Mystics & Statistics

In most cases, our calculation of unit losses is based upon the data we assembled for the Kursk Data Base, built from a careful examination of the unit records, and some estimation and guesswork to fill in the hole in the records. Here is what we have for LSSAH tank losses for this day:

Pz IV long: 16 (4 destroyed, 12 damaged)

Pz VI: 1 damaged

Marder III: 2 destroyed

 

Now, we also report 12 tanks returning to duty this day. This is 10 StuG IIIs and 2 Marder IIIs. In the case of the Marder IIIs, two were reported as killed on 12 July (T313, R389) even though there was no change in reported strength from the 11th though the 13th. So….

The battle on the “tank fields of Prokhorovka” occurred on the 12th of July 1943. Ben Wheatley’s count of German losses is based upon aerial photos taken on 14-16 July 1943. The Germans had control of most of the battle area during that time, The SS Panzer Corps was still attacking with the Totenkopf SS Division on the 13th and with the Das Reich SS Division on the 14th and 15th of July. Therefore, the Germans certainly had the time and opportunity to repair or evacuate any damaged or destroyed tanks. We assume that they moved some or most of them by after three to five days. They often tried to evacuate tanks the same day or the day after.

The German army was absolutely axxx very diligent about evacuating and repairing tanks. Their reporting on this is very detailed. If the records survived, every destroyed tank had a hand drawn map in the files showing where they are and by serial number. One such map from an earlier fight is shown above. They regularly provided ten-day status reports tracking the repair status of all tanks. It is clear that they often evacuated tanks and only later wrote them off as destroyed. Sometimes it would take a while before they made that determination. They did not leave a lot of destroyed tanks on the battlefield if they could avoid it. They could always scavenge them for parts.

This subject is significant enough that we have already done a number of blog posts on the subject. For example:

German Damaged versus Destroyed Tanks at Kursk

The Tank Repair and Replacement Efforts of II Guards Tank Corps compared to Totenkopf SS Division

So, if Ben Wheatley is able to count five Panzer IVs on the battlefield, that does not mean the Germans only lost five Panzer IVs. It just means those were the five tanks that were so badly damaged that they were not repairable and there was not a whole lot to scavenge from them. LSSAH Division’s tank losses were clearly higher than 5. We will address that in the next post.

In addition to elements of the XVIII Tank Corps being engaged with Totenkopf SS Division, also, elements of the XXIX Tank Corps were engaged with the Das Reich SS Division.

As I report on page 329 of my Prokhorovka book (or page 940 of my Kursk book — This account was slightly revised for my newer book with one sentence added and two sentences adjusted in the third paragraph):

On the other side of the railroad track, the 25th Tank Brigade, with two batteries of the 1446th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment made more progress. They attacked through Stalinskoye Otdeleniye Sovkhoz and by 1400 (Moscow time) they had taken Storozhevoye and overcome the German fire resistance from Ivanovskii Vyiselok and the groves 1.5 kilometers northeast of Yasnaya Polyana. They also are reported to have taken significant casualties from air and artillery fire (this is Rotmistrov’s claim) but no mention is made of the losses from tank fire. Their attack then stalled somewhere around Storozhevoye, tangled up with the Das Reich SS Division.

The Das Reich reported in the morning an attack against the small forest east of Ivanovskii Vyiselok with 18 to 20 tanks and against its defenses west of Storozhevoye with infantry and tanks. It reported at 1140 Soviet attacks with tanks and infantry against the II Battalion, Deutschland SS Regiment. After this attack was defeated, at 1255 the battalion attacked Storozhevoye. It reported nine Soviet tanks were destroyed. At 1340, the II Battalion then took the south part of Storozhevoye as well as the little woods south of there. At 1505, the battalion was in the north part of Storozhevoye attacking to the east.

The 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade, with the 271st Mortar Regiment, meanwhile had advanced into the woods north of Storozhevoye and were able to reach the “glade.” Elements of the brigade along with at least 15 T-34s from the first tank battalion of the 32nd Tank Brigade had already penetrated to Komsomolets Sovkhoz in the original attack. Even though two attacking Soviet tank brigades were stalled in front of the German positions around height 252.2, elements of the tank corps had been able to bypass this point and take Komsomolets Sovkhoz. The railroad and the woods north of Storozhevoye probably served to cover the brigade’s right flank as it continued forward. After “fierce fighting,” by 1400 (Moscow time), they were able to take Komsomolets Sovkhoz. Still, as none of the other armor of the XXIX Tank Corps had been able to come forward with this brigade, they were left in an untenable position and the Das Reich SS Division was attacking Storozhevoye, behind them.

There is more, but you get the picture. It is clear that significant elements of the XXIX Tank Corps were primarily engaged with Das Reich SS Division.

Therefore, we have parts of the XVIII Tank Corps engaging the Totenkopf SS Division and parts of the XXIX Tank Corps engaging the Das Reich SS Division. This is a little more complicated picture than just the two corps attacking the LSSAH Division. It is not as simple as a 5-to-200+ or even a 19-to-240 exchange. Here are the figures we used in the engagement sheets created from the Kursk Data Base (from pages 954-956 in the Kursk book, and pages 345-347 in the Prokhorovka book):

Totenkopf SS:

…..134 tanks (0 light) versus 70 Soviet tanks (33 light)

…..28 German tanks lost versus 33 Soviet tanks lost

LSSAH:

…..99 tanks (6 light) versus 260 Soviet tanks (83 light)

…..19 German tanks lost versus 155 Soviet tanks lost (!!!)

DR SS:

…..108 tanks (0 light) versus 251 Soviet tanks (103 light) *

…..1 German tanks lost versus 121 Soviet tanks lost

 

This is a little fuzzier picture. Because of the poor quality of record keeping on this day (which does happen when people get busy), there is some confusion as to what some people were doing during parts of the battle. Lining up exactly who was facing who for each division fight requires a little guess work.

 

* This engagement sheet also covers the attacks by the II Guards Tank Corps and the afternoon attack by the II Tank Corps.

If one looks at the losses in the above graphics, one sees the Totenkopf SS Panzer Grenadier Division loosing 28 tanks on the 12th and 29 tanks on the 13th. This is merely a straight line estimate of the losses over two days, as we do not know what they lost on the 12th. We know what they report ready for action on the 11th and we know what they report ready for action on the 13th.

Totenkopf had as of the evening of 11July the following tanks (source: TDI’s Kursk Data Base):

Pz III Long: 54

Pz III Observation: 5

Pz III Command: 7

Pz IV short: 4

Pz IV long: 26

Pz VI: 10 *

Pz VI Command: 1

StuG III: 21

Marder II: 11

On the 13th we have them with:

Pz III long: 32

Pz III Observation: 5

Pz Command: 5

Pz IV short: 3

Pz IV long: 14

Pz VI: 0

Pz VI Command: 1

StuG III: 20

Marder II: 2

This is decline of 57 tanks.

There was a status report for Totenkopf on the 12th but it indicates no losses for the 12th of July (and includes one additional Tiger). Considering its operations that day (read pages 924-927 of my Kursk book or 307-312 of my Prokhorovka book), that is hard to believe. For in addition to being engaged with the gutted 52nd Guards Rifle Division and the fresh 95th Guards Rifle Division of the Fifth Guards Army, they were also engaged with the 11th Motorized Rifle Brigade (X Guards Tank Corps), the 99th Tank Brigade (II Tank Corps) and to some extent with the 181st Tank Brigade (XVIII Tank Corps). Furthermore, they conducted offensive operations: at 0715 (Berlin time) taking the barracks (at Kluchi?) with their panzer battalion, and then their armored group at 0930 (Berlin time) jumped off from hill 226.6 to the northeast. The Fifth Guards Army confirms that the Germans launched this attack claiming at 1215 (Moscow time) the Germans attacked with 100 tanks in the direction of height 226.6. This attack was successful and pushed on to the eastern outskirts of Veselyii and height 236.7.

The Soviets throughout the day launched multiple attacks against the division also. Totenkopf reports attacks on the barracks northwest of Klyuchi at 0330 and 0730. The second attack had tank support (we think from the 99th Tank Brigade, II Tank Corps). There were also many other Soviet attacks during the day.

And then, at 1115 (Berlin time) Totenkopf diverted its drive to the northeast to turn its armor south to cross the Psel at Mikhailovka and move in behind the Soviets south of the Psel. Part of Totenkopf’s armor did cross to the south of the Psel this day and got into a heavy exchange with the XVIII Tank Corps.

It is hard to say what was where at this time, but Totenkopf continued to also advance north of the Psel to the northeast. At 1500 (Berlin time) the Totenkopf armored group was two kilometers northwest of Polezhayev. At 1630 (Moscow time), the Soviets reported that the German offensive had been halted, but fighting clearly continued, for at 1835 (Berlin time), the SS Panzer Corps reported that the armored group from Totenkopf were engaged in heavy tank battles around one kilometer northwest of Polezhayev. Worth looking at a map for this, but Polozhayev is north of Prokhorovka.

There is also the claim in Soviet records that at 1600 (Moscow time) 36 German tanks from hill 226.6 descended into the depression north of that hill and moved through the ravine west of Polezhayev, and headed towards hill 236.7 (some four kilometers away). Reaching the hill, the tanks spent an hour driving back and forth on it, and then departed into the depression west of hill 236.7 (see Prokhorovka, page 309).

Hard to believe that the Totenkopf SS Division suffered no armor losses on the 12th, not even a tank or two broken down. Hard to move armor around without a few breakdowns. Yet, Totenkopf has a tank status report for the 12th that shows no losses. We do not believe that this report reflects the actual situation as of the end of the day on the 12th.

So, we were left with assuming that there were no armor losses on the 12th and 57 tanks lost on the 13th…..or we could split them evenly between the two days. We did the latter, as that appeared more rational. Considering the offensive operations conducted by the Totenkopf SS Division on the 13th and that they were then driven back (!), one could certainly make the argument that more losses should have been assigned on the 13th than the 12th (see pages 965-969 of my Kursk book or 359-363 of my Prokhorovka book). Still, hard to believe there were no losses on the 12th.

It also opens up the question of how many of the XVIII Tank Corps losses were due to the actions of the Totenkopf SS Division and how many tanks did Totenkopf loose engaging the XVIII Tank Corps. The record is not clear here.

 

* They had either 9 Pz VIs this day or 10, depending on which report you choose to accept (see page 926-927 or 311-312)

I do have a nice simple graphic in my books that compares the tank losses on the 12th (and 13th) of July 1943 for both sides. It is on page 953 of my Kursk book and page 344 of my Prokhorovka book. It is shown above.

As can be seen by my count based upon the unit records, the LSSAH Panzer Grenadier Division lost 19 tanks on the 12th. The XVIII Tank Corps lost 81 tanks while the XXIX Tank Corps lost 159 tanks. This is 19 compared to 240. Now, Ben Wheatley from his photo analysis concludes it was 5 Panzer IVs lost versus over 200 Soviet tanks.

But…..this is not the whole story. To start with, the Soviet XVIII Tank Corps was partly engaged with the Totenkopf SS Panzer Grenadier Division. As I note on page 931 of my Kursk book (page 318 of my Prokhorovka book): Rotmistrov reported that at 1330 (Moscow time), the first echelon brigades were fired on by 13 Tigers tanks from the area of height 226.6, which were moving in the direction of the northwestern outskirts of Mikhailovka. The Totenkopf Division had around 11 Tigers operational on the evening of the 11th (and had 10 damaged/broken down on the 12th and 13th). Also, the XXIX Tank Corps was partly engaged with the Das Reich SS Panzer Grenadier Division. So….

(more to come)

I did include in my Kursk book 32 aerial photos taken by the Germans in June and July 1943 (pages 569-600), in what was called the “Photo Reconnaissance Section.” I considered them useful for examining the terrain and a nice supplement to the 1:5000 scale maps I included in the book. I also included 12 such photos in my Prokhorovka book, pages 189-202. It is a nice, large and untapped collection at the National Archives. You can tell when archives files have been heavily used. These looked untouched. I was directed to these files by John Sloan about 10 years ago.

Apparently a British historian by the name of Ben Wheatley tapped into the pictures of the battlefield taken on 14-16 July. He was able to see in some of them the destroyed tanks on the battlefield. It resulted in this article in BBC (it is nice that they pay attention to history): https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48963295

That article was posted in a message to this blog by David Carr. Ben Wheatley paper is here:                                                                          .  https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16161262.2019.1606545

The real story at Prokhorovka has been known for a while, so surprised that this has been getting such attention. The BBC article states that the Germans lost 5 Pz IVs at Prokhorovka while the Soviets lost more than 200.

This is probably a little more certainty about the figures than I have in my books. So over the next couple of posts, I will be exploring what those figures may be. The first problem is the definition of the battlefield and who is on it. The next problem is what tanks were lost on what days. There is also an issue with defining what a loss is.