Mystics & Statistics

The Hierarchy of Combat

The second conceptual element in Trevor Dupuy’s theory of combat is his definition of the hierarchy of combat:

[F]ghting between armed forces—while always having the characteristics noted [in the definition of military combat], such as fear and planned violence—manifests itself in different fashions from different perspectives. In commonly accepted military terminology, there is a hierarchy of military combat, with war as its highest level, followed by campaign, battle, engagement, action, and duel.

A war is an armed conflict, or a state of belligerence, involving military combat between two factions, states, nations, or coalitions. Hostilities between the opponents may be initiated with or without a formal declaration by one or both parties that a state of war exists. A war is fought for particular political or economic purposes or reasons, or to resist an enemy’s efforts to impose domination. A war can be short, sometimes lasting a few days, but usually is lengthy, lasting for months, years, or even generations.

A campaign is a phase of a war involving a series of operations related in time and space and aimed toward achieving a single, specific, strategic objective or result in the war. A campaign may include a single battle, but more often it comprises a number of battles over a protracted period of time or a considerable distance, but within a single theater of operations or delimited area. A campaign may last only a few weeks, but usually lasts several months or even a year.

A battle is combat between major forces, each having opposing assigned or perceived operational missions, in which each side seeks to impose its will on the opponent by accomplishing its own mission, while preventing the opponent from achieving his. A battle starts when one side initiates mission-directed combat and ends when one side accomplishes its mission or when one or both sides fail to accomplish the mission(s). Battles are often parts of campaigns. Battles between large forces usually are made up of several engagements, and can last from a few days to several weeks. Naval battles tend to be short and—in modern times—decisive.

An engagement is combat between two forces, neither larger than a division nor smaller than a company, in which each has an assigned or perceived mission. An engagement begins when the attacking force initiates combat in pursuit of its mission and ends when the attacker has accomplished the mission, or ceases to try to accomplish the mission, or when one or both sides receive significant reinforcements, thus initiating a new engagement. An engagement is often part of a battle. An engagement normally lasts one or two days; it may be as brief as a few hours and is rarely longer than five days.

An action is combat between two forces, neither larger than a battalion nor smaller than a squad, in which each side has a tactical objective. An action begins when the attacking force initiates combat to gain its objective, and ends when the attacker wins the objective, or one or both forces withdraw, or both forces terminate combat. An action often is part of an engagement and sometimes is part of a battle. An action lasts for a few minutes or a few hours and never lasts more than one day.

A duel is combat between two individuals or between two mobile fighting machines, such as combat vehicles, combat helicopters, or combat aircraft, or between a mobile fighting machine and a counter-weapon. A duel begins when one side opens fire and ends when one side or both are unable to continue firing, or stop firing voluntarily. A duel is almost always part of an action. A duel lasts only a few minutes. [Dupuy, Understanding War, 64-66]

Reminder – Speaking at Historicon in Lancaster, PA., Friday 12 July

I will be speaking at Historicon in Lancaster, PA., Friday 12 July. Historicon is one of the three major annual wargaming conventions run by the Historical Miniatures Gaming Society (HMGS). It will be run from 10 July-14 July, 2019. Their website is here: https://www.hmgs.org/general/custom.asp?page=HconHome

As part of this large convention, they have organized a “War College.” This is an impressive effort that includes 18 lectures on Thursday, Friday and Saturday. I have the last lecture on Friday, from 6 – 7 PM. The speakers for this series include published authors Paul Westermeyer, Pete Panzeri, Steve R. Waddell and John Prados, among others. Lecture descriptions are here:                                                                               . https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.hmgs.org/resource/resmgr/historicon/hcon_19/pels/19_war_college_pel_6-19-2019.pdf

I will be doing a presentation similar to the one I did at the New York Military Affairs Symposium (NYMAS). It is based upon part of my book War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat.

Trevor Dupuy’s Definition of Military Combat

Ernst Zimmer: “Das Lauenburgische Jäger-Bataillon Nr. 9 bei Gravelotte” [Wikipedia]
The first element in Trevor Dupuy’s theory of combat is his definition of military combat:

I define military combat as a violent, planned form of physical interaction (fighting) between two hostile opponents, where at least one party is an organized force, recognized by governmental or de facto authority, and one or both opposing parties hold one or more of the follow-on objectives: to seize control of territory or people; to prevent the opponent from seizing or controlling territory or people; to protect one’s own territory or people; to dominate, destroy, or incapacitate the opponent.

The impact of weapons creates an environment of lethality, danger, and fear in which achievement of the objectives by one party may require the opponent to choose among: continued resistance and resultant destruction; retreat and loss of territory, facilities, and people; surrender. Military combat begins in any interaction, or at any level of combat from duel to full-scale war, when weapons are first employed with hostile intent by one or both opponents.  Military combat ends for any interaction or level of combat when both sides have stopped fighting.

There are two key points in this definition that I wish to emphasize. Though there may be much in common between military combat and a brawl in a barroom, there are important differences. The opponents in military combat are to some degree organized, and both represent a government or quasi-governmental authority. There is one other essential difference: the all-pervasive influence of fear in a lethal environment. People have been killed in barroom brawls, but this is exceptional. In military combat there is the constant danger of death from lethal weapons employed by opponents with deadly intent. Fear is without question the most important characteristic of combat. [Dupuy, Understanding War, 63-64]

America’s Modern Wars – status

I notice that Amazon.com is currently out of stock of hardback editions of America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam. There are still kindle versions available, and hardback editions can be ordered directly from Casemate (click on the picture of the book to the right). We also have copies for sale at The Dupuy Institute: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/booksfs.htm

 

Aces at Kursk – Chapters

Yak-9 at war memorial, northwest of Yakovlevo, Belrorod-Oboyan road (1995)

The following is the list of chapters and estimated page count for the book I am finishing: Aces at Kursk: The Belgorod Offensive Air War

Front Matter: 12 pages

Acknowledgements: 4 pages

Prologue: 16 pages

.

Chapter One: The Strategic Air Campaign: 12 pages

Chapter Two: Both Sides Prepare: 23 pages

Chapter Three: The Strike at Dawn: 5 July 1943 (Monday): 18 pages

Chapter Four: The Fight for Air Superiority: 6-7 July 1943: 34 pages

Chapter Five: The Air War Continues: 8-9 July 1943: 18 pages

Chapter Six: A Less Intense Air War Continues: 10-18 July 1943: 34 pages

Chapter Seven: The Last Air Offensive: 15 pages

.

Appendix I: German and Soviet Terminology: 8 pages

Appendix II: Air Campaign Statistics: 77 pages

Appendix III: Commander Biographies: 9 pages

.

Photo Section 1: The Weapons of War: 28 pages

Photo Section 2: The Photo Reconnaissance 35 pages

Photo Section 3: Commanders and Pilots: 8 pages

.

Map Section 4 or 29 pages (depending on whether I include the 1:50000 1942 topo maps).

Bibliography: 12 pages

Index: 10 pages

Biography: 1

.

It comes in at around 378-403 pages, including 94 pages of new text. I am effectively done with the book and am now trying to line up a publisher for it. I usually finish my books before I go looking for a publisher.

 

U.S. Senate and Model Validation – Comments

This is a follow-up to our blog post:

Have They Been Reading Our Blog?

This rather significant effort came out of the blue for us, and I gather a whole lot of others in the industry. The actual proposed law is here:

U.S. Senate on Model Validation

Some people, we gather, are a little nervous about this effort. On the other hand, Clinton Reilly, an occasional commenter on this blog and the Managing Director of Computer Strategies Pty Ltd, Sydney Australia, nicely responds to these concerns with the following post:

I would not be too concerned by the prospect of more rigorous validation. I am sure it represents a major opportunity to improve modelling practices and obtain the increased funding that will be required to support the effort.

One of the first steps will be the development of a set of methodologies that will be tailored to testing the types of models required. I am sure that there will be no straight jacketing or enforced uniformity as it is obvious the needs served by the models are many and varied and cannot be met by a “one size fits all” approach.

Provided modellers prepare themselves by developing an approach to validation that is required by their user community they will be in a good position to work with the investigating committee and secure the support and funding needed.

In the end, validation is not a “pass-fail” test to be feared, it is a methodology to improve the model and improve confidence in the model results, and to fully understand the strengths and weaknesses of a model. This is essential if you are going to be using the model for analytical uses, and practically essential even if you are using it for training.

So this is an opportunity not a threat. It is a much needed leap forward.

Let us begin work on developing an approach to validation that suits our individual modelling requirements so that we can present them to the review committee when it asks for input.

Now, my experience on this subject, which dates back to managing the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base (ACSDB) in 1987, is that many of the U.S. Military Operations Research community will not see it as “…an opportunity, not a threat.” We shall see.

The Elements of Trevor Dupuy’s Theory of Combat

Trevor Dupuy’s combat models (the Quantified Judgement Model (QJM) and the Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model (TNDM)) are formal expressions of his theory of combat. Dupuy provided an extensive discussion of the basis for his theory in his books, particularly Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat (NOVA Publications, 1987). While many are familiar with his models, fewer are aware of the concepts that he based it upon. This will be the first in a series of posts looking at those elements.

As Dupuy explained,

As a starting point for an explanation of a scientific theory, it is useful to define fundamental terms, to state and explain critical assumptions, and to establish—or limit—the scope of the discussion that follows. The definitions and explanations that follow are generally consistent with usage in the military and analytical communities, and with definitions that have been formulated for its work by The Military Conflict Institute. However, I have in some instances modified or restated these to conform to my own ideas and usage. [Dupuy, Understanding Combat, 63]

The basic elements of his theory of combat are:

Definition of Military Combat
The Hierarchy of Combat
The Conceptual Components of Combat
The Scope of Theory
Definition of a Theory of Combat

These will each be discussed in future posts.

Reminder – Speaking at Historicon in Lancaster, PA., Friday 12 July

I will be speaking at Historicon in Lancaster, PA., Friday 12 July. Historicon is one of the three major annual wargaming conventions run by the Historical Miniatures Gaming Society (HMGS). It will be run from 10 July-14 July, 2019. Their website is here: https://www.hmgs.org/general/custom.asp?page=HconHome

As part of this large convention, they have organized a “War College.” This is an impressive effort that includes 18 lectures on Thursday, Friday and Saturday. I have the last lecture on Friday, from 6 – 7 PM. The speakers for this series include published authors Paul Westermeyer, Pete Panzeri, Steve R. Waddell and John Prados, among others. Lecture descriptions are here:                                                                               . https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.hmgs.org/resource/resmgr/historicon/hcon_19/pels/19_war_college_pel_6-19-2019.pdf

I will be doing a presentation similar to the one I did at the New York Military Affairs Symposium (NYMAS). It is based upon part of my book War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat.

Casualty Estimates for Conflict with Iran – Summation

Well, things in the Gulf have been quieter this last week. We ended up doing three posts related to the casualty estimates for a conflict in Iran. This was because part of President Trump’s decision making was based on an estimate of 150 killed if they struck Iran. This got my attention, because actually, hearing about casualty estimates before a conflict is kind of rare. We end up with three posts on the subject. The first post on subject speculated that President Trump was given a range of estimates, and that was probably the upper boundary of that range. The second post asked is that estimate was for killed or casualties? If is was killed, then were we looking at over 1,000 casualties from three air strikes?  The third post noted that casualty estimates for “evaluating wars” is not that common. This lead me to guess that no such estimate has been made for an extended conflict with Iran. An extended conflict with Iran could move beyond the Gulf to Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan.

Casualty Estimates for Conflict with Iran

Casualty Estimates for Conflict with Iran – Killed and Wounded

How Common are Casualty Estimates?

Anyhow, for the moment things are quiet and nothing has been resolved. We shall see what happens next.

Some other relevant post posts on casualty estimates:

Forecasting the Iraqi Insurgency

Forecasting U.S. Casualties in Bosnia

Assessing the TNDA 1990-91 Gulf War Forecast

Assessing the 1990-1991 Gulf War Forecasts

President Obama’s Casualty Estimates

Casualty Estimates for a War with North Korea

The CRS Casualty Estimates