Category China

The Chinese amphibious lift capacity

During the Third HAAC a discussion developed over what is the amphibious lift capacity of the armed forces of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). This is, of course, directly related to the issue of whether China can successfully invade and conquer Taiwan. We then held follow-up discussions with some the HAAC attendees on the subject.  This is going to generate some new posts to the blog detailing out what we explored. But, let me summarize the tentative conclusions of the discussion here.

First, China has the ability to land over 20,000 soldiers on Taiwan on the first wave. This is not much considering the defending Taiwanese ground forces consist of over 100,000 active troops. China maybe be able to supplement that with 10,000 airmobile troops, but this is risky in a strong anti-air environment. They may be able to add other troops by use of commercial shipping and other means, but this is pretty uncertain.

Obviously on subsequent days, they can land another 20,000 or more troops, but we are looking at a week to build up an army capable to fully engaging the Taiwanese Army. In the meantime, Taiwan can mobilize hundreds of thousands of reserves. Added to that, Chinese reinforcements and resupply are subject to interdiction. While China has a lot of aircraft and missiles, so too does Taiwan if it is properly backed up by the United States. This invasion does not appear to be an “iffy” proposition, it appears to be one that will most likely fail.

Now, if China can directly seize a port and/or an airfield, then possibilities develop, but if Taiwan properly defends these locales, this is also a long shot. 

To successfully invade Taiwan China will need to be able to land a whole lot more troops on the first and subsequent waves. Nominally it has that capability with a large number of 50-year old landing craft. These are mostly not active and some are in civilian use as tugs and ferries. Furthermore these small landing craft have to traverse 100 miles of ocean at a speed of 8-12 miles per hour in a hostile environment. This is not promising. There are other options, like using merchant ships (and running them aground?), fishing fleets, etc. None of these are particularly promising for a modern mechanized army. 

Now China does have dozens of large roll-on, roll-off ferry ships that could be used to supplement their amphibious operations, but, they usually need a dock to unload at. This implies that any amphibious operation will have to start by seizing a port, which can be defended, and if taken, can be denied immediate use. These are really not first wave assets. Nominally they can provide additional over-the-beach lift capacity for an initial wave by loading them up with small landing craft and unloading the small craft offshore at sea, but there are still two limitations here: 1) they need small landing craft or amphibious vehicles, and 2) because they are in commercial use, activating them will give Taiwan weeks, if not months of notice. Taiwan’s reserves are 2.3 million people. See: China’s Secret Weapon in the Invasion of Taiwan: RoRo Ferries

It is clear that while China has maintained a modern Marine force with amphibious capability, they had not maintained the amphibious capability to invade Taiwan. Their Marine force is structured for use elsewhere, not Taiwan. It is clear, based upon their military capabilities, that they currently have no real plans to invade Taiwan.

This, of course, can change if the United States does not continue to support Taiwan or if Taiwan loses the desire to defend itself, but right now, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is not really practical given the limited Chinese first wave lift capacity.

We will be discussing the details of this on subsequent days: 

  • Tues: The load on PLA Navy Amphibious Assault Ships
  • Wed: Other Chinese landing craft
  • Thu: The RoRo Ships
  • Fri: The Chinese fishing fleet as an amphibious asset

 

The Japanese Gifu and Chinese Zhuhai Airshows, 2024

Continuing with a weekly post from Geof Clark, an American currently residing in Japan:

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Title: Japanese Gifu and Chinese Zhuhai Airshows, 2024


Image credit @AfbR681dzgszG1a
https://twitter.com/AfbR681dzgszG1a/status/1858810386805649512/photo/4

Recently, I attended an airshow at the Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces (JASDF) air base in Gifu Prefecture. According to the JASDF, about 65,000 people attended. This included many interesting aircraft, including F-15Js & F-2s fighters, KC-767 tanker, C-1 & C-2 cargo aircraft, and a USMC F/A-18C from the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni, among others. It was very impressive, however, the majority of these aircraft are decades old, and while they have been modified and improved over the years, the fundamental capabilities are unchanged. The JASDF and Japanese Maritime SDF (JMSDF) have both invested in F-35A and F-35B stealth aircraft in more recent years, but these were not on display in Gifu.

Perhaps the most modern kit on display was probably the XASM-3. This is a standoff anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) which allows the F-2 aircraft to launch a maritime strike on enemy vessels from outside of their air defense envelope.

“Japan started full-scale development of a missile called XASM-3 in FY2010 that can be operated by (JASDF) F-2 fighter jets. The XASM-3 was an air-launched anti-ship missile (ASM) that cruised at supersonic speeds (above Mach 3) thanks an Integral Rocket Ramjet engine. It had a range of about 200 km (108 nautical miles).”


Four J-20s banks left of the show center. (Image credit: Rin Sakurai)

In contrast, the annual Chinese airshow at Zhuhai this year was very impressive. According to CCTV (the state-operated military news outlet), 600,000 people attended, and new contracts worth 280 billion yuan (about $38.6 billion) were signed. On display a number of impressive new aircraft and capabilities for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), from Russia, and available for possible export. The Aviationist has a good list of capabilities revealed. The following list & commentary is by no means exhaustive, but it gives an idea of these capabilities:

• PLA Air Force (PLAAF) – The Shenyang FC-31 prototype has been accepted by the PLAAF and commissioned as the J-35A stealth fighter. A smaller and probably less expensive stealth fighter to complement the J-20A, which is already in service. Is this part of a “high/low mix” with Chinese characteristics? Some claim that some smoke plumes seen illustrate the ongoing challenges China faces trying to match Western & Russian engine capability & quality.
• PLAAF – a J-20 “four ship” (four aircraft) put on a great flying demonstration, and a twin seat J-20S mock-up was on display. I saw one comment on X (twitter) claim that this was the first 5.5 generation fighter, as it is the first twin seat stealth fighter, which purports to better enable the concept of operations (CONOPS) of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA). These are the fancy U.S. terms for the rear seat occupant managing flights of drones that accompany or are in close proximity (i.e. line of sight) to the J-20S aircraft. The USAF is progressing with plans for CCA, to be used with the F-22, F-35, possibly F-15EX and ultimately the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) “family of systems”. How much will a second person in the cockpit matter?
• Rosoboronexport (Russian state owned enterprise for arms exports) – an Su-57 (well, actually a T-50 prototype, thanks Millenium 7 …) gave an impressive flight display, complete with stunning acrobatics. The export statistics brochure data for both Su-57E and Su-75 Checkmate are linked here. There was also an announcement that the Su-57E has its first export contract, and speculation that Algeria is the most likely purchasing country, although others are possible … and indeed it might be the next in a long line of contracts that did not materialize …
• The Russian Knights put on an impressive display, returning to Zhuhai after an eight year absence. They flew in formation and solo demonstrations of Su-30SM and Su-35S. While this was certainly impressive, the Flanker family has had some challenges in Ukraine, and we will explore this in detail in a separate blog post soon.
• The PLAAF displayed their J-16D variant of the Flanker, and the PLA Navy (PLAN) displayed a similar J-15D, both of which are dedicated electronic warfare (EW) variants. Many military analysts comparing these to an EA-18G Growler, which might be apt for the J-15D, since both are carrier-borne, but the J-16D is a dedicated EW platform for the PLAAF, and the last time the U.S. Air Force (USAF) has such a platform was the EF-111A, which was retired in 1998.
• PLAN also displayed the J-15T naval variant, now equipped to be launched by catapult by the PLANS-18 (CV-003) Fujian aircraft carrier (CV), and probably future PLAN CVs, as well as being backward compatible with the existing ski-jump CVs. This will provide the capability to launch more rapidly with a much greater payload weight, possibly heralding a maritime strike fighter role, in addition to the air defense role. Other elements of the future air wing are expected to include a naval version of the J-35A mentioned above, and a fixed wing airborne early warning and control (what the U.S. calls AWACS) aircraft with the possible designation of KJ-600 As a side note, the Fujian has departed for sea trial number 5.
• A plethora of un-crewed platforms that were also on static display including …

o CH-7, a peer competitor to US-made RQ-180, “ready to meet navy’s demand for maritime missions”. With a “debut at the airshow in 2018, it was being designed to be a stealth armed reconnaissance UAV that can play a strategic role in combat, so it was bigger and able to conduct strike missions to eliminate a strategic target. However, six years on, the CH-7 project has experienced a change … to [an] advanced tactical drone that is able to conduct various missions due to the development of modern warfare and the changing demand of clients”, Cao Ran of Aerospace CH UAV told the Global Times at the airshow.
o CH-9, a larger sized armed reconnaissance drone
o CH-3D, a smaller, lower cost drone
o CH-YH-1000, a cargo drone
o SS-UAV, or “Smart configuration Support Un-crewed Aerial Vehicle”, is a large, modular drone which according to Jane’s Defense might “undertake multiple missions, including maritime strike, long-range cargo transport, and surveillance.” There was speculation that it might also act as a mothership for multiple “attritable” drones in a swarm.

There are other systems which play a big role in aerial warfare, including the HQ-19 and DF-1000, which we will blog about soon!

Thanks for reading and for your comments!

“The Games the Marine Corps Plays”

An associate strongly recommended I look at this article. I would recommend the same to our readership: The Games the Marine Corps Plays | Military.com

It is written by Gary Anderson of GWU, who I do not know. But, to quote a few lines from the article:

  1. “You do not want prying eyes on your work that might question its rigor or validity.”
  2. “Since the Marines would be hundreds of miles away and irrelevant, they could be safely ignored.”
  3. “First, the Corps hired the most incompetent red team in the history of war-gaming, or their analysts cooked the books” (this sounds like a familiar problem, see:  Wargaming 101 – Sayers vs. The U.S. Navy | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)).

Anyhow, it is not a long article. Recommend reading it.

U.S. Defense Budget for 2022

The U.S. Defense budget was signed into law on Monday. A few things that caught my attention:

  1. Increase of 5% (I guess we have to replace all that equipment left behind in Afghanistan).
  2. 2.7% pay raise (which I gather makes up around 2% or so of that 5% increase).
  3. Seems to be focused on keeping “pace militarily with China and Russia.”
  4. “The bill includes $7.1 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and a statement of congressional support for the defense of Taiwan, measures intended to counteract China’s influence in the region.”
  5. “It also includes $300 million for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, a show of support in the face of Russian aggression, as well as $4 billion for the European Defense Initiative.”

Let’s look at what keeping “pace militarily with China and Russia” looks like in dollars and sense:

U.S. Budget: $768.2 billion (2022) or 3.42% of GDP in 2019.

Chinese (PRC) Defense Budget: $209.4 billion (2021) or 1.3% of GDP (2021)

Russian Defense Budget: 61.7 billion (2020-21) or 4.3% of GDP (2019).

 

See: https://www.marketwatch.com/story/biden-signs-bill-authorizing-768-2-billion-in-2022-defense-spending-including-a-2-7-pay-raise-for-service-members-into-law-01640648957?siteid=yhoof2&yptr=yahoo

Some Polling on Taiwan

This article showed up on my yahoo news feed that caught my attention: https://news.yahoo.com/poll-almost-9-10-taiwanese-184348279.html

Highlights:

  1. 86% of Taiwanese oppose “one country, two system” policy of Deng Xiaoping.
  2. 85% of Taiwanese support maintain the status quo, 7% say Taiwan should declare independence, and 1.6% expressed support for reunification.
  3. 69% of Americans support the recognition of Taiwan as an independent nations. 
  4. 53% of Americans support a formal alliance between the U.S. and Taiwan.

This last finding kind of surprised me so I pulled up that article: https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/research/public-opinion-survey/first-time-half-americans-favor-defending-taiwan-if-china-invades

The interesting aspect of that survey is: 60% of Republicans support sending U.S. troops to Taiwan’s defense, as do 50% of Democrats and 49% of Independents.

Pratas Island

Noted an article yesterday:

https://www.yahoo.com/news/china-debated-attacking-taiwan-controlled-123900171.html

Basically, Taiwan is saying that China is considering invading Pratas island in 2024 or after (but not before 2024).

Now, Pratas Island is located 200 miles (310 kilometers) southeast of Hong Kong. It is 276 miles (444 kilometers) from Taiwan.

It is a circular atoll with a single island that is crescent-shaped (see picture).  It is that little piece of land in the western part of the atoll with a lagoon.

Map of Pratas Island (1969)

The island is about 430 acres (174 hectares) and measure 1.7 miles long (2.8 kilometers) and is only about a half-mile wide (0.537 miles or 0.865 kilometers). Not exactly a prize the size of Taiwan. There are “numerous” oil wells to the west of island. Not sure how much, if any, oil is being pumped there. 

The height of the island at the base of the “The Pratas Triangulation Point” is 2.4875 meters (8.16 feet). Sea levels are currently projected to rise 2-3 feet by the end of this century, so I gather this island is going to get smaller over time.

According to Wikipedia there are about 500 Taiwanese marines stationed there. The island has no permanent inhabitants. (see: Pratas Island – Wikipedia).

Pratas Island Lagoon

Now, I am not sure I am going to loose a lot of sleep over this one.

  1. It is a fairly insignificant piece of terrain.
  2. No one lives there.
  3. Is China really going to take the political and economic hit to take this?

If China grabbed the island, they were certainly take a political hit. They are not exactly the most popular country in the world right now, and this would have a negative impact to their world image and standing. I assume the local defense force would defend it, making it a bloody conquest. What would be the cost of this?

Militarily, it would serve to justify increases in the U.S., Taiwanese, South Korean and Japanese defense budgets.

Economically, it might have little impact, but two of China’s major trading partners are the United States and Taiwan. There might be limited or extensive economic sanctions.

Is this a hit that China is willing to take? 

Things related to our discussion on invading Taiwan

Over the last month, we did something like eleven posts analyzing the possibilities and the ability of China to invade and occupy Taiwan. The summery post is here:
Will China invade Taiwan in the next 20 years? Summation: | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Just spotted a CNN article that is related: US Air Force to send dozens of F-22 fighter jets to the Pacific amid tensions with China

A few highlights:

  1. We are sending 25 F-22s to Guam and Tinian Islands (Northern Marianas).
  2. F-22’s are fifth-generation combat jets. China has 20-24. We have 180 F-22s (and then there are F-35s).
  3. Only about half of the F-22s “…are mission capable at any one time due to maintenance requirements.”
  4. 10 F-15s and 2 C-130Js are also deploying.

I copied the cover picture from the article. 

Excess Deaths in China

Still can’t get to the Johns Hopkins site to do my weekly update. Not sure why.

In the meantime, let me briefly address the issue of excess deaths in China, as that was not discussed in the Economist article.

An article of interest: https://medicalxpress.com/news/2021-02-deaths-china-covid-outbreak.html

Also see: https://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/372/bmj.n415.full.pdf

Main points:

  1. This only looked at 1 January to 31 March 2020
  2. Overall deaths did not increase for most of China.
  3. Excess deaths were in Wuhan were 412 per 100,000.
    1. Or, to convert this to a meaningful number, population of the urban area of  Wuhan in 2018 was 8,896,900. 
      1. Population of the Prefecture is 11,081,000 in 2018.
      2. Population of the Metro area is 19 million.
    2. Therefore, excess deaths are at least 36,655 depending on which population is used.
  4. Outside of Wuhan city, the overall death rate was slightly lower. This is probably related to the lockdown.

I have not seen excess deaths calculations for all of China or excess death calculations after 31 March 2020. China reported as of last week 4,848 deaths. This is probably undercounted. The actual number of deaths in China from Coronavirus is probably in the tens of thousands and may exceed a hundred thousand. I have not seen evidence indicating that it is worse than that.

Will China invade Taiwan in the next 20 years? Summation:

This post is a summation of my previous ten posts on the subject. We first looked in two posts whether there was a reasonable threat of Taiwan being invaded in the next six years. Our conclusion was that the idea was “somewhat loopy.” I was surprised that I received no push-back from any readers on this. The two posts are:

Invading Taiwan in the next six years – wherefore and why? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Invading Taiwan in the next six years – the fight? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

My nagging suspicion was that the claims made by retiring Admiral Phillip Davidson of the Indo-Pacific Command was a whole lot more related to preserving or generating budget than it was a realistic assessment.

I then looked at what is the costs and risks for China if they choose to invade Taiwan. They are significant and it is not just economic. I also looked at the leadership of China, which is more than one man. This is in this post: Will China take the risk and actually invade Taiwan? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

I then took a more long-term look (20 years) at the subject with an introductory post and six follow-up post discussing each of the six variables in depth. They are:

Will China invade Taiwan in the next 20 years? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Variable 1: Who is the leader of China? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Variable 2: What is the changing composition of the politburo? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Variable 3: How is the economy of China doing? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Variable 4: Is there a problem with internal turmoil and unrest in China? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Variable 5: What is the degree of U.S. commitment to Taiwan? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Variable 6: What is the size and capabilities of the Chinese Armed Forces? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

To try to summarize, the leadership of China is in their sixties. They tend to be careful, deliberate and somewhat risk adverse. They are not very likely do a high-risk operation that could undermine the Chinese economy and potentially Communist Chinese rule. Therefore, the Taiwan is really not at risk of invasion unless there is a leadership change and this is probably not going to happen in the next 10-15 years. That new leadership may also be risk adverse. So, kind of looking at less than a 25% chance of getting risk taking leadership who would be tempted to do this, and that window for that happening is probably 15-20 years out.

But, in addition to getting the leaders who would take the risk, the Chinese also needs to build up a navy and air force to do so. They really don’t have the air force. For example, they only have 400 modern aircraft. Taiwan alone has 159. Add a few hundred aircraft from the U.S. inventory of 2,700 and any invasion is in trouble. Good luck conducting and sustaining a large amphibious operation when the defenders have air superiority. I don’t recall this ever being attempted before. Basically, for China to do anything militarily, it has to build another 1,000 or more modern aircraft. This is expensive. Certainly can’t be done with present defense budget. So, what we will see, and it we will have years of warning, is a significant increase in Chinese defense budget (above 2% of GDP), building of hundred of aircraft, building more naval assets and so forth. So we will know if they are really serious by the budget expenditures. Right now, their defense budget does not really give them the ability to invade Taiwan.

Now, of course, such a scenario does require U.S. assistance to defend Taiwan. This is discussed in “variable 4.” The real key is that to defend Taiwan can be done primarily with air assets. This is a much less lower threshold for engagement then sending troops, and we have not been that adverse to sending troops around the world (Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria for example). Do we have enough commitment to send just air forces? 

The real key is whether U.S. commitment declines over time and whether China does indeed build up. This does create a window say 15-20 years out where China may have the capability in place and U.S. commitment is wavering and the Chinese leadership is willing to take a risk. The problem is that China has a demographic problem. According to some reports, their population is already declining. This is going to create a drag on their economy. 

We have been talking about this for a while: Demographics of China | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Witness Japan: Where Did Japan Go? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

So, the drag on the Chinese economy from their demographics, along with possibly other economic or political problems may well become a major factor in the next ten years. How does this play out if their window of opportunity for doing this military and politically is 15-20 years out? Does this mean that they really will never be in position to invade Taiwan? This does look to be the case. 

Now, this does not rule out a mis-calculation or a major mistake by the Chinese leadership. History is full of such idiocy, like Japan attacking a country in 1941 that had over ten times the GDP that they did. So we cannot rule out, no matter how the situation looks on paper, that someone will ignore the statistics and do it anyway. There are plenty of examples of this in history.

Now, I do believe that it is essential that the U.S. maintains its commitment to Taiwan to maintain the deterrence. This certainly includes maintaining fleet presence in the area, arm sales to Taiwan, and conducting exercises with South Korea and Japan the emphasizes reinforcing the area. This are all good and what we have been doing. Of course, plopping a brigade in Taiwan would be the ultimate commitment, but I don’t think that is on anyone’s agenda.

Still, my conclusion is that this is:

  1. Not going to happen in the next 6 years.
  2. Probably not going to happen in the next 15 years.
  3. May be a threat in the next 15-20 years, but only if
    1. The new Chinese leadership is willing to take a risk.
    2. The Chinese economy is growing.
    3. The Chinese governance is stable.
    4. The Chinese military has been built up significantly.
    5. The U.S. commitment has weakened.
  4. Could always happen if the Chinese make a major mis-calculation.

My overall conclusion is that this is not very likely to happen. Still, one must be prepared for it, and by being prepared for it, it decreases the likelihood of it ever happening.

 

 

—–some additional ruminations from the first draft of this blog post that was done about a month ago——-

It is clear that the danger to Taiwan will become obvious over time. The army may be capable of conducting an amphibious invasion now, but the navy and air force is not large enough. With a concerted effort, certainly the Air Force could be built up and modernized over a decade or so, but it going to take longer to build a fleet that at least temporarily contest the seas with the U.S. These are build-ups that will develop over time and will be noticed. So we will know when were are truly moving into a period of real exposure. Whether the political leadership will react in the proper and timely manner is another subject.

But, there is also the possibility of a changing regime in the People’s Republic (more democratic or in political turmoil) could obviate the threat to Taiwan or much less likely, a changing regime in the Democratic Republic (Taiwan) could take away the need to defend it (they might want to join China?). So the problem could magically go away, but we have no indication of that now.

The end result is I do not think there is a real threat of it happening any time in the next decade. I think in the second half of the second decade (more than 15 years from now) China could have all the pieces in place to make it happen, but we will see them develop it over time. Right now, with defense spending at 1.7% or less of their GDP, they may not get there in two decades. But regardless, it will be clear if it is happening.

So, I sort of discount the possibility that China will invade Taiwan in the next 20 years. It could happen. To do so would require 1) new leadership that is willing to take the risk, 2) significant build up of the air force, 3) build up of naval and sea-lane control assets, 4) the correct internal regime conditions (desire and sufficient economic/political stability), and 5) a favorable international situation (U.S. lack of commitment). Will all these conditions track in a manor favorable to invading Taiwan in the next 20 years? I would not stake money on it.

Variable 6: What is the size and capabilities of the Chinese Armed Forces?

I think I covered most of this in my previous posts, for example: Invading Taiwan in the next six years – the fight? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). But, let me walk and talk through the subject one last time.

An amphibious invasion of Taiwan is going to require China to not only put an army across that can defeat the 130,000-man Taiwanese Army, but to also supply that invading army for the duration of the operation (which could takes weeks or months). This means maintaining control of the sea and the air. So while China probably has the army right now that is capable of doing this, if the United States supports Taiwan, it does not have the navy or the air force to do this (especially over time).

So, for the Chinese armed forces to invade Taiwan, they will need not only an army (which the have), but a navy (which they currently do not have) and an air force (which they really don’t have) that can control the sea and the air around Taiwan.

So, for the Chinese to invade Taiwan, they need to either 1) build up their navy, 2) built up and modernize their air force, and/or 3) make sure the United States does not intervene. As this last point is covered in the last post, let us just look like at what they need to do to address the first two points.

The Chinese navy currently consists of 2 small carriers and 36 destroyers. The U.S. navy consists of around 11 large carriers, 9 amphibious carriers, 22 cruisers and 59 destroyers. This is a gross mismatch. See: .

See: The Size of Fleets in the South China Sea, Part 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

And: Size of Fleets around the South China Sea, Part 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The U.S. Navy is here: U.S. Navy Compared to Russian Navy | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Therefore, over the next 20 years, any significant build-up of naval capabilities will be a strong indicator of intention. The build-up has to be more than another small carrier or two and more than a few more destroyers. They have to build up a capability to at least seal the Straits of Formosa from U.S. naval intervention for at least a month. Now that can be done with air, missiles, smaller surface ships, submarines, etc., but without a deep water navy, they will have lots of other problems (economic interdiction, interdiction of oil supplies, loss of the Spratly Islands, etc.). It is not a pretty picture for them no matter how they look at it, and building up a navy that can take on our deep water fleet is a very tough task to do in next 20 years. Kind of reminds me of Kaiser Willy’s attempt before the Great War to build a battlefleet to challenge the British. That did not work out well either.

And then there is the air. Now according to an article Clinton Reilly just posted in the comments (and I saw not reason to cross-check their data) the U.S. Air Force has nearly 2,300 warplanes in service and 1,422 aircraft for the U.S. Navy and Marines. So, 3,700 + Taiwan’s air force (300+) + anyone else that wants to help (S. Korea, Japan and Australia come to mind). China has 1,264 airplanes. Furthermore, among the most advanced planes are 19 J-20s, 50 J-16s, and 235 J-11s (a variant of the Su-27), 24 Su-34s, 76 Su-30s or 404 airplanes that hold my attention. In contrast the United States Air Force has 432 F-15s, 939 F-16s, 186 F-22s, and 283 F-35s or 1,840. The U.S. Navy has 532 F-18s and 18 F-35s while the USMC has 273 F-18s and 57 F-35s. Taiwan has 113 F-16s and 46 Mirage 2000. So a total of 2,720 vice 404. 

So while one can talk about differing world-wide missions and obligations for the U.S. air forces; for a short period of time, it ain’t that hard to quickly shift a lot of the planes to the defense of Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China (Red China) kind of needs to be able to take on over 2,000 hostile modern fighter aircraft. Hard to do with only 400 of their own.

So, for China to be able to establish permanent control of the airspace around Taiwan, do they need at least another 1,000 planes? May be…probably. Not sure how they do so otherwise. So, then means a pretty serious building program over the next 20 years. We will see this coming. 

So, to have a serious threat to invade and maintain that invasion force they are really going to have go through a serious build-up of both naval and air assets. Far more than what they are doing right now. Furthermore, we will see it coming for years. Added to that, we can also respond in kind. So…..