Mystics & Statistics

Size of aid bill versus Russian defense budget

The military aid bill currently languishing in the House is $61 billion for Ukraine.

It is reported (via Wikipedia) that the Russian defense budget in 2023 was only $86.4 billion. Now, I am not sure how accurate that figure is and whether it has gone up in 2024 (I assume it has). Also Russian labor costs are lower, so it is hard to directly compare with western defense budgets. The 2024 Military Balance puts the Russian budget at $294.6 billion based upon PPP (Purchasing Power Parity).

Still, the Russian “defense” budget only makes up 4.1% of its GDP in 2023. This is surprisingly low for a country at war. In comparison, the U.S. defense budget as a percent of GDP was 3.47%. in 2022. The budget was $816.7 billion in 2023.

In contrast, Ukraine is spending 18% of its GDP on defense in 2024 with a budget of $45 billion (based on nominal figures… PPP figures will be higher as their labor costs are lower than Russia’s).

It is clear that the western power needs to provide at least 100-120 billion a year in military aid to Ukraine. Our European partners are providing half of that.

When does the campaign season start?

The “Eastern Front” is driven by the weather conditions. Kharkov is almost on the 50 degree latitude. The majority of the population of Canada lives below that line. The extended western part of border between the U.S. and Canada is on the 49th latitude line. Winters are kind of cold there. Bad time for campaigning (as the Russians demonstrated in February 2022).

And then at the end of winter the snow melts and everything gets very muddy. It also rains a lot during their “spring.” This is called Pasputitsa (see: Rasputitsa – Wikipedia). These muddy seasons are infamous, effectively stopping all serious military operations. In the case of the battles between Kharkov and Belgorod in 1943, the Germans continued advancing north towards Belgorod until around 21 March, when they had to halt because of the weather. They were not able to consider renewing their offensive operations until after the middle of May. So, the general rule of thumb is that you really can’t do anything in April or most of May. In the case of the Ukrainian offensive last year, they waited until the first week of June to initiate operations. They were also further to the south.

So, right now, everyone is saying that the spring/summer of 2024 is going to open with a Russian offensive. Have no idea of how big or how serious it is going to be. Their last offensive operation, the Battle of Avdiivka (10 October 2023 – 17 February 2024), was overall successful (they took Avdiivka), even if the objective had more political value than military (see: Battle of Avdiivka (2023–2024) – Wikipedia). It did take them a while. It is expected that they will continue offensive operations once the ground dries out.

So, I get weather reports on my iPhone. On Tuesday (when this is going to be posted) the weather is expected to range from 49 (9 Celsius) to a high of 72 (22 Celsius). There was precipitation on Monday but nothing until next Sunday. Precipitation over the next 24 hour is estimated to be 0.15″, which is pretty light. It is unusually dry and moderate. Now, my weather app does not report surface trafficability. There is probably some website that does but I have not found it. The question is: is the ground now dry enough to drive tanks and AFVs across, so everyone is not road bound? I doubt it.

Most likely, we will not see the rumored Russian offensive until the second half of May or later.

Call Congress about Ukrainian aid

Advocacy is not our business, but there a $61 billion aid bill for Ukraine that is coming up in the House perhaps early next week. If you have an opinion on the subject, now is the time to call your congressman and let them know. The links are here: Ukraine – Call Congress. To have an impact, now or early this week is the time to call. In the end, almost no one is there without over 50% of the votes of the voters in their district. We do get the government we deserve. Please let your congressmen know where you stand on the subject.

 

 

Two missing reports – #26 and #27

As I was going through our early reports, it again came to my attention that we were missing two early reports. See: TDI – The Dupuy Institute Publications. They are:

26. Target/Range Experience for Tank & Antitank Weapons (1969) (Batelle) – Pages: NA

27. Historical Data on Tactical Air Operations: The Rome Campaign, 11 May-17 June 1944 (1970) (AFS&A) – Pages: NA

They have been missing for a while. Our report list comes from the 1980s, and even then their pages were listed as “N/A.” I gather that means we were missing them at that time. They may have been classified. When DMSi/HERO was shut down in the early 1990s, any classified reports had to be burned.

Anyhow, the customers for those reports were Batelle and AFS&A. If anyone has access to these reports, we would love to get a copy for our files.

Personnel Attrition Rates….

While searching the internet for something else, I ran across this April 1996 report by Dr. Robert L. Helmbold of CAA (Center for Army Analysis). Personnel Attrition Rates in Historical Land Combat Operations: Losses of National Populations, Armed Forces, Army Groups, and Lower Level Land Combat Forces. (dtic.mil)

I am surprised that I have not seen that before. At the time of its publication we were under contract with CAA for work on the Kursk Data Base (KDB). I gather Dr. Helmbold retired shortly thereafter. I was asked if I wanted to take over his slot at CAA, but being the executive officer of TDI, I was not willing to step back down to a non-management position. I had gotten spoilt.

Anyhow, a few notes:

Page 1-1 (page 22 in the pdf file): They list six supporting reports done between 1992-1995. I assume there are all available from DTIC.

Page 2-1 (page 27): This chapter addresses the question of losses in wars as a whole. This might have some value in looking at mobilization levels for Ukraine.

Page 3-1 (page 55): This chapter addresses variation of loses by nationality, theater and major operations or campaigns.

Page 4-1 (page 66): The Chapter addresses losses by Army Groups. This chapter is mostly based upon George Kuhn’s work the LMI, as is some of the next two chapters. Some of George Kuhn’s data was collected under contract with HERO (our predecessor company).

Page 5-1 (page 75): This chapter address losses by Army. This chapter does include a number of graphs from the CDB90 data base (which was built from our work) as does the next chapter.

Page 6-1 (page 99): This chapter addresses losses by Corps.

Anyhow, two Dupuy books are referenced in this report, along with four HERO reports. In the study directive the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base (ACSDB) and the Kursk Data Base (KDB) was both referenced but they were not used. I was the program manager for both of those databases.

Tank Ditch at Prokhorovka

Recently got a request for a better map of the tank ditch at Prokhorovka. This request was in response to this post: Tank Losses on 12/13 July 1943 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Instead of a map, Eugene Matyukhin provided me the following annotated aerial photographs taken at the time:

A few blog posts related to this subject:

The Importance of the Tank Ditch | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Basis of the Tank Ditch Story of 12 July 1943 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Was the Tank Ditch encountered in the morning, the afternoon, or both? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Meanwhile back at the Tank Ditch | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8-10 October 2024

This is the second provisional schedule for the third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC). We currently have 27 presentations scheduled by 19 speakers and two group discussions planned. We are looking for more presentations. Each slot is an hour long, so plan for a 45-minute presentation and 15 minutes of discussion.

The conference is at 1934 Old Gallows Road, Suite 350, Vienna, VA 22182. This is basically across the street by Tysons Corner Shopping mall and the Marriot Hotel on Route 7. It is right off the Route 7 exit from 495 (the Beltway). It is at the corner of Route 7 (Leesburg Pike) and Old Gallows Road. It is in the building above the restaurant called Rangos. Parking is in the parking garage next door to it.

Conference description is here: The Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 in Tysons Corner, VA | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Costs, Hotels and Call for Presentations (these are all 2023 postings but nothing has changed): Cost of the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17 -19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Hotels for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Call for Presentations for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The cost of the conference is $150 for entire conference or $60 a day. This the same as the last two years. Please pay through PayPal (www.paypal.com) to SRichTDI@aol.com. The conference is priced to cover the costs of the conference facility. We are also set up to take credit card payments by phone. Call The Dupuy Institute during working hours at (703) 289-0007.

We are set up for virtual presentations and virtual attendees. We do record the presentations but most have not been published yet.

 

Schedule: Pike and Gallows Conference Center

Updated: revised 11 April 2024

 

Day 1: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 0930   Introductory remarks – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

0930 – 1030   Studying Combat: The “Base of Sand” Problem – Dr. Shawn R. Woodford

1030 – 1130   Slouching Towards Wabash: The Withering of Historical Analysis in the American Profession of Arms – Ivan Torres (Major, U.S. Army, ret.)

1130 – 1230   Redux: Quantifying Warfare – Alexandru Filip (Canadian Center for Strategic Studies)

1230 – 1400   Lunch

1400 – 1500   Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII – Sasho Todorov, esquire  

1500 – 1600   Validation Challenges in Wargaming: What’s Real Here? – Dr. Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1600 – 1700   open

1700 – 1800   Grinch in Ukraine – Carl Larson

 

Evening (1900):   Group Dinner – Rangos

 

Day 2: Analysis of Unconventional Warfare

0900 – 1000   Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1000 – 1100   The Gaza Death Numbers – Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University)

1100 – 1200   HAMAS: A History of Terrorism (Jennifer Schlacht, M.A.)

1200 – 1300   Lunch

1300 – 1400   Native American Wars and Conflicts, 1500-1900 – Dr. David Cuberes

1400 – 1500   Close Combat Overmatch Weapons (SLAMMER) – Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.)

1500 – 1600   open 

1600 – 1700   Group Discussion: The Next Middle East Wars

 

Evening (1900):   Group Dinner – BJs

 

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000   open

1000 – 1100   Reserved (Dr. James Slaughter)

1100 – 1200   The Future of TDI and work of the conference – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1200 – 1300   Lunch

1300 – 1400   The Red Army’s Offensive Operations in Ukraine, 1943-44 – Dr. Richard Harrison

1400 – 1500   Critique of Western Wargames of NATO-WP Conflict – Walker Gargagliano

1500 – 1600   Capabilities of FPV drones in Ukraine: Revolution or Continuation of Historical Quantitative Trend? – Dr. Alexander Kott 

1600 – 1700   Group Discussion: Russo-Ukrainian War

 

Evening:   Happy hour – Rangos 

 

 

Schedule: Einstein Conference Room

 

Day 1: Poster and Book Room

Opened at 0800

 

Afternoon Day 1: Air Warfare Analysis

1400 – 1500   open

1500 – 1600   Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII (part 2 or overflow presentation) – Sasho Todorov, esquire 

1600 – 1700   open

 

Day 2: Analysis of Conventional Combat – mostly virtual

0900 – 1000   Designing Computer Based AI Wargaming Systems for Simulating and Investigating Historical Battles – Clinton Reilly (Computer Strategies, Australia) – virtual

1000 – 1100   Beaches by the Numbers – Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill (Concordia University, Quebec) – virtual

1100 – 1200   Surveying and Quantifying Naval Warfare – Alexandru Filip

1200 – 1300   Lunch

1300 – 1400   Urban Warfare: Myths and Reality – Dr. James Storr (UK) – virtual

1400 – 1500   Urban Warfare (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1500 – 1600   open

1600 – 1700   Winfield Scott: Architect of American Joint Warfare (LtC. Nathan A. Jennings) – virtual 

 

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000   The Impact of Horses on Native Americans – Dr. David Cuberes

1000 – 1100   The Red Army’s Plans for a Preemptive Attack in 1941 – Dr. Richard Harrison

1100 – 1200   Mass Egress after an IED Explosion: Lessons Learned about Validation – Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1200 – 1300   Lunch    

1300 – 1400   Political Science Pedagogy in Strategic Studies (A Contrast in Quantified History) – Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill – virtual

1400 – 1500   open

1500 – 1600   open

1600 – 1700   open

 

The presentations from all three days of the first HAAC are here: Presentations from the first HAAC – all three days | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Friday, October 11: Tour of a Civil War Battlefield – Antietam: bloodiest day of the U.S. Civil War (and in the Western Hemisphere?). –  we will arrange transport there and back ($20 charge for tour).

The 40% Rule

Hadn’t done a blog post in the while. Been focused on getting a book done. Sorry.

There is a rule of thumb often quoted out there and often put in war games that a unit becomes ineffective or reaches a breakpoint at 40% casualties. The basis for this rule is a very limited body of studies and analysis.

First, I have never seen a study on when a unit become ineffective. Even though it is now an accepted discussion point, I have not seen such a study establishing this relationship and do not think that such a study exists. I am not saying that there is not a relationship between casualties and unit effectiveness, what I am saying that I have never seen a study establishing that 1) this relationship exists, and 2) what are its measurements, and 3) what is the degree of degradation.

What has been done is studies on breakpoints, and over time, a rule of thumb that at 40% a unit “breaks” appears to be widely accepted. It appears that this rule has then been transferred to measuring unit effectiveness.

The starting point for “breakpoints” study is Dorothy Clark’s study of 43 battalions from World War II done in 1954. That study showed that the average casualties for these battalions was around 40%, although the ranged from around 1% to near 100%. Her conclusion was that “The statement that a unit can be considered no longer combat effective when it has suffered a specific casualty percentage is a gross oversimplification not supported by combat data.” She also stated “Because of wide variations in data, average loss percentages alone have limited meaning.”. We have discussed this before, see: C-WAM 4 (Breakpoints) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and April | 2018 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Breakpoints in U.S. Army Doctrine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Response 3 (Breakpoints) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). 

The next point is the U.S. Army’s Maneuver Control manuals (FM 105-5) which in 1964 set the attacker’s breakpoint at around 20 percent casualties and the defender’s breakpoint at around 40 percent at the battalion-level. Charts in the 1964 Maneuver Control field manual showed a curve with the probability of unit break based on percentage of combat casualties. Once a defending unit reached around 40 percent casualties, the chance of breaking approached 100 percent. Once an attacking unit reached around 20 percent casualties, the chance of its halting (type I break) approached 100 percent, and the chance of its breaking (type II break) reached 40 percent. These data were for battalion-level combat. 

We have never found any studies establishing the data for these Maneuver Control manuals and we do not think they exist. Something may have been assembled when they were writing these manuals, but we have not been able to find any such files. Most likely, the tables were extension of the Dorothy Clark study, even though she said that it should not apply.

Anyhow, that is kind of it. Other stuff had been published on breakpoints, Helmbold in 1972, McQuie in 1987 (see: Battle Outcomes: Casualty Rates As a Measure of Defeat | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)) and Dupuy in the late 1980s, but I have not seen anything of significance since, as it appears that most significant studies and analysis work stopped around 1989. 

Now, Dr. Richard Harrison, who spends a lot of time translating old Soviet documents, has just sent me this: 

“Supposing that for the entire month not a single unit will receive reinforcements, then we will have a weakening of 30%, with 70% of the troops present. This is a significant weakening, but it does not yet deprive the unit of its combat strength; the latter’s fall begins approximately with losses of 40%.”

His source is: 

N.N. Movchin, Posledovatel’nye Operatsii po Opytu Marny i Visly (Consecutive Operations on the Experience of the Marne and Vistula) (Moscow and Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1928), page 99.

So, the U.S. came up with the 40% rule in 1954 which it disowned and then adopted in 1964 regardless. And here we have a 1928 Russian writing which is directly applying a 40% rule to unit effectiveness. I have no idea what the analytical basis is for that statement, but it does get my attention.  

Let’s talk about artillery shells

Now, when we first did the validation database the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base, one of the fields we had to fill in for each division, and corps, and army was on the tons of ammunition used each day by four types.

This was because the combat models that were supposed to be validated using this database were used in part to determine the number of shells needed for a predicted upcoming war. Back in 1987, when we started this database, it was a war in Europe versus the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

Now, my history with the Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA), later renamed the Center for Army Analysis (still CAA), goes back to 1973, when it was founded in Bethesda, MD. I was in my junior year in high school, my mother had just been promoted to a school principal and my father had just finished his three-year assignment in the Pentagon. My mother did not want to move again, so, my father found another assignment in the DC area. This was with the newly forming CAA in 1973. He had just happened to have finished a master degree in Systems Analysis from USC, so was nominally qualified.

My father was working over at manpower in the Pentagon, under Col. John Brinkerhoff. They all reported to General Donn Starry (who I did have the pleasure of meeting). Those two transferred together over the CAA, with Col. (Dr.) John Brinkerhoff taking over a division with my father as his assistant. I therefore started hearing stories about CAA combat models in 1973 based upon my father’s hands-on experience. One of the stories he told was that the model tended to fire the longest-range weapons first as units were closing. This made the 8″ Howitzer very valuable. In fact, so valuable, that the best wargaming strategy was build an army of 8″ Howitzers and destroy the Warsaw Pact before they could ever get into engagement range. Obviously, there were a couple of flaws in that wargame.

But, the suite of models, some of which are still in use today, was used to determine the ammunition requirements for the U.S. Army. Therefore, a validation database needed to address these issues. The same fields also existed the Kursk Data Base (1993-1996), which ended up never being used to validate a combat model. It was used to create a big-ass book.

Anyhow, CAA combat models did determine our ammunition requirements until the end of the cold war (22 or 25 or 26 December 1991 when the Soviet Union fell). They were also used to determine the requirements for the 1991 Gulf War. According to the story I heard in a meeting, CAA provided the Army general staff with the requirements for the Gulf War. The general staff doubled the figures CAA gave and then we stacked every dock in the Gulf with ammunition. Luckily none of Hussian’s missiles hit those docks. At the end of the war, it turns out we shipped at least ten times the ammunition we needed. As this was old dumb munitions dating back to World War II, it was cheaper to destroy them there then ship them back, which is what we did. Don’t have a count of what was destroyed in the Gulf, but guessing it was millions of rounds. 

After that, I do not know what OSD PA&E or CAA or the U.S. Army did to determine ammunition requirements. We no longer had a neatly canned scenario like the Fulda Gap. We no longer had a clear enemy. How much ammunition is needed is driven by both the combat model used (which tends to “run hot”) and more significantly, the scenarios used. If all the scenarios used a four-day combat scenario (like the Gulf War) then one will end up with very different needs then if one is planning for a 90-day or 180-day war (or three-year war in the case of Ukraine). I have no idea what scenarios were used, and it is probably classified. But, the end result, is that our production of ammunition over the decades since 1991 has dropped considerably while a lot of our reserves were destroyed in the Gulf.

This, of course, harkens back to a complaint I have made over the years, which is that we tend to focus on the missions and wars we think are most likely now, and not the entire spectrum of wars and conflicts that we can see are possible if one looks wider and deeper into history. Clearly, we were not ready for extended war in Ukraine, and this is not the first time in recent times we have not been properly prepared for certain conflicts. I do discuss this issue in America’s Modern Wars. 

P.S. The West is underestimating Ukraine’s artillery needs – Defense One

So, has Ukraine only lost 31,000 since the start of the war?

Well, Zelenskyy got my attention with his claim on Sunday that Ukraine has lost 31,000 killed in action since the start of the war. He also claimed that the Russians have lost 180,000. See: Zelenskyy says 31,000 Ukrainian soldiers killed since Russia invaded 2 years ago | CBC News).

Several issues here:

First, who makes up those 31,000 killed? If Zelenskyy has thrown out a figure for the first time since the summer of 2022, I am guessing it is based upon something. These figures probably do not include missing. Now we do not have a count of the missing. We do know that as of 30 June 2022 Russia claimed that there were at least 6,000 Ukrainians captured (see Battle for Kyiv, Chapter 20). In early July 2022, the Ukrainian missing person commissioner stated on TV that more than 7,000 people are missing, including soldiers, national guardsmen, border guards and intelligence officers. When on the defense and retreating, the missing can add up, sometimes exceeding the number reported as killed. This is shown by the Russian First Guards Tank Army reports for 24 February to 15 March 2022 (even though they were on the offiense), the missing outnumbered the killed (See: Tank Losses and Crew Casualties in the Russo-Ukrainian War | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and The Russian First Tank Army Report from 24 February – 15 March 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)). 

But, I am not sure that is all that is missing. Are Ukrainian National Guard included? The Ukrainian National Guard includes units such as the Azov Battalion. They are not organizationally part of the Ukrainian Army. Then there is the Territorial Defense Forces. These often ad hoc organizations are officially part of the Ukrainian Army, but not sure that their losses are being counted among the army losses. So, actually Ukrainian losses are clearly higher than 31,000.

The last time Zelenskyy gave an estimate was on 21 August of 2022. He said at the time that their losses were around 9,000. Two months earlier (11 June), there were reports that Ukraine was saying that their losses were 10,000. So they have a 1,000 less losses two months later? A presidential aide put Ukrainian losses as of 1 December 2022 at 10,000 – 13,000. So, we have 13,000 losses in the first 9 months of the war, and another 18,000 losses in the last 15 months? 

Now, in my last estimate of Ukrainian losses, I put Ukrainian losses at least at 60,000 killed. I am not sure I am ready to back away from that: See: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 699 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Part of the reason for my higher totals is that I don’t think there is a wide disparency between Ukrainian and Russian losses. Yet, Zelenskyy is saying there is an exchange rate of almost 6-to-1. How does that happen? Supposedly Russian has an artillery advantage, Ukraine has a shell shortage (which is part of the reason they are claiming for the loss of Avdiivka), and Russia is firing like three times to ten times the rounds per day as Ukraine is. Now, in a modern conventional war (modern in this case is defined as 1904 and later), the majority of casualties are taken by artillery and other high explosive weapons. If Russia has a significant artillery advantage, then how in the hell are they taking six times the losses of the Ukrainians? This simply defies logic. 

So, either the Ukrainian claims of losses is too low (which is probably the case) or the Ukrainian claims of Russian losses are simply too high (which is also probably the case). I will stick with my previous estimates (repeated liink): The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 699 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Now, the last report from the Ukrainian defense ministry was that Russian losses were over 400,000 killed (409,820 as of 25 February 2024). This number had been batted around without comment by a lot of people on twitter (now known as X – which sucks as an App name). Clearly, Zelenskyy is now repudiating his defense ministry’s own claims by providing a figure that is less than half of that. Are all those people on twitter who have accepted these previous Ukrainian claims lock, stock and barrel going to scale back to the lower figures? I am tempted to call them out by name, but I prefer to find the truth, not get into arguments with people. There has been a lot of really light-weight bullshit casualty figures put out there by people who should know better.

So let us say that Russia does have an artillery advantage and has been firing more shells (see: The West is underestimating Ukraine’s artillery needs – Defense One). That would argue for higher Ukrainian losses than Russian losses. Now, I gather the nature of their artillery shells are not the same. Russia is firing lots of “dumb” munitions. That is certainly the case with the stuff they are getting from North Korea. I gather the percent of rounds that are smart munitions is higher (much higher?) for the Ukrainians than for Russia. So, less firepower but more accuracy. Does that generate a more favorable exchange ratio for Ukraine? Could be. Does in generate a 6-to-1 exchange ratio? Probably not.

Now, for all practical purposes, Ukraine has really not been on the offensive since November 2022. The little attack that they did in early June 2023 was “offensive light” and called off before the casualties got too high. They really have not done anything since then. On the other hand, Russia has had two extended furious offensives, at Bakhmut in early 2023, where they clearly took losses (and threw people away in penal units) and now Avdiivka. Do these two offensives add up to another 150,000 killed above and beyond what Ukraine has lost? I seriously doubt it. I do not rule out that it did run up Russian losses to be higher than Ukrainian losses, which is part of the reason I potentially put Ukrainian losses at only 75% of Russian losses. This a very different than a 6-to-1 exchange ratio.

So, for now I am sticking with my estimates as outlines in the post (repeated link): The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 699 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The count of Russian losses by Mediazona is now 44,654 (as of 15 February 2024). If I double that, then we are looking at potentially 89,308 killed. This is about half of what Zelenskyy is saying. Now, the Ukrainian Book of Remembrance for the Fallen for Ukraine had 22,224 names listed of the end of August 2023, while Mediazone has 30,698 Russian names listed as of 24 August 2023 (this is 72%). If we take 75% of Russia’s casualties, then we end up with 66,981. Is this a valid Ukrainian casualty estimate? If so, that puts Ukrainian losses at over twice what Zelenskyy is saying.

Is it possible in the middle of a war that a politician running one side could claim their losses are half of what they actually suffered while doubling their enemy’s losses? Distinctly possible.