on the other side (the German side) of the tank ditch. He described the antitank ditch as being 4.5 meters tall on the Russian side and only 1.2 meters on the German side. He describes several Russian tanks driving full speed into the tank ditch. The T-34s were able to continue moving after this, but certainly the shock of such a fall seriously rattled the crew inside. He then states that as they came out of the ditch on the other side, the tank undersides were partially exposed and easy targets (see Prokhorovka, page 328). The source of this story is from Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pages 327-328, but his footnote does not state the source, only that the story came from the “author’s personal archive.”

The 25th Tank Brigade attacked to the south of the railroad line that split the battlefield. Does not appear that this tank brigade ever encountered a tank ditch.

Furthermore, 15 T-34s from the 32nd Tank Brigade are reported to have crossed the railway embankment to bypass the Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz along with some infantry from the 53rd Motorized Brigade (see page 319 of my Prokhorovka book). These people did not encounter a tank ditch.

There are only two German accounts of Soviet tanks hitting the tank ditch that I am aware of (but I have not exhaustively looked for every German account). This was the report by Ribbentrop of the 6th panzer company and a report by Roes of the 7th panzer company. So, it does appear that the tank ditch halted the advance of one reduced strength tank brigade and that may have been all. The 32nd Tank Brigade had around 60 T-34s. But, 15 tanks of the first battalion were with the 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade at Komsomolets Sovkhoz. Therefore, the number of their tanks involved in the attack that went to the tank ditch was 45 or less. Also attached to them was the 1529th Heavy Self-Propelled Regiment (1 KV-1 and 11 Su-152…but took not losses and probably did not see action that day) and three batteries of the 1446th Self-Propelled Regiment, with its other two batteries attached to the 25th Tank Brigade. The regiment had 8 Su-76s and 12 Su-122s ready for action. Probably only a handful of T-34s, at worst, fell into the tank ditch.

The 32nd Tank Brigade suffered the highest losses of any attacking tank brigade of the day, suffering 54 T-34s either burned, knocked out or in need of repair, leaving the brigade with only 6 T-34s. These losses included all 15 T-34s that went to Komsomolets Sovkhoz. The brigade’s reported losses at the end of the day were 100 men killed and 130 wounded.

The 25th Tank Brigade had around 31 T-34s and 36 T-70s. In the second echelon, behind the 32nd Tank Brigade, was the 31st Tank Brigade with around 29 T-34s and 38 T-70s. The 31st Tank Brigade attacked behind the 32nd Tank Brigade and by 1400 (Moscow time) had reached the area one kilometer northeast of Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz. Upon reach the northeastern outskirts of the Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz, the brigade was delayed by German artillery and mortar fire and by “ceaseless” German air attacks (see Prokhorovka, page 320 or Kursk, page 933). It appears to have never gotten to the tank ditch.

So, in the bigger picture, it appears that the tank ditch helped stop the attack of one reduced strength brigade of around 45 T-34s out of the ten tank and mechanized corps engaged that day. Still, it was a significant terrain issue on the tank fields of Prokhorovka.

But it really wasn’t just a tank battle

Just to state the obvious, Prokhorovka was not just a tank battle. While the Soviets attacked without proper air or artillery support, the Germans did have that. The Germans had a lot of antitank weapons they could bring to bear. Let us look at the inventory on the evening of the 11th for the LSSAH Division (this listing does not include small arms):

MMG: 136

28/20 AT: 0

50mm AT: 35

75mm AT: 16

81mm Mortar: 67

75mm lt IG: 15

150mm hy IG: 0

105mm Howitzer: 15

150mm Howitzer: 12

105mm Gun: 4

150mm Launcher: 6

210mm Launcher: 6

20mm AA (towed): 26

20mm AA (SP): 24

20mm AA x 4 (SP): 11

37mm AA (SP): 10

88mm AA: 10

.

Pz I: 2

Pz II: 4

Pz III short: 1

Pz III long: 4

Pz III Observation: 8

Pz III Command: 7 (most were armed)

Pz IV Long: 47

Pz VI: 4

StuG III: 10

Marder III: 10

Hummel: 5

Wespe: 12

Grille: 12

Marder II 76.2mm: 1

Pz IV Munitions: 1

.

AC 4w MG (221): 4

AC 4w 20mm (222): 7

AC 4w MG (223): 5

AC 8w 20mm (231): 1

AC 8w 20mm (232): 4

AC 4w (261): 10

AC 8w MG (263): 0

AC 4w (247): 1

.

LHT (2501/1): 25

LHT (250/3): 22

LHT 81mm Mortar (250/7): 4

LHT 37mm AT (250/10): 3

LHT 20mm (250): 8

MHT (251/1): 26

MHT 81mm Mortar (251/2): 4

MHT (251/5): 1

MHT (251/7): 9

MHT (251/6): 1

MHT (251/8): 4

MHT 75mm Lt IG (251/9): 4

MHT 37mm AT (251/10): 7

LHT (252): 4

LHT (250/5): 6

LHT (253): 4

MHT (251): 5

LHT (250/4): 3

.

Bridge Set J: 1

Bridge Set H: 1

.

Source: Kursk Data Base, TDI copy.

So, they had:

Antitank guns (including 37mm AT) and 88mm Flak: 71

Tanks 50mm and greater (including Marders): 84

Artillery pieces and rockets (105mmm or larger): 72

Miscellaneous stuff that goes boom (37mm AA, 75mm lt IG, 81mm Mortars): 104

.

Now that is over 200 serious tank killing weapons not counting the “miscellaneous stuff.” If one is in a defensive position facing an attack coming across open ground, there is a lot of damage that can be done.

Oh and they also had air support. Now we really don’t know how much air support they had. It was reported that at 0910 (Berlin time), the VIII Air Corps notified the SS that it had dispatched two Stuka groups. The Germans flew 398 ground-attack type sorties this day of which 150 were Stuka sorties. As they were supporting five German corps, not all of these missions went to the SS Panzer Corps. In my engagements sheets (pages 954-959 of Kursk and 345-352 of Prokhorovka), I have the T SS PzGrD with 94 supporting sorties, the LSSAH PzGrD with 131 supporting sorties + 24 Soviet fratricidal sorties, the DR SS PzGrD with 57 supporting sorties and the 167th Infantry Division with 92. Of course, these are very rough guesstimates.

They also had some support from “friendly fire” cases where at 1300 Soviet assault aircraft (Il-2s) attacked the 32nd Tank Brigade (XXIX Tank Corps) and 170th Tank Brigade (XVIII Tank Corps). The II Guards Tank Corps was also attacked by Soviet aircraft (see Prokhorovka, page 338).

The Totenkopf and Das Reich SS Divisions were similarly equipped. So, there were a lot of weapons there.