Mystics & Statistics

Two proposals on Combat Casualties

In my last post I referenced two proposals I prepared for the CCCRP (Combat Casualty Care Research Program) on combat casualties. This was built off Chapter 15 “Casualties” in my book War by Numbers and some combat casualty modeling work I had done at the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL). The working level of CCCRP was very supportive of this effort, but their proposal process went through a group of reviewers, and in each case, one reviewer saw no reason to do this work. As I think the reviewers were medical doctors, and the proposals were not directly related to casualty care, it is not surprising that a couple of them would feel that way. It obviously did not fit any of their immediate needs or concerns. So, this effort died in the fall of 2020.

The two proposals were:

  1. Combat Analysis Proposal of three tasks:
    1. Ratios for operations: A brief exploration of existing sources to determine what the expected wounded-to-killed ratios are for different types of operations. This would include a projection for 1) modern (post-World War II) conventional combat scenarios, 2) modern counter-insurgencies, 3) modern training and assistance missions, and 4) special operations and other active assistance programs. The goal would be to assemble a set of figures that can then be applied to combat model outputs, planning, and other studies and analysis.
    2. Ratios by Posture: Conduct a detailed analysis of division-level conventional combat to determine the wounded-to-killed ratios dependent on outcome and posture. This will be a comparative analysis based upon the coded outcomes of the engagements in the database and whether the force is conducting an offensive, defensive or other type of mission. The goal is to determine if wounded-to-kill ratios vary in these conditions (which they certainly do) and to determine to what extent they do and what are those values.
    3. Lethality of IEDs: Develop a set of values for the lethality of modern IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), booby traps, mines, claymores, truck bombs, suicide bombers, and other such devices. The lethality figures will have to be developed from a systematic review of a variety of combat and medical reports. Ideally, this data can be assembled from the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, but research will also examine various operations in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Vietnam and other post-WWII insurgencies. This would also include a review of the Wound Data and Munitions Effectiveness Team (WDMET) data from the Vietnam War and the ongoing Joint Theater Trauma Registry (JTTR).
  2. Combat Modeling Proposal of three tasks:
    1. Lethality Rates: A brief exploration of existing sources to determine what the lethality rates are for various weapons. This effort will tap existing open sources and is an extension of the work outlined in Chapter 15, “Casualties” in the book War by Numbers.
    2. How Models Measure Casualties: Conduct a review of around a half-dozen active U.S. Army and DOD conventional combat models and determine how they measure casualties and how they determine wounded versus killed (and missing). This review will probably include meetings with the modelers, in additional to conducting an analysis for the differences between their various approaches.
    3. Medical Deployment Options for Conventional Operations: Conduct a comparative simulation of medical care, evacuation and return-to-duties over an extended conventional warfare exercise. This would be an examination of the optimal medical support structure of the sake of sustaining combat power over an extended conventional deployment.
      1. The three recommended scenarios are 1) Emergency deployment to the Baltic States, 2) intervention in collapsed state of North Korea, and 3) the validation scenario for Iraq in 2006. Other scenarios may be added time permitting, or as a possible future effort.

This was the last time I attempted to market DOD. It took some man-months of effort to assemble and submit these proposals along with all the required supporting documentation. There is a trade-off of whether my time is better spent looking for the next contract or writing my next book. I decided after this experience to focus on writing my next books, which is why I now have two completed books going through editing and am about to contract for two more books. It is difficult for a small company to work for the DOD. The number of hoops and time consumed in marketing efforts are the same whether it is Lockheed Martin or TDI. Anyhow, if CCCRP would not approve such an effort, then I do not know who in DOD would. As it is, I gave up trying to further market it and prioritized my time to other projects.

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – Day 103 (ground actions)

Lots of back and forth over Sievierodonetsk this weekend. On 27 May a Russian group broke into the Myr Hotel. On 30 May they were reported to have entered the northeastern and southeastern parts of Sievierodonetsk. Two days later, they took 70% of the city and took another 10% over the next two days.  Ukraine reported that “Part of the Ukrainian troops” have now “retreated to more advantageous, pre-prepared positions” while other troops continue “fighting inside the city.” This looks like a planned and phased withdrawal. Then on Saturday (June 4) Ukraine took back 20% of the city and now controls around half of the city. They also took the eastern suburb of Metolkine. This is kind of an unusual back-and-forth. While some are painting it as a significant victory, it does appear the Russian advance in the city was due to a Ukrainian withdrawal. Those advance forces may have only been recon elements and forwards detachments. Ukraine’s retaking of parts of the city may have been done against a limited force.

Regardless, this fight is still significant politically, as this is one of the four cities that Russia needs to take to claim all of Donetsk and Lugansk. It appears that they are not going to take it yet. Furthermore, they were in a position to surround both Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk and had effectively enveloped them from three sides. The Ukrainians are fighting around Sievierodoentsk and Lysychansk with their head in a noose. But those surrounding efforts had not made any progress for days. It appears that the Russian attacks have simply stalled out. Can they renew them? If not, then it appears the Russian offensive phase of this war has completely stalled out. This next week will be telling. It is claimed that the army has been ordered to take or encircle Sievierodonetsk by 10 June. 

Fighting is still going on in around seven locales along the front. There is still fighting going on to north and northeast of Kharkov, and Ukraine made some advances there a couple of days ago (retook the village Vesele). In Lugansk/Donetsk area Russia threatens operations towards Barvenkove, from Lyman towards Slovyansk, and around Poposna in addition to Sievierodonetsk. A few days ago Russia took Komyshuvakha, to the north of Popasna. No villages in these areas have changes hands over the weekend. Around Kherson, Ukraine is conducting two offensives, one towards Kherson and one to the NE of Kherson looking to drive behind it. They don’t seem to be gaining much ground and these attacks may be to distract and tie down Russian forces. It may not be a Ukrainian major offensive. Again, no villages changed hands over the weekend. Right now, the only place the front lines are moving is in Sievierodonetsk.

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia map

The map below from 20 May is borrowed from Dr. Michael Mackay @mhmck. The area threatened with encirclement contain the cities of Sievierdonetsk and Lysychansk and surrounding areas which had a population in excess of 350,000. One can see the expansion around Popasna.

The Russians have made some progress on their larger objective of taking all of the Lugansk/Donetsk provinces. Not sure how much more they can do. The objectives are clearly Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk. Sloviansk and Kramatorsk appear to be secure. The four main cities in this area are Sievierodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Sloviansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084). It appears that the war has been reduced to 1) a fight over Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk and 2) maybe a fight over Kherson. We shall see if any other major operations develop.

We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only two appear to be active right now. Russia now occupies four cities, Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928), Melitopol (pop. 150,768) and Kherson (pop. 283,649). 

1. Kiev – secure

2. Odessa – secure

3. Kharkov – secure

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces
5. Mariupol – operations completed
6. Crimean border/Kherson

It appears that Kiev, Chernigov, Sumy and the northeast part of Ukraine are secure. Of course, Russia can always reintroduce troops later from Russia or Belarus. They are supposed to have around 20 BTGs in Russia. A Ukranian border guard was killed on 16 May near Sumy.

The U.S. DOD is reporting that the Russian forces in Ukraine are being reinforced, with the count of BTGs going up from 92 to 105 (now 106). It this preparation for a big push in a week or two?

Here is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kiev is secure. It did get hit with missile attacks on Sunday.

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secure.

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkov looks to be securely held but is still being hit by both missiles and artillery. The areas held here have not changed much since 17 May (see maps below).

Map showing front lines near Kharkov on 27 April and 17 May (cribbed from @War_Mapper), with the 17 May map showing the taking of Dementiivka.

The Russians do appear to have been pushing to the southwest towards Barvinkove (pop. 8,110), vice the south or southeast. So it is either a broader encirclement of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, or the rumored drive on Dnipro (which I really don’t believe they are going to try). Still, no villages have been reported taken in this area for the last week or so. A video from Sky News from Barvinkove (3:58): Ukraine War: Ukrainian soldiers stand firm in Barvinkove. Trench warfare (2:14)?

Russia did take the village of Lyman (pop. 20,469) on 27 May (although they claimed they took it on 25 May). On 23 May, the mayor there said the town was down to 7,000-8,000 residents. Another map cribbed from @War_Mapper dated 9 May. Since then the Russians have taken Lyman and most of the areas north of the Severskii Donets River.

As can be seen from this map, this brings all the area on the northern side of the Seversky Donets River under Russian control.The Russians also took Yarova (pop. 2,079 in 2011) on 1 June, to the NW of Lyman. The Ukrainians still have the river between them and Slovyansk.

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provincesThe Russians currently hold around half of Sievierdonetsk. The Ukrainians control the eastern suburb of Metolkine. The city is surrounded on three sides. This also puts Lysychansk in danger. According to Ukraine only 15,000 civilians remained in Sievierodonetsk and only 20,000 reman in Lysychansk.

To the south, the village of Zolote in still held by Ukraine, even though some reports claimed Russia took it on 23 May. The Ukrainian government is still reporting on 2 June that houses were destroyed in Zolote from shelling, which indicates that Ukraine holds it. The Ukrainians retook Toshkivka on 29 May but lost at least part of it the following day. Ukraine is still reporting on houses lost of Toshkivka also, so I assume they still hold part of it. Both of these locales are just south of Sievierodonetsk and this is helping secure the city from envelopment from the south.

The danger of surrounding Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk is coming from the Russian operations around Popasna (pop. 19,672), which has been in Russian hands since 7 May. They are threatening Bakhmut (pop. 72,310) and Soledar (pop.10,692). The Russian forces have advanced to within 10 miles (16 kilometers) of Bakhmut. The Russians have taken Komyshuvakha (pop. 2,058) to the north of Popasna. 

The map below is from 4 June by @War_Mapper.

Further south Avdiyivka (31,940) is still in Ukranian hands but is being shelled. Ukraine claimed on 27 April that Avdiyivka was hit twice by phosphorus munitions. They are reported pushing towards Kamyanka and Novoselivka, to its north.

Slovyansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084) appear safe for now. Still, it is claimed there are only about 22,000 people left in Slovyansk. Kramatorsk had its rail station hit on 9 April with over 50 civilians killed.

To the southwest of this fight, the Ukrainians have retaken Maryinka (pop. 9,256) on 19 April, which had been taken by the DPR on 17 March. 

The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 26 May that they had 1,986 soldiers killed and 8,199 wounded (4.13-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio) out of a supposed strength of 20,000. This is 51% casualties out of an estimated force of 20,000, which is pretty serious. They have been surprisingly diligent about regularly reporting their casualty figures. One wonders if some Russian losses or contractors are being included in these figures. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio. Don’t know how many of DPR and LPR forces are Russians from Russia as opposed to locals.

Zelensky in an interview on CNN on 17 April said they had 44,000 professional military men in the Donbas.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): The siege lasted seventy-seven days. As of 17 May, Mariupol is under control of Russia although they declared on 20 May that they had “completely liberated” the steel works. It apparently took a couple of days for everyone to surrender, including the final 531 Ukranian troops. The Alamo held out for 13 days. The Germans surrounded in Stalingrad held out for 72 days. The Russian defense minister said 1,908 at that same time, and they have now upped their claimed prisoners to 2,439 (note that 1908 + 531 = 2,439). This is more prisoners that some of the previous Russian claims of defender strength. So far, none have been exchanged. Denys Prokopenkop, the senior commander in the Azovstal steel mill, is being held in Russian controlled territory and was able to have brief conversation with his wife. 

The population of the city is down to 100,000 or less. I assume the civilians are not planning to return. The mayor, who is no longer in the city, claimed that more than 10,000 people have been killed. The head of DPR (Donets People’s Republic) has said over 5,000 people have been killed. The city has been decimated, lots of buildings and houses destroyed. Mariupol has no power, gas or water. 

There is a mass grave being reported outside of Mariupol near the town of Manhush. It looks like around 200 graves have been dug. Another mass grave is also being reported on 23 April. So far, they appear to be graves for hundreds of people, vice thousands. A third mass grave has been reported. There has been no new reports on this for a while.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is under Russian control. Are the Ukrainians going to make a push to take back Kherson? The Ukrainians are conducting offensive operations around Kherson, but not major territory has exchanged hands. The more interesting operation is the one to the NE of Kherson, where Ukraine has driven down a road that goes behind the city. towards the Dnipro River. This advance towards Kostromka threatens to cut off the Russian forces to the NE of there. This could result is a significant gain of ground by Ukraine. It also could start the process of isolating Kherson. We shall see if this advance continues. It does not seem to have gained much ground in the last week and Russia still holds Kostromka.

 

Weather: Kharkov at 3 PM: 75 degrees (24 Celsius) and mostly cloudy. Low tonight 55 degrees (13 Celsius). No rain is forecasted for the next ten days. Looks like weather is clear for operations. 

Ukrainian Army Build-up: 

The big news is what is occurring off the battlefield, where U.S. and other international aid is now providing more than $90 billion in aid to Ukraine. Over the long run this will change the military balance between Ukraine and Russia, unless Russia fully mobilizes for war. They seem hesitant to do this. The U.S. has just added another 0.7 billion in military aid to this total. Germany is slowly getting around to providing more weapons.

Not sure how large the army now is (assume over 200,000). There is a Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force of 100,000 to 200,000. Wikipedia was reporting 209,000 in their armed forces and 102,000 paramilitary. They are now reporting their armed forces at 196,600. President Zelensky said on 21 May that 700,000 soldiers are defending Ukraine. Most of those are militia. The Ukrainian army is around 200,000 and I gather is going to grow to 300,000. It does take a while to build up an army. The upper limited of mobilization is around 5% of the population (there have been cases where it has been higher). So Ukraine with a population of 40 million can build up an army of 2 million, especially if it continues to receive significant outside help. The Russia commentor Col. Kodaryonok stated in his outburst on Russian TV a couple of days ago that “But the situation from the overall strategic position is that the Ukrainian armed forces are able to arm a million people. They’re saying it themselves, that for us, there’s no difficulty in mobilizing a million people. The whole issue is to what extent they’re able to supply this army of modern weapons and military hardware… so a million armed Ukrainian soldiers needs to be viewed as a reality of the very near future.” I would also add that they need to be trained, which takes a while.

The Azov Regiment that was holding in Mariupol was actually a militia unit. That is the case with some of the foreign volunteer battalions also. There are some foreign volunteer units that have been there a while, including two Chechen battalions and a Georgian unit. I have yet to any statistics as to how many other foreign volunteers have been deployed, just individual stories.

There also the independent Belarussian Kastus Kalinouski Battalion, which as of 5 March is reported to have 200 members. They were serving in Irpin (near Kiev). It is reported that they have had thousands of volunteers. The deputy commander of the battalion (age 31) was killed on action on 13 March and another member was lost on 24 March in Irpin. On 16 May it was reported that a company commander had been killed. They state that a total of six Belarussians had died in this battalion since February. This, of course, threatens to bring the war into Belarus at some point.

Outside support for Ukraine is considerable and reported in a separate blog post: Outside Support for Ukraine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Not sure I am going to update this. Additional material is being sent, including Harpoon anti-ship missiles from Denmark.

The U.S. is now admitting that it helped target Russian generals. See: American intel used to kill Russian generals in Ukraine: US officials. This is something we had assumed for a while. See:  How Much is U.S. Intelligence helping Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and How Much is U.S. intelligence helping Ukraine? – part 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). And then yesterday they admitted that U.S. intel helped with tracking the sunk Russian cruiser Moskva, some we also assumed: Official: US gave intel before Ukraine sank Russian warship. Apparently, they did not provide specific targeting information. A group of Russian officers were hit 17 May in the Russian occupied city of Melitopol. Ukraine claims it was done by “partisans.” They are also reporting attacking an armored train. If true, this opens a whole new dimension to this war, although other reports indicate that this was a “special operation” as opposed to partisans. Major General Kanamat Botashev was reported killed while flying an Su-25. This has been confirmed. Two more generals reported killed this weekend, General Roman Kutuzov and Roman Berdnikov. Kutuzov has been confirmed.

So far twelve named generals have been reported killed in this war. Five deaths have been confirmed and three are still alive.

Russian Army Build-up:  I have yet to see many reports of Russia expanding its army or calling up more reserves and conscripts. Their biannual call-up starts on 1 April, and Putin just signed a decree ordering up 134,500 new conscripts into the army. See the comments in the Day 35 for a discussion on the significance of this. We are now in the tenth week of the war. Are they going to expand their army as Ukraine is clearly expanding theirs, or are they expecting that this war will end shortly? It looks like the Russian Army is adding a couple of thousand volunteers. The U.S. DOD told reporters on 8 April that the Russia could be looking to recruit as many as 60,000 soldiers to join the fight. Still have not seen any indications of major build-up, although they are rebuilding and refitting their units.

Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000 (up to 190,000). Donetsk PR is estimated at 20,000 and Lugansk at 14,000. Russia may be able to add more forces from their own resources, but not much more. If they want to add more, they are going to have to mobilize. Russia appears to be hesitant to do so. I suspect with full mobilization; we could be looking at a Ukrainian army larger than 300,000. People are now even talking about a Ukrainian armed force of 700,000 to 1,000,000. At some point, Russia will have to mobilize to continue this war. I do not think Russia can win this war without further mobilization. If fact, with the increased aid flowing into Ukraine, Russia may very well end up losing territory it currently holds without additional mobilization. The failure to mobilize is hard to explain from a military point of view. It is clearly a result of domestic political concerns.

Economics and the Home Fronts: The U.S. congress has approved a $40 billion aid bill for Ukraine. That along with previous aid from dozens of other countries ($20-$25 billion), new economic aid from the G-7 (now reported at $19.8 billion), the previous U.S. aid bill in March ($13 billion), and so forth, is pushing the amount of aid this year towards $100 billion (40.1 + 25 + 19.8 + 13 + 0.7 = 99). This is enough to match the entire Russian 2021 defense budget of 61.7 billion and keep the Ukrainian economy afloat. It means that Ukraine can stay in this war for an extended fight. It changes the strategic balance and strategic considerations.

The discussion of the economic situation and the home fronts has been updated in a separate rambling blog post: The Home Fronts during the Russo-Ukrainian War – update 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Price of oil is up to 119.79 as of 8:28 AM and the ruble is at 62.00 to the dollar, which is the strongest I have seen it in a very long time (in 2-3 years).

Casualties: Ukraine admitted on 29 April that they have suffered “serious losses” in battles. Zelensky is now saying that between “50 to 100 Ukrainians could be killed”  each day in the Battle for Donbas. We take these claims at face value. They also claim that Russian losses are “colossal.” That claim has not been confirmed. Zelensky told CNN on 15 April that Ukrainian Army had lost between 2,500-3,000 troops since the fighting has begun and about 10,000 have been wounded (wounded-to-killed ratio of 4.00- or 3.33-to-1). According to NYT the U.S. intelligence estimates as of 19 April are between 5,500 to 11,000 Ukrainians killed and between 7,000 to 10,000 Russians killed.

Zelensky stated in an interview on 1 June that between 60 to 100 Ukrainian soldiers are lost on the battlefield each week, with an additional 500 wounded. This would make for a wounded-to-killed ratio of 5-to-1 or 8.33-to-1.

Ukraine is claiming as of 19 April that 20,800 Russian and DPR soldiers have been killed, Russians are claiming as of 16 April that 23,367 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed. Are both sets of figures similarly inflated? It does argue that losses on both sides are similar in size.

Prisoner swap of wounded Ukrainians trapped in Mariupol appeared to have been negotiated, but so far nothing has been reported. I gather that the 53 seriously wounded prisoners are being swapped. Don’t know about the rest of the people. On 2 June, Ukraine and Russia exchanged 160 bodies of killed soldiers.

The UN is reporting as of 2 June at least 4,183 civilians confirmed dead in the war. Of those 2,400 of the deaths are in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk with 147 killed in territory controlled by Russian separatists. Ukraine is reporting that as of 25 April, 3,818 civilians were killed in Ukraine. This is not that far from the UN figure. One wonders if the claimed Mariupol casualties are included in these figures. The rate of accrual of reported civilian casualties has gone down. 

It is clear that more than 13,000 people have died in this conflict (1,351 (Russian Army) + at least 2,000 more (Russian Army) + 3,000 (Ukrainian Army) + 4,183 (Civilians) + 1,986 (DPR) + 600 (LPR) = 13,120). It is probably in excess of 20,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. The number of deaths of Mariupol are unverified and unknown and could add thousands to these totals.

Ukraine is claiming to have killed 31,250 Russian soldiers, while Russia is claiming to have killed 38,257 Ukrainian soldiers (as calculated by @HelloMrBond). I have questioned the Ukrainian claims: The Ukrainian casualty claims are inflated – part 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Needless to say, I also doubt the Russian claims.

A more detailed discussion is provided here: Losses during the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Air Power: The Pentagon on 12 March is reporting that Russia is flying about 200 sorties a day. The Ukrainian air force has 56 operational jets flying 5 to 10 hours a day. March 22 it was reported by the U.S. that Russia flew more than 300 sorties into Ukraine. March 24 it was reported that more than 250 Russian sorties were flown, mostly around Kiev and Kharkov. On 12 May, the U.S. was claiming that the Russians flew 300 sorties over Ukraine in the last 24 hours. On 14 May they were claiming 250 Russian sorties. It has been pretty consistent reporting of 250-300 sorties a day for quite some time now.

Missile Defense: According to Zelenskyy the missile barrage near Lvov on 12 March consisted of 30 missiles, 8 missiles that landed and 22 missiles that were intercepted and shot down. On the morning of 16 April in the Lvov region, Ukraine claimed it downed four cruise missiles fired by Su-35s operating from Belarus. Zelensky claimed on 26 April that Russians have fired more than 1,100 missiles at Ukraine. The U.S. DOD claimed on 29 April that more than 1,950 missiles have been fired at Ukraine since the start of the war and they are currently firing about 50 a day.

End of the War: It does look like Russia intends to take and hold onto all of Donetsk and Lugansk provinces, and possibly all of Kherson province and four-fifths of Zaporizhzhia province. The capital Zaporizhzhia (pop. 722,713) may not be on their list of areas to take. So, four out of Ukraine’s 24 provinces and Crimea.

Populations of partly or completely occupied areas (2019 estimates):

Donetsk: 4,165,901

Lugansk: 2,151,833

Crimea: 2,033,700 (2001 census)

Zaporizhzhia: 1,705,836

Kherson: 1,037,640

Sevastopol: 509,992 (2021 estimate)

 

Population of Ukraine (excluding Crimea), 2022 estimate: 41,167,336

What they are willing to later negotiate away to achieve peace or a ceasefire is unknown. What Ukraine is willing to negotiate away is also unknown, although they are now saying the war will continue until all areas are freed. Does that include the LPR, DPR and Crimea? When they are ready to return to talks is unknown. This looks like an extended war and I don’t think will be over before the end of summer. At this point, unless Russia mobilizes, it will slowly turn to Ukraine’s advantage.

Atrocities:  Reports from Ukraine have put the body count of civilians found in the towns and villages surround Kiev at 1,222. Not sure if this has been independently confirmed, but I assume the UN counting efforts have now picked up most of these civilian deaths. Ukraine has identified ten Russian soldiers wanted for “pre-mediated murder” in Bucha. They are all enlisted from the 64th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. These are the first charges unveiled of over 8,000 criminal investigations. The U.S. is claiming it has “credible information” of Russians killing Ukrainians in the vicinity of Donetsk who were trying to surrender.

There are also various accusations against the Russian Army Chechen unit operating around Bucha: Brutal Sect of Putin’s Army Accused of Murdering Their Own Comrades.

More claims of atrocities coming out with videos of Russian troops shooting two civilians outside of Kiev in March. Ukraine has sentenced a 21-year old POW to life in prison for shooting a civilian who was talking on his phone. Ukraine is now charging 48 more Russian soldiers (currently POWs) and investigating around 13,000 alleged offenses. The Ukrainian officials have a list of about 6000 suspects. Two POWs pleaded guilty on 26 May of firing Grad rockets from Russia’s Belgorod region towards Kharkov on 24 Feb.

Meanwhile, the head of the DPR is saying that the fighters who surrendered at the Azovstal steel mill are to be put on trail. Somehow, this response does not surprise me.

There is also a video out there of Ukrainian soldiers shooting several Russian prisoners in their legs. There is a second video showing Ukrainian troops executing what appears to be four Russian prisoners seven miles SW of Bucha. See: https://news.yahoo.com/video-appears-show-ukrainian-soldiers-192219323.html. More detailed description from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/61025388. It is on Youtube, if you want to look it up. I believe they are members of the Georgian Legion, a group of Georgian volunteers fighting for Ukraine.

There are also some retribution killings going on: Ukrainian Chief Intelligence Directorate: another traitor of Ukraine found shot.

Other Issues: Azerbaijani troops have occupied an area in Nagorno-Karabakh that they are claiming is theirs. The Russian peacekeeping troops there have not expelled them. Widespread protests in Armenia this weekend over Nagorno-Karabakh followed by 180 detentions. There were more protests this Sunday and another 237 protesters were detained. On 10 May another 61 protesters were detained.

NATO has confirmed 18 May that both Finland and Sweden have officially applied to join NATO. NATO has said it will welcome them with open armsThe process of accepting them is expected to take about two weeks and they could be members within a few months. It does require unanimous consent of all 30 members for them to join NATO. Turkey is withholding consent until there is some resolution concerning some weapons embargoes against Turkey and the presence in Sweden of Kurdish refugees wanted by Turkey. It does add an 810-mile (1300 km) border with Russia, but NATO already abuts Russian and Belarussian territory in the Baltic states. 

Ukraine was supposed to be on the fast track to join the European Union (EU), which was the issue that started all the turmoil in 2013. But EU member Austria has objected, and now France is saying that it may take years. All EU members must unanimously agree for a country’s membership negotiations to begin. This is the issue that fueled all the conflict over the last nine years, for the Euromaidan revolt occurred when Ukrainian President Yanukovich decided to join Putin’s Eurasian Union vice the EU. The subsequent conflicts included the whole three-month Euromaidan revolt in the dead of winter of 2013-2014 that led to over 100 Ukrainians being killed, many protesters shot in the street by President Yanokovich’s security forces; the seizure of Crimea; the creation of LPR and DPR; the subsequent war; and now this war. Ukraine certainly has paid a much higher cost to join the EU than anyone else ever has. Current polling (Reuters April 5) shows that 91% of the Ukrainians support joining the EU. 

A Ukrainian court on 23 May order the arrest of former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich. He is accused of treason over the agreement he signed in 2010 (The Kharkiv Pact) to extend Russian leave on naval facilities in Crimea. In 2014 Russian forces in Sevastopol seized all of Crimea and Victor Yanukovich left Ukraine for Russia and was in Moscow by 25 February 2014. He has remained in Russia ever since. He had already received a 13-year jail sentence over a letter he sent to Vladimir Putin on 1 March 2014 asking for Russia to use Russian army and police forces to restore order in Ukraine. 

The Map: The attached map is from Wikipedia. It is dated 6 June. It does show some updates on 2 June. It is still showing Zolote in Russian hands, which appears to be incorrect.

Wounded-to-killed ratios in Ukraine in 2022

I made a post on Friday that unsurprisingly got some pushback on twitter. It is here: The Ukrainian casualty claims are inflated – part 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

One of the twitter complaints is that I used a wounded-to-killed ratio of 4-to-1 for my challenge of the Ukrainian kill claims. This was based upon the only set of aggregate wounded-to-killed statistics offered in the conflict, the reports from the Donets Peoples Republic (DPR) who are reporting as of 26 May that they had 1,912 soldiers killed and 7,919 wounded (a 4.14-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). 

This also generated another twitter criticism because I was using DPR data. Yet, this last week Zelensky has stated that they are losing between 60 – 100 Ukrainian soldiers a week. An additional 500 are wounded. This is at least 5-to-1 wounded to killed ratio (or 8.33-to-1). 

Apparently, some other people have been using a 3-to-1 wounded to killed ratio (not that this lower figure changes my argument one iota). What is the basis for people using 3-to-1? WWII data? Lack of artillery?

It almost certainly is a traditional figure drawn from Trevor Dupuy or WWII data or convention. Now, wounded-to-kill figures vary by 1) definition, 2) posture, 3) medical care, 4) how Died-of-Wounds (DOW) are counted, 5) mix of wounding agents, 6) number MIA or captured, 7) use of body armor and 8) the nature of the targets (airplanes or tanks compared to infantry). This is discussed in depth in Chapter 15 of my book War by Numbers.

Let my post a table from my book:

German

                                                                        U.S. Army      UK Army       Army[1]

Ardennes from 16 – 23 December                  4.85-to-1         1.67-to-1         3.25-to-1

Ardennes from 24 December – 1 January      5.65-to-1         2.89-to-1         3.08-to-1

Ardennes from 2 – 16 January                        5.12-to-1         4.59-to-1         2.99-to-1

 

                                                                        German Army[2]          Soviet Army[3]

Kursk from 4 – 11 July                                   5.11-to-1                     2.29-to-1

Kursk from 12 – 18 July                                 4.54-to-1                     2.68-to-1

See my book for the footnotes.

So, 3-to-1 or greater for WWII data. The Soviet Army at Kursk, when on the defensive and having divisions being overrun with large numbers of MIA and captured had lower than 3-to-1. But, when the Soviet missing was less than 10% of the casualties, the wounded to killed ratio rose to 3-to-1. This is discussed in more depth in my book along with supporting data. Anyhow, 3-to-1 is kind of the minimal figure to be used for most ground combat in WWII and as you can see from the table above, it is sometimes higher. 

The wounded-to-killed ratios since WWII have been higher. In some cases much higher (like 13-to-1 for the U.S. Marine Corps in Afghanistan). All this is discussed in depth in my book. 

From a practical point of view, I do not know what the wounded-to-killed ratio will be for the fighting in Ukraine. I expect it to be more than 3-to-1. This is the old WWII figure and medical care has improved since then and many people are now wearing body armor. Body armor certainly increases survivability from blast and fragmentation wounding, which is the majority of wounding on most battlefields.

Therefore, the DPR wounded-to-killed figures of 4-to-1 looked reasonable to me. They may be low, depending on how they are counting wounded (not all lightly wounded are counted as wounded). Zelensky’s off-the-cuff figure of 5-to-1 (or higher) also seems reasonable. 

On other hand, for those using a 3-to-1 figure, then I have to ask what is their basis for using this figure (WWII data or tradition?) and what is their basis for not revising it to reflect better medical treatment improvements over the last 75 years and the rather extensive use of body armor now?

Now, as this war continues, I expect the wounded-to-killed ratio to actually increase. This is because both sides are making more use of artillery and more of the engagements are using dismounted infantry. This changes the mix of causative agents and targets in a manner that should result in more people wounded per person killed (or to express it another way, less mortality per casualty). 

 

 

P.S. Final note: in the fall of 2020 I was hoping to obtain contracts based upon two proposals submitted to CCCRP (Combat Casualty Care Research Program) to further examine wounded-to-killed ratios and the analysis of combat casualties, including a combat casualty modeling effort. This effort died because some reviewers did not feel a strong need to further examine this subject. I still feel this subject needs to be fully explored. Tempted to do a further blog post on this. To date, my book is the most complete discussion on the subject that I am aware of.

The Ukrainian casualty claims are inflated – part 1

Just to state the obvious, the Ukrainian Army claims of Russian casualties are inflated. Still, I find people on twitter who are repeating the Ukrainian claims like they are fact, including people with significant followings (100K+). They are even doing some estimates of Russian dead per day, based upon this questionable data. They should know better.

Let us look for a moment at the Ukrainian Army claims as of early 3 June of 30,950 Russian soldiers killed. Now, the wounded-to-killed ratio for operations in this war looks to be around 4-to-1. This is based on the reporting of the Donets Peoples Republic, which oddly enough, has been consistently and steadily reporting their losses. Also see: Wounded-To-Killed Ratios | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Chapter 15 of my book War by Numbers.

So 30,950 x 5 = 154,750 casualties (not counting captured and missing-in-action). This is out of a Russian force in Ukraine estimated to be 150,000 to 190,000. Something does not match up here.

The Russians are advancing, so they are either 1) advancing against a Ukrainian army of 200,000+ with the few remaining tens of thousands of troops they have, or 2) They have deployed over 100,000 brand new replacements (for which there is no evidence) who are advancing against this motivated and experienced Ukrainian army, or 3) the Ukrainian estimates are high. The latter seems the most logical explanation.

It does appear that the Ukrainian claims are off by a factor of 2 to 4. So, maybe 7,738 to 15,475 killed if we divide the Ukrainian estimates by 4 or 2. The NYT claimed that as of 19 April U.S. intelligence estimates were between 7,000 to 10,000 Russians killed. This seems like a more reasonable estimate.

The same NYT report on U.S. intelligence estimates were that Ukrainians had suffered 5,500 to 11,000 killed as of 19 April.

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – Day 100 (ground actions)



Tempted to say day 100 of 3. Tempted to put together a listing of all the wars where people predicted a short and decisive result and did not get one (the old “Home before the leaves fall” or “mission accomplished” syndrome). Suspect it would be a very long list.

The big news is that Russian in the last two days has managed to take most (now 80%) of Sievierodonetsk. Seems like the last bits are holding out. Ukraine is reporting that “Part of the Ukrainian troops” have now “retreated to more advantageous, pre-prepared positions” while other troops continue “fighting inside the city.” This looks like a planned and phased withdrawal. I guess when your head is in a noose, it makes military sense to pull it out.

This is a significant political objective. The city was not completely surrounded but defending it put Ukraine in a difficult position. The Ukrainians held the flanks against Russian pressure, but apparently did not have sufficient force or the Russians had significant forces attacking the city itself. It does look like it will fall completely, instead of turning into another extended fight like Mariupol. Most of the civilians had already evacuated Sievierodonetsk. 

Fighting is still going on in around seven locales along the front. There is still fighting going on to north and northeast of Kharkov, and some advances there by Ukraine (retook the village Vesele). In Lugansk/Donetsk area Russia threatens operations towards Barvenkove, from Lyman towards Slovyansk, and around Poposna in addition to taking Sievierodonetsk. The push on Sievierodonetsk is still slowly gaining ground. They have also taken Komyshuvakha, to the north of Popasna. The Russian may have concentrated forces in these two areas to achieve this. Around Kherson, Ukraine is conducting two offensives, one towards Kherson and one to the NE of Kherson looking to drive behind it. They don’t seem to be gaining much ground and these attacks may be to distract and tie down Russian forces. It may not be a Ukrainian major offensive. Because of the low troop densities on most of these fronts, any major push hitting a weak defense could result in fairly quick and significant advances. Right now, the only place the front lines are moving is in Sievierodonetsk and around Popasna.

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia map

The map below from 20 May is borrowed from Dr. Michael Mackay @mhmck. The area threatened with encirclement contain the cities of Sievierdonetsk and Lysychansk and surrounding areas which had a population in excess of 350,000. One can see the expansion around Popasna.

The Russians have made some progress on their larger objective of taking all of the Lugansk/Donetsk provinces. Not sure how much more they can do, but I assume at this point that Lysychansk, which is just south of Sievierodonetsk is in danger. Right now, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk appear to be secure. The four main cities in this area are Sievierodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Sloviansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084). It appears that the war has been reduced to 1) a fight over Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk and 2) maybe a fight over Kherson. We shall see if any other major operations develop.

We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only two appear to be active right now. Russia now occupies four cities, Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928), Melitopol (pop. 150,768) and Kherson (pop. 283,649). 

1. Kiev – secure

2. Odessa – secure

3. Kharkov – secure

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces
5. Mariupol – operations completed
6. Crimean border/Kherson

It appears that Kiev, Chernigov, Sumy and the northeast part of Ukraine are secure. Of course, Russia can always reintroduce troops later from Russia or Belarus. They are supposed to have around 20 BTGs in Russia. A Ukranian border guard was killed on 16 May near Sumy.

The U.S. DOD is reporting that the Russian forces in Ukraine are being reinforced, with the count of BTGs going up from 92 to 105 (now 106). It this preparation for a big push in a week or two?

Here is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kiev is secure. 

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secure.

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkov looks to be securely held but is still being hit by both missiles and artillery. Nine people were killed 26 May. By 30 May Russia took back some area to the north/NW of Kharkov and lost some other territory in the area nearby as Ukraine again pushed to another part of the Russia border to the north/NE of Kharkov. This kind of just seems to some back-and-forth operations using limited forces. Suspect Ukraine has transferred some assets to the fighting in the south. The Ukrainians just retook the village of Vesele. The areas held here have not changed much since 17 May (see maps below).

Map showing front lines near Kharkov on 27 April and 17 May (cribbed from @War_Mapper), with the 17 May map showing the taking of Dementiivka.

The Russians do appear to have been pushing to the southwest towards Barvinkove (pop. 8,110), vice the south or southeast. So it is either a broader encirclement of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, or the rumored drive on Dnipro (which I really don’t believe they are going to try). Still, no villages have been reported taken in this area for the last week or so. A video from Sky News from Barvinkove (3:58): Ukraine War: Ukrainian soldiers stand firm in Barvinkove. Trench warfare (2:14)?

Russia did take the village of Lyman (pop. 20,469) on 27 May (although they claimed they took it on 25 May). On 23 May, the mayor there said the town was down to 7,000-8,000 residents. Another map cribbed from @War_Mapper dated 9 May. Since then the Russians have taken Lyman and most of the areas north of the Severskii Donets River.

As can be seen from this map, this brings all the area on the northern side of the Seversky Donets River under Russian control. The Russians also took Yarova (pop. 2,079 in 2011) on 1 June, to the NW of Lyman. The Ukrainians still have the river between them and Slovyansk.

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provincesThe Russians have taken around 80% of Sievierdonetsk. The city was surrounded on three sides. One wonders if Ukraine decided if it was best to limit the defense of this area. This also probably puts Lysychansk in danger. It is now being shelled (one civilian killed yesterday). According to Ukraine only 15,000 civilians remained in Sievierodonetsk and only 20,000 reman in Lysychansk.

In the case of Sievierodonetsk (pop. 101,135) a Russian group broke into the Myr Hotel on 27 May. On 30 May they were reported to have entered the northeastern and southeastern parts of Sievierodonetsk. Two days later, they took 70% of the city and took another 10% in the last two days. This is pretty quick. Not all urban operations turn into a major slog.

Some maps show Zolote in Russian hands and it is claimed by some that it was taken on 23 May. The Ukrainian government is still reporting on 2 June that houses were destroyed in Zolote from shelling, which indicates that Ukraine holds it. The Ukrainians retook Toshkivka on 29 May but lost at least part of it the following day. Ukraine is still reporting on houses lost of Toshkivka also, so I assume they still hold part of it. Both of these locales are just south of Sievierodonetsk and this is helping secure the city from envelopment from the south.

The danger of surrounding Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk is coming from the Russian operations around Popasna (pop. 19,672), which has been in Russian hands since 7 May. They are threatening Bakhmut (pop. 72,310) and Soledar (pop.10,692). The Russian forces have advanced to within 10 miles (16 kilometers) of Bakhmut. The Russians have taken Komyshuvakha (pop. 2,058) to the north of Popasna. 

The map below is from 20 May by @War_Mapper.

Further south Avdiyivka (31,940) is still in Ukranian hands but is being shelled. Ukraine claimed on 27 April that Avdiyivka was hit twice by phosphorus munitions. They are reported pushing towards Kamyanka and Novoselivka, to its north.

Slovyansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084) appear safe for now. Kramatorsk had its rail station hit on 9 April with over 50 civilians killed.

To the southwest of this fight, the Ukrainians have retaken Maryinka (pop. 9,256) on 19 April, which had been taken by the DPR on 17 March. 

The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 26 May that they had 1,912 soldiers killed and 7,919 wounded (4.14-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio) out of a supposed strength of 20,000. This is 49% casualties out of an estimated force of 20,000, which is pretty serious. They have been surprisingly diligent about regularly reporting their casualty figures. One wonders if some Russian losses or contractors are being included in these figures. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio. Don’t know how many of DPR and LPR forces are Russians from Russia as opposed to locals.

Zelensky in an interview on CNN on 17 April said they had 44,000 professional military men in the Donbas.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): The siege lasted seventy-seven days. As of 17 May, Mariupol is under control of Russia although they declared on 20 May that they had “completely liberated” the steel works. It apparently took a couple of days for everyone to surrender, including the final 531 Ukranian troops. The Alamo held out for 13 days. The Germans surrounded in Stalingrad held out for 72 days. The Russian defense minister said 1,908 at that same time, and they have now upped their claimed prisoners to 2,439 (note that 1908 + 531 = 2,439). This is more prisoners that some of the previous Russian claims of defender strength. So far, none have been exchanged. Denys Prokopenkop, the senior commander in the Azovstal steel mill, is being held in Russian controlled territory and was able to have brief conversation with his wife. 

The population of the city is down to 100,000 or less. I assume the civilians are not planning to return. The mayor, who is no longer in the city, claimed that more than 10,000 people have been killed. The head of DPR (Donets People’s Republic) has said over 5,000 people have been killed. The city has been decimated, lots of buildings and houses destroyed. Mariupol has no power, gas or water. 

According to the DOD on 18 April there are almost a dozen BTGs in Mariupol. The U.S. DOD claimed a couple of weeks ago that 2,000 troops and some Chechen fighters are still in Mariupol and that 10 BTGs were now moving north. The Chechen fighters are still reported (as of 23 May) to still be in the area. Does this portend an offensive south of Sievierdonetsk pushing north? They do indicate that some of the BTGs appears to have paused to be refitted, which is not all that surprising.

There is a mass grave being reported outside of Mariupol near the town of Manhush. It looks like around 200 graves have been dug. Another mass grave is also being reported on 23 April. So far, they appear to be graves for hundreds of people, vice thousands. A third mass grave has been reported. There has been no new reports on this for a while.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is under Russian control. Are the Ukrainians going to make a push to take back Kherson? The Ukrainians are conducting offensive operations around Kherson, but not major territory has exchanged hands. The more interesting operation is the one to the NE of Kherson, where Ukraine has driven down a road that goes behind the city. towards the Dnipro River. This advance towards Kostromka threatens to cut off the Russian forces to the NE of there. This could result is a significant gain of ground by Ukraine. It also could start the process of isolating Kherson. We shall see if this advance continues. It does not seem to have gained much ground in the last four days and Russia still holds Kostromka.

 

Weather: Kharkov at 3 PM: 75 degrees (24 Celsius) and mostly cloudy. Low tonight 57 degrees (14 Celsius). Rain is forecasted for Sunday (40%) and Thursday (50%). Looks like weather is clear for operations, dependent on surface trafficability. 

Ukrainian Army Build-up: 

The big news is what is occurring off the battlefield, where U.S. and other international aid is now providing more than $90 billion in aid to Ukraine. Over the long run this will change the military balance between Ukraine and Russia, unless Russia fully mobilizes for war. They seem hesitant to do this. The U.S. has just added another 0.7 billion in military aid to this total. Germany is slowly getting around to providing more weapons.

Not sure how large the army now is (assume over 200,000). There is a Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force of 100,000 to 200,000. Wikipedia was reporting 209,000 in their armed forces and 102,000 paramilitary. They are now reporting their armed forces at 196,600. President Zelensky said on 21 May that 700,000 soldiers are defending Ukraine. Most of those are militia. The Ukrainian army is around 200,000 and I gather is going to grow to 300,000. It does take a while to build up an army. The upper limited of mobilization is around 5% of the population (there have been cases where it has been higher). So Ukraine with a population of 40 million can build up an army of 2 million, especially if it continues to receive significant outside help. The Russia commentor Col. Kodaryonok stated in his outburst on Russian TV a couple of days ago that “But the situation from the overall strategic position is that the Ukrainian armed forces are able to arm a million people. They’re saying it themselves, that for us, there’s no difficulty in mobilizing a million people. The whole issue is to what extent they’re able to supply this army of modern weapons and military hardware… so a million armed Ukrainian soldiers needs to be viewed as a reality of the very near future.” I would also add that they need to be trained, which takes a while.

The Azov Regiment that was holding in Mariupol was actually a militia unit. That is the case with some of the foreign volunteer battalions also. There are some foreign volunteer units that have been there a while, including two Chechen battalions and a Georgian unit. I have yet to any statistics as to how many other foreign volunteers have been deployed, just individual stories.

There also the independent Belarussian Kastus Kalinouski Battalion, which as of 5 March is reported to have 200 members. They were serving in Irpin (near Kiev). It is reported that they have had thousands of volunteers. The deputy commander of the battalion (age 31) was killed on action on 13 March and another member was lost on 24 March in Irpin. On 16 May it was reported that a company commander had been killed. They state that a total of six Belarussians had died in this battalion since February. This, of course, threatens to bring the war into Belarus at some point.

Outside support for Ukraine is considerable and reported in a separate blog post: Outside Support for Ukraine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Not sure I am going to update this. Additional material is being sent, including Harpoon anti-ship missiles from Denmark.

The U.S. is now admitting that it helped target Russian generals. See: American intel used to kill Russian generals in Ukraine: US officials. This is something we had assumed for a while. See:  How Much is U.S. Intelligence helping Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and How Much is U.S. intelligence helping Ukraine? – part 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). And then yesterday they admitted that U.S. intel helped with tracking the sunk Russian cruiser Moskva, some we also assumed: Official: US gave intel before Ukraine sank Russian warship. Apparently, they did not provide specific targeting information. A group of Russian officers were hit 17 May in the Russian occupied city of Melitopol. Ukraine claims it was done by “partisans.” They are also reporting attacking an armored train. If true, this opens a whole new dimension to this war, although other reports indicate that this was a “special operation” as opposed to partisans. Major General Kanamat Botashev was reported killed while flying an Su-25. This has not been confirmed. So far seven named generals have been reported killed in this war, with only two deaths confirmed. Three additional claims have been disputed and are probably incorrect.

Russian Army Build-up:  I have yet to see many reports of Russia expanding its army or calling up more reserves and conscripts. Their biannual call-up starts on 1 April, and Putin just signed a decree ordering up 134,500 new conscripts into the army. See the comments in the Day 35 for a discussion on the significance of this. We are now in the tenth week of the war. Are they going to expand their army as Ukraine is clearly expanding theirs, or are they expecting that this war will end shortly? It looks like the Russian Army is adding a couple of thousand volunteers. The U.S. DOD told reporters on 8 April that the Russia could be looking to recruit as many as 60,000 soldiers to join the fight. Still have not seen any indications of major build-up, although they are rebuilding and refitting their units.

Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000 (up to 190,000). Donetsk PR is estimated at 20,000 and Lugansk at 14,000. Russia may be able to add more forces from their own resources, but not much more. If they want to add more, they are going to have to mobilize. Russia appears to be hesitant to do so. I suspect with full mobilization; we could be looking at a Ukrainian army larger than 300,000. People are now even talking about a Ukrainian armed force of 700,000 to 1,000,000. At some point, Russia will have to mobilize to continue this war. I do not think Russia can win this war without further mobilization. If fact, with the increased aid flowing into Ukraine, Russia may very well end up losing territory it currently holds without additional mobilization. The failure to mobilize is hard to explain from a military point of view. It is clearly a result of domestic political concerns.

Economics and the Home Fronts: The U.S. congress has approved a $40 billion aid bill for Ukraine. That along with previous aid from dozens of other countries ($20-$25 billion), new economic aid from the G-7 (now reported at $19.8 billion), the previous U.S. aid bill in March ($13 billion), and so forth, is pushing the amount of aid this year towards $100 billion (40.1 + 25 + 19.8 + 13 + 0.7 = 99). This is enough to match the entire Russian 2021 defense budget of 61.7 billion and keep the Ukrainian economy afloat. It means that Ukraine can stay in this war for an extended fight. It changes the strategic balance and strategic considerations.

The discussion of the economic situation and the home fronts has been updated in a separate rambling blog post: The Home Fronts during the Russo-Ukrainian War – update 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Price of oil is up to 118.06 as of 8:46 AM and the ruble is at 62.89 to the dollar, which is the strongest I have seen it in a very long time (in 2-3 years).

Casualties: Ukraine admitted on 29 April that they have suffered “serious losses” in battles. Zelensky is now saying that between “50 to 100 Ukrainians could be killed”  each day in the Battle for Donbas. We take these claims at face value. They also claim that Russian losses are “colossal.” That claim has not been confirmed. Zelensky told CNN on 15 April that Ukrainian Army had lost between 2,500-3,000 troops since the fighting has begun and about 10,000 have been wounded (wounded-to-killed ratio of 4.00- or 3.33-to-1). According to NYT the U.S. intelligence estimates as of 19 April are between 5,500 to 11,000 Ukrainians killed and between 7,000 to 10,000 Russians killed.

Ukraine is claiming as of 19 April that 20,800 Russian and DPR soldiers have been killed, Russians are claiming as of 16 April that 23,367 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed. Are both sets of figures similarly inflated? It does argue that losses on both sides are similar in size.

Prisoner swap of wounded Ukrainians trapped in Mariupol appeared to have been negotiated, but so far nothing has been reported. I gather that the 53 seriously wounded prisoners are being swapped. Don’t know about the rest of the people.

The UN is reporting as of 31 May at least 4,149 civilians confirmed dead in the war. Of those 2,371 of the deaths are in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk with 146 killed in territory controlled by Russian separatists. Ukraine is reporting that as of 25 April, 3,818 civilians were killed in Ukraine. This is not that far from the UN figure. One wonders if the claimed Mariupol casualties are included in these figures. The rate of accrual of reported civilian casualties has gone down. 

It is clear that more than 13,000 people have died in this conflict (1,351 (Russian Army) + at least 2,000 more (Russian Army) + 3,000 (Ukrainian Army) + 4,149 (Civilians) + 1,912 (DPR) + 600 (LPR) = 13,012). It is probably in excess of 20,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. The number of deaths of Mariupol are unverified and unknown and could add thousands to these totals.

A more detailed discussion is provided here: Losses during the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Air Power: The Pentagon on 12 March is reporting that Russia is flying about 200 sorties a day. The Ukrainian air force has 56 operational jets flying 5 to 10 hours a day. March 22 it was reported by the U.S. that Russia flew more than 300 sorties into Ukraine. March 24 it was reported that more than 250 Russian sorties were flown, mostly around Kiev and Kharkov. On 12 May, the U.S. was claiming that the Russians flew 300 sorties over Ukraine in the last 24 hours. On 14 May they were claiming 250 Russian sorties. It has been pretty consistent reporting of 250-300 sorties a day for quite some time now.

Missile Defense: According to Zelenskyy the missile barrage near Lvov on 12 March consisted of 30 missiles, 8 missiles that landed and 22 missiles that were intercepted and shot down. On the morning of 16 April in the Lvov region, Ukraine claimed it downed four cruise missiles fired by Su-35s operating from Belarus. Zelensky claimed on 26 April that Russians have fired more than 1,100 missiles at Ukraine. The U.S. DOD claimed on 29 April that more than 1,950 missiles have been fired at Ukraine since the start of the war and they are currently firing about 50 a day.

End of the War: It does look like Russia intends to take and hold onto all of Donetsk and Lugansk provinces, and possibly all of Kherson province and four-fifths of Zaporizhzhia province. The capital Zaporizhzhia (pop. 722,713) may not be on their list of areas to take. So, four out of Ukraine’s 24 provinces and Crimea.

Populations of partly or completely occupied areas (2019 estimates):

Donetsk: 4,165,901

Lugansk: 2,151,833

Crimea: 2,033,700 (2001 census)

Zaporizhzhia: 1,705,836

Kherson: 1,037,640

Sevastopol: 509,992 (2021 estimate)

 

Population of Ukraine (excluding Crimea), 2022 estimate: 41,167,336

What they are willing to later negotiate away to achieve peace or a ceasefire is unknown. What Ukraine is willing to negotiate away is also unknown, although they are now saying the war will continue until all areas are freed. Does that include the LPR, DPR and Crimea? When they are ready to return to talks is unknown. This looks like an extended war and I don’t think will be over before the end of summer. At this point, unless Russia mobilizes, it will slowly turn to Ukraine’s advantage.

Atrocities:  Reports from Ukraine have put the body count of civilians found in the towns and villages surround Kiev at 1,222. Not sure if this has been independently confirmed, but I assume the UN counting efforts have now picked up most of these civilian deaths. Ukraine has identified ten Russian soldiers wanted for “pre-mediated murder” in Bucha. They are all enlisted from the 64th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. These are the first charges unveiled of over 8,000 criminal investigations. The U.S. is claiming it has “credible information” of Russians killing Ukrainians in the vicinity of Donetsk who were trying to surrender.

There are also various accusations against the Russian Army Chechen unit operating around Bucha: Brutal Sect of Putin’s Army Accused of Murdering Their Own Comrades.

More claims of atrocities coming out with videos of Russian troops shooting two civilians outside of Kiev in March. Ukraine has sentenced a 21-year old POW to life in prison for shooting a civilian who was talking on his phone. Ukraine is now charging 48 more Russian soldiers (currently POWs) and investigating around 13,000 alleged offenses. The Ukrainian officials have a list of about 6000 suspects. Two POWs pleaded guilty on 26 May of firing Grad rockets from Russia’s Belgorod region towards Kharkov on 24 Feb.

Meanwhile, the head of the DPR is saying that the fighters who surrendered at the Azovstal steel mill are to be put on trail. Somehow, this response does not surprise me.

There is also a video out there of Ukrainian soldiers shooting several Russian prisoners in their legs. There is a second video showing Ukrainian troops executing what appears to be four Russian prisoners seven miles SW of Bucha. See: https://news.yahoo.com/video-appears-show-ukrainian-soldiers-192219323.html. More detailed description from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/61025388. It is on Youtube, if you want to look it up. I believe they are members of the Georgian Legion, a group of Georgian volunteers fighting for Ukraine.

There are also some retribution killings going on: Ukrainian Chief Intelligence Directorate: another traitor of Ukraine found shot.

Other Issues: Azerbaijani troops have occupied an area in Nagorno-Karabakh that they are claiming is theirs. The Russian peacekeeping troops there have not expelled them. Widespread protests in Armenia this weekend over Nagorno-Karabakh followed by 180 detentions. There were more protests this Sunday and another 237 protesters were detained. On 10 May another 61 protesters were detained.

NATO has confirmed 18 May that both Finland and Sweden have officially applied to join NATO. NATO has said it will welcome them with open armsThe process of accepting them is expected to take about two weeks and they could be members within a few months. It does require unanimous consent of all 30 members for them to join NATO. Turkey is withholding consent until there is some resolution concerning some weapons embargoes against Turkey and the presence in Sweden of Kurdish refugees wanted by Turkey. It does add an 810-mile (1300 km) border with Russia, but NATO already abuts Russian and Belarussian territory in the Baltic states. 

Ukraine was supposed to be on the fast track to join the European Union (EU), which was the issue that started all the turmoil in 2013. But EU member Austria has objected, and now France is saying that it may take years. All EU members must unanimously agree for a country’s membership negotiations to begin. This is the issue that fueled all the conflict over the last nine years, for the Euromaidan revolt occurred when Ukrainian President Yanukovich decided to join Putin’s Eurasian Union vice the EU. The subsequent conflicts included the whole three-month Euromaidan revolt in the dead of winter of 2013-2014 that led to over 100 Ukrainians being killed, many protesters shot in the street by President Yanokovich’s security forces; the seizure of Crimea; the creation of LPR and DPR; the subsequent war; and now this war. Ukraine certainly has paid a much higher cost to join the EU than anyone else ever has. Current polling (Reuters April 5) shows that 91% of the Ukrainians support joining the EU. 

A Ukrainian court on 23 May order the arrest of former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich. He is accused of treason over the agreement he signed in 2010 (The Kharkiv Pact) to extend Russian leave on naval facilities in Crimea. In 2014 Russian forces in Sevastopol seized all of Crimea and Victor Yanukovich left Ukraine for Russia and was in Moscow by 25 February 2014. He has remained in Russia ever since. He had already received a 13-year jail sentence over a letter he sent to Vladimir Putin on 1 March 2014 asking for Russia to use Russian army and police forces to restore order in Ukraine. 

The Map: The attached map is from Wikipedia. It is dated 3 June. It does not appear to have been updated since 30 May.

 

Who’s Who at HAAC – part 1

We have blogged about the work of a few of our presenters at HAAC. The schedule for the conference is here: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 7 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Let me flag a few those presenters. This will take three or four posts:

1. Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University of London) – see: TDI Friday Read: Mike Spagat’s Economics of Warfare Lectures & Commentaries | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Accounting for Death in War | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). We ended up doing about thirty blog posts on Dr. Spagat’s work.

2. Dr. Richard Harrison – Richard Harrison worked at TDI on the Kursk Data Base: Validation Data Bases Available (Kursk) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Losses of the 32nd and 31st Tank Brigades at Prokhorovka | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and here is his author’s list on Amazon (4 books):  Amazon.com: Richard W. Harrison: Books, Biography, Blog, Audiobooks, Kindle. His latest release (27 July) is The Soviet Army’s High Commands: The Soviet Army’s High Commands in War and Peace, 1941–1992: Harrison, Richard W: 9781952715105: Amazon.com: Books

3. William (Chip) Sayers – He worked with Trevor Dupuy in the early 1990s on developing the TNDM. See his blog posts: A story about planning for Desert Storm (1991) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and An Independent Effort to Use the QJM to Analyze the War in Ukraine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

4. Dr. Tom Lucas (NPS) – We have discussed some of his work a few times: The Use of the Two Campaign Data Bases | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Lanchester equations have been weighed…. | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Really…..Lanchester? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

5. Dr. Michael Johnson (CNA) – He did one blog post for us: The Meaning of Military Expenditures II | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

His bio is here:

For over 34 years, Michael Johnson—known as Mike—has been an operations analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), the Federally Funded Research and Development Center for the Department of the Navy.  He has served as the CNA Field Representative or CNA Scientific Analyst at several Navy, Marine Corps, and Joint commands such as Commander, Battle Force, 6th Fleet; Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center; Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force Training Command; Marine Corps Information Operations Center; Joint UAV Joint Test and Evaluation; Joint UAS Center of Excellence; OPNAV N-80; and Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration.  He has led or participated in analytical studies related to anti-air warfare, surface-to-air radars, multinational naval operations, peace operations, advanced gun systems, unmanned aircraft systems, operations in the information environment, and in organizations, roles, and missions. 

He has a PhD in Physics from Brigham Young University (1989), Bachelor’s Degrees in Physics and Math from the University of Utah (1985), a Graduate Certificate from the Naval War College, and also studied British history and institutions at Cambridge University in the UK.  He has taught various mathematics courses for Chapman University and physics courses for the Brigham Young University—Idaho.

He has had an interest in the Battle of Midway since receiving the Avalon-Hall game on Midway as a birthday present in 1970.

6. LtCol. Amos Fox (USA) – His work has caught our attention: The Battles of the Donetsk Airport (May 2014 – Jan 2015) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Toward An American Approach To Proxy Warfare | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Active Defense, Forward Defense, and A2/AD in Eastern Europe | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and U.S. Army Doctrine and Future Warfare | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Back To The Future: The Return Of Sieges To Modern Warfare | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and The Combat Value of Surprise | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Sketching Out Multi-Domain Battle Operational Doctrine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Linking Operations, Strategy, and Policy In Russian Hybrid Warfare | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Tanks and Russian Hybrid Warfare | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

7. Dr. Alexander Kott (ARL) – We have blogged about some of his work before: Dupuy’s Verities: Fortification | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Data Used for the ARL Paper | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Data Used of the ARL Paper – post 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Technological Advancement Lessons from History? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Two ARL Reports | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Dupuy used for Click Bait | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – Day 98 (ground actions)

The big news is that Russian in the last two days has managed to take most (70%) of Sievierodonetsk. Ukraine is reporting that “Part of the Ukrainian troops” have now “retreated to more advantageous, pre-prepared positions” while other troops continue “fighting inside the city.” This looks like a planned and phased withdrawal.

This is a significant political objective. The city was not completely surrounded but defending it put Ukraine in a difficult position. The Ukrainians held the flanks against Russian pressure, but apparently did not have sufficient force or the Russians had significant forces attacking the city itself. It does look like it will fall completely, instead of turning into another extended fight like Mariupol. Most of the civilians had already evacuated Sievierodonetsk. 

Fighting is still going on in around seven locales along the front. There is still fighting going on to north and northeast of Kharkov, but no major movement in the lines for the last two days. In Lugansk/Donetsk area Russia threatens operations towards Barvenkove, from Lyman towards Slovyansk, and around Poposna in addition to taking Sievierodonetsk. Only the push on Sievierodonetsk is gaining ground. The Russian may have concentrated forces there to achieve this. Around Kherson, Ukraine is conducting two offensives, one towards Kherson and one to the NE of Kherson looking to drive behind it. They don’t seem to be gaining much ground and these attacks may be to distract and tie down Russian forces and may not be a Ukrainian major offensive. Because of the low troop densities on most of these fronts, any major push hitting a weak defense could result in fairly quick and significant advances. Right now, the only place the front lines are moving is in Sievierodonetsk.

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia map

The map below from 20 May is borrowed from Dr. Michael Mackay @mhmck. The area threatened with encirclement contain the cities of Sievierdonetsk and Lysychansk and surrounding areas which had a population in excess of 350,000. One can see the expansion around Popasna.

The Russians have made some progress on their larger objective of taking all of the Lugansk/Donetsk provinces. Not sure how much more they can do, but I assume at this point that Lysychansk, which is just south of Sievierodonetsk is in danger. Right now, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk appear to be secure. The four main cities in this area are Sievierodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Sloviansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084). It appears that the war has been reduced to 1) a fight over Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk and 2) maybe a fight over Kherson. We shall see if any other major operations develop.

We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only two appear to be active right now. Russia now occupies four cities, Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928), Melitopol (pop. 150,768) and Kherson (pop. 283,649). 

1. Kiev – secure

2. Odessa – secure

3. Kharkov – secure

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces
5. Mariupol – operations completed
6. Crimean border/Kherson

It appears that Kiev, Chernigov, Sumy and the northeast part of Ukraine are secure. Of course, Russia can always reintroduce troops later from Russia or Belarus. They are supposed to have around 20 BTGs in Russia. A Ukranian border guard was killed on 16 May near Sumy.

The U.S. DOD is reporting that the Russian forces in Ukraine are being reinforced, with the count of BTGs going up from 92 to 105 (now 106). It this preparation for a big push in a week or two?

Here is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kiev is secure. 

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secure.

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkov looks to be securely held but is still being hit by both missiles and artillery. Nine people were killed 26 May. By 30 May Russia took back some area to the north/NW of Kharkov and lost some other territory in the area nearby as Ukraine again pushed to another part of the Russia border to the north/NE of Kharkov. This kind of just seems to some back-and-forth operations using limited forces. Suspect Ukraine has transferred some assets to the fighting in the south. 

Map showing front lines near Kharkov on 27 April and 17 May (cribbed from @War_Mapper), with the 17 May map showing the taking of Dementiivka.

The Russians do appear to have been pushing to the southwest towards Barvinkove (pop. 8,110), vice the south or southeast. So it is either a broader encirclement of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, or the rumored drive on Dnipro (which I really don’t believe they are going to try). Still, no villages have been reported taken in this area for the last week or so. A video from Sky News from Barvinkove (3:58): Ukraine War: Ukrainian soldiers stand firm in Barvinkove. Trench warfare (2:14)?

Russia did take the village of Lyman (pop. 20,469) on 27 May (although they claimed they took it on 25 May). On 23 May, the mayor there said the town was down to 7,000-8,000 residents. Another map cribbed from @War_Mapper dated 9 May: 

As can be seen from this map, this brings all the area on the northern side of the Seversky Donets River under Russian control. The Ukrainians still have the river between them and Slovyansk.

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces: The Russians have taken around 70% of Sievierdonetsk. The city was surrounded on three sides. One wonders if Ukraine decided if it was best to limit the defense of this area. This also probably puts Lysychansk in danger. According to Ukraine only 15,000 civilians remained in the city.

In the case of Sievierodonetsk (pop. 101,135) a Russian group broke into the Myr Hotel on 27 May. On 30 May they were reported to have entered the northeastern and southeastern parts of Sievierodonetsk. And now two days later, they have 70% of the city. This is pretty quick. Not all urban operations turn into a major slog.

Some maps are still show Zolote in Ukrainian hands, although it is claimed by some that it was taken on 23 May. The Ukrainian government is still reporting on 29 May that buildings were destroyed there from shelling. The Ukrainians retook Toshkivka on 29 May but lost at least part of it the following day. Both of these locales are just south of Sievierodonetsk and this is helping secure the city from envelopment from the south.

The danger of surrounding Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk is coming from the Russian operations around Popasna (pop. 19,672), which has been in Russian hands since 7 May. They are threatening Bakhmut (pop. 72,310) and Soledar (pop.10,692). The Russian forces have advanced to within 10 miles (16 kilometers) of Bakhmut. There does not appear to have been any major advances around here in the last two days.

The map below is from 20 May by @War_Mapper.

Further south Avdiyivka (31,940) is still in Ukranian hands but is being shelled. Ukraine claimed on 27 April that Avdiyivka was hit twice by phosphorus munitions. They are reported pushing towards Kamyanka and Novoselivka, to its north.

Slovyansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084) appear safe for now. Kramatorsk had its rail station hit on 9 April with over 50 civilians killed.

To the southwest of this fight, the Ukrainians have retaken Maryinka (pop. 9,256) on 19 April, which had been taken by the DPR on 17 March. 

The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 26 May that they had 1,912 soldiers killed and 7,919 wounded (4.14-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio) out of a supposed strength of 20,000. This is 49% casualties out of an estimated force of 20,000, which is pretty serious. They have been surprisingly diligent about regularly reporting their casualty figures. One wonders if some Russian losses or contractors are being included in these figures. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio. Don’t know how many of DPR and LPR forces are Russians from Russia as opposed to locals.

Zelensky in an interview on CNN on 17 April said they had 44,000 professional military men in the Donbas.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): The siege lasted seventy-seven days. As of 17 May, Mariupol is under control of Russia although they declared on 20 May that they had “completely liberated” the steel works. It apparently took a couple of days for everyone to surrender, including the final 531 Ukranian troops. The Alamo held out for 13 days. The Germans surrounded in Stalingrad held out for 72 days. The Russian defense minister said 1,908 at that same time, and they have now upped their claimed prisoners to 2,439 (note that 1908 + 531 = 2,439). This is more prisoners that some of the previous Russian claims of defender strength. So far, none have been exchanged. Denys Prokopenkop, the senior commander in the Azovstal steel mill, is being held in Russian controlled territory and was able to have brief conversation with his wife. 

The population of the city is down to 100,000 or less. I assume the civilians are not planning to return. The mayor, who is no longer in the city, claimed that more than 10,000 people have been killed. The head of DPR (Donets People’s Republic) has said over 5,000 people have been killed. The city has been decimated, lots of buildings and houses destroyed. Mariupol has no power, gas or water. 

According to the DOD on 18 April there are almost a dozen BTGs in Mariupol. The U.S. DOD claimed a couple of weeks ago that 2,000 troops and some Chechen fighters are still in Mariupol and that 10 BTGs were now moving north. The Chechen fighters are still reported (as of 23 May) to still be in the area. Does this portend an offensive south of Sievierdonetsk pushing north? They do indicate that some of the BTGs appears to have paused to be refitted, which is not all that surprising.

There is a mass grave being reported outside of Mariupol near the town of Manhush. It looks like around 200 graves have been dug. Another mass grave is also being reported on 23 April. So far, they appear to be graves for hundreds of people, vice thousands. A third mass grave has been reported. There has been no new reports on this for a while.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is under Russian control. Are the Ukrainians going to make a push to take back Kherson? The Ukrainians are conducting offensive operations around Kherson, but not major territory has exchanged hands. The more interesting operation is the one to the NE of Kherson, where Ukraine has driven down a road that goes behind the city. towards the Dnipro River. This advance towards Kostromka threatens to cut off the Russian forces to the NE of there. This could result is a significant gain of ground by Ukraine. It also could start the process of isolating Kherson. We shall see if this advance continues. It does not seem to have gained much ground in the last two days and Russia still holds Kostromka.

 

Weather: Kharkov at 3 PM: 81 degrees (27 Celsius) and mostly cloudy. Low tonight 63 degrees (17 Celsius). Rain is forecasted for today (80%), Thursday (80%), Friday (80%), Sunday (60%) and Monday (50%). Not ideal weather for operations, but less of an issue in urban areas. 

Ukrainian Army Build-up: 

The big news is what is occurring off the battlefield, where U.S. and other international aid is now providing more than $90 billion in aid to Ukraine. Over the long run this will change the military balance between Ukraine and Russia, unless Russia fully mobilizes for war. They seem hesitant to do this. The U.S. has just added another 0.7 billion in military aid to this total. Germany is slowly getting around to providing more weapons.

Not sure how large the army now is (assume over 200,000). There is a Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force of 100,000 to 200,000. Wikipedia was reporting 209,000 in their armed forces and 102,000 paramilitary. They are now reporting their armed forces at 196,600. President Zelensky said on 21 May that 700,000 soldiers are defending Ukraine. Most of those are militia. The Ukrainian army is around 200,000 and I gather is going to grow to 300,000. It does take a while to build up an army. The upper limited of mobilization is around 5% of the population (there have been cases where it has been higher). So Ukraine with a population of 40 million can build up an army of 2 million, especially if it continues to receive significant outside help. The Russia commentor Col. Kodaryonok stated in his outburst on Russian TV a couple of days ago that “But the situation from the overall strategic position is that the Ukrainian armed forces are able to arm a million people. They’re saying it themselves, that for us, there’s no difficulty in mobilizing a million people. The whole issue is to what extent they’re able to supply this army of modern weapons and military hardware… so a million armed Ukrainian soldiers needs to be viewed as a reality of the very near future.” I would also add that they need to be trained, which takes a while.

The Azov Regiment that was holding in Mariupol was actually a militia unit. That is the case with some of the foreign volunteer battalions also. There are some foreign volunteer units that have been there a while, including two Chechen battalions and a Georgian unit. I have yet to any statistics as to how many other foreign volunteers have been deployed, just individual stories.

There also the independent Belarussian Kastus Kalinouski Battalion, which as of 5 March is reported to have 200 members. They were serving in Irpin (near Kiev). It is reported that they have had thousands of volunteers. The deputy commander of the battalion (age 31) was killed on action on 13 March and another member was lost on 24 March in Irpin. On 16 May it was reported that a company commander had been killed. They state that a total of six Belarussians had died in this battalion since February. This, of course, threatens to bring the war into Belarus at some point.

Outside support for Ukraine is considerable and reported in a separate blog post: Outside Support for Ukraine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Not sure I am going to update this. Additional material is being sent, including Harpoon anti-ship missiles from Denmark.

The U.S. is now admitting that it helped target Russian generals. See: American intel used to kill Russian generals in Ukraine: US officials. This is something we had assumed for a while. See:  How Much is U.S. Intelligence helping Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and How Much is U.S. intelligence helping Ukraine? – part 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). And then yesterday they admitted that U.S. intel helped with tracking the sunk Russian cruiser Moskva, some we also assumed: Official: US gave intel before Ukraine sank Russian warship. Apparently, they did not provide specific targeting information. A group of Russian officers were hit 17 May in the Russian occupied city of Melitopol. Ukraine claims it was done by “partisans.” They are also reporting attacking an armored train. If true, this opens a whole new dimension to this war, although other reports indicate that this was a “special operation” as opposed to partisans. Major General Kanamat Botashev was reported killed while flying an Su-25. This has not been confirmed. So far seven named generals have been reported killed in this war, with only two deaths confirmed. Three additional claims have been disputed and are probably incorrect.

Russian Army Build-up:  I have yet to see many reports of Russia expanding its army or calling up more reserves and conscripts. Their biannual call-up starts on 1 April, and Putin just signed a decree ordering up 134,500 new conscripts into the army. See the comments in the Day 35 for a discussion on the significance of this. We are now in the tenth week of the war. Are they going to expand their army as Ukraine is clearly expanding theirs, or are they expecting that this war will end shortly? It looks like the Russian Army is adding a couple of thousand volunteers. The U.S. DOD told reporters on 8 April that the Russia could be looking to recruit as many as 60,000 soldiers to join the fight. Still have not seen any indications of major build-up, although they are rebuilding and refitting their units.

Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000 (up to 190,000). Donetsk PR is estimated at 20,000 and Lugansk at 14,000. Russia may be able to add more forces from their own resources, but not much more. If they want to add more, they are going to have to mobilize. Russia appears to be hesitant to do so. I suspect with full mobilization; we could be looking at a Ukrainian army larger than 300,000. People are now even talking about a Ukrainian armed force of 700,000 to 1,000,000. At some point, Russia will have to mobilize to continue this war. I do not think Russia can win this war without further mobilization. If fact, with the increased aid flowing into Ukraine, Russia may very well end up losing territory it currently holds without additional mobilization. The failure to mobilize is hard to explain from a military point of view. It is clearly a result of domestic political concerns.

Economics and the Home Fronts: The U.S. congress has approved a $40 billion aid bill for Ukraine. That along with previous aid from dozens of other countries ($20-$25 billion), new economic aid from the G-7 (now reported at $19.8 billion), the previous U.S. aid bill in March ($13 billion), and so forth, is pushing the amount of aid this year towards $100 billion (40.1 + 25 + 19.8 + 13 + 0.7 = 99). This is enough to match the entire Russian 2021 defense budget of 61.7 billion and keep the Ukrainian economy afloat. It means that Ukraine can stay in this war for an extended fight. It changes the strategic balance and strategic considerations.

The discussion of the economic situation and the home fronts has been updated in a separate rambling blog post: The Home Fronts during the Russo-Ukrainian War – update 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Price of oil is up to 117.32 as of 8:41 AM and the ruble is at 65.49 to the dollar.

Casualties: Ukraine admitted on 29 April that they have suffered “serious losses” in battles. Zelensky is now saying that between “50 to 100 Ukrainians could be killed”  each day in the Battle for Donbas. We take these claims at face value. They also claim that Russian losses are “colossal.” That claim has not been confirmed. Zelensky told CNN on 15 April that Ukrainian Army had lost between 2,500-3,000 troops since the fighting has begun and about 10,000 have been wounded (wounded-to-killed ratio of 4.00- or 3.33-to-1). According to NYT the U.S. intelligence estimates as of 19 April are between 5,500 to 11,000 Ukrainians killed and between 7,000 to 10,000 Russians killed.

Ukraine is claiming as of 19 April that 20,800 Russian and DPR soldiers have been killed, Russians are claiming as of 16 April that 23,367 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed. Are both sets of figures similarly inflated? It does argue that losses on both sides are similar in size.

Prisoner swap of wounded Ukrainians trapped in Mariupol appeared to have been negotiated, but so far nothing has been reported. I gather that the 53 seriously wounded prisoners are being swapped. Don’t know about the rest of the people.

The UN is reporting as of 30 May at least 4,113 civilians confirmed dead in the war. Of those 2,337 of the deaths are in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk with 144 killed in territory controlled by Russian separatists. Ukraine is reporting that as of 25 April, 3,818 civilians were killed in Ukraine. This is not that far from the UN figure. One wonders if the claimed Mariupol casualties are included in these figures. The rate of accrual of reported civilian casualties has gone down. 

It is clear that more than 13,000 people have died in this conflict (1,351 (Russian Army) + at least 2,000 more (Russian Army) + 3,000 (Ukrainian Army) + 4,113 (Civilians) + 1,912 (DPR) + 600 (LPR) = 12,976). It is probably in excess of 20,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. The number of deaths of Mariupol are unverified and unknown and could add thousands to these totals.

A more detailed discussion is provided here: Losses during the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Air Power: The Pentagon on 12 March is reporting that Russia is flying about 200 sorties a day. The Ukrainian air force has 56 operational jets flying 5 to 10 hours a day. March 22 it was reported by the U.S. that Russia flew more than 300 sorties into Ukraine. March 24 it was reported that more than 250 Russian sorties were flown, mostly around Kiev and Kharkov. On 12 May, the U.S. was claiming that the Russians flew 300 sorties over Ukraine in the last 24 hours. On 14 May they were claiming 250 Russian sorties. It has been pretty consistent reporting of 250-300 sorties a day for quite some time now.

Missile Defense: According to Zelenskyy the missile barrage near Lvov on 12 March consisted of 30 missiles, 8 missiles that landed and 22 missiles that were intercepted and shot down. On the morning of 16 April in the Lvov region, Ukraine claimed it downed four cruise missiles fired by Su-35s operating from Belarus. Zelensky claimed on 26 April that Russians have fired more than 1,100 missiles at Ukraine. The U.S. DOD claimed on 29 April that more than 1,950 missiles have been fired at Ukraine since the start of the war and they are currently firing about 50 a day.

End of the War: It does look like Russia intends to take and hold onto all of Donetsk and Lugansk provinces, and possibly all of Kherson province and four-fifths of Zaporizhzhia province. The capital Zaporizhzhia (pop. 722,713) may not be on their list of areas to take. So, four out of Ukraine’s 24 provinces and Crimea.

Populations of partly or completely occupied areas (2019 estimates):

Donetsk: 4,165,901

Lugansk: 2,151,833

Crimea: 2,033,700 (2001 census)

Zaporizhzhia: 1,705,836

Kherson: 1,037,640

Sevastopol: 509,992 (2021 estimate)

 

Population of Ukraine (excluding Crimea), 2022 estimate: 41,167,336

What they are willing to later negotiate away to achieve peace or a ceasefire is unknown. What Ukraine is willing to negotiate away is also unknown, although they are now saying the war will continue until all areas are freed. Does that include the LPR, DPR and Crimea? When they are ready to return to talks is unknown. This looks like an extended war and I don’t think will be over before the end of summer. At this point, unless Russia mobilizes, it will slowly turn to Ukraine’s advantage.

Atrocities:  Reports from Ukraine have put the body count of civilians found in the towns and villages surround Kiev at 1,222. Not sure if this has been independently confirmed, but I assume the UN counting efforts have now picked up most of these civilian deaths. Ukraine has identified ten Russian soldiers wanted for “pre-mediated murder” in Bucha. They are all enlisted from the 64th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. These are the first charges unveiled of over 8,000 criminal investigations. The U.S. is claiming it has “credible information” of Russians killing Ukrainians in the vicinity of Donetsk who were trying to surrender.

There are also various accusations against the Russian Army Chechen unit operating around Bucha: Brutal Sect of Putin’s Army Accused of Murdering Their Own Comrades.

More claims of atrocities coming out with videos of Russian troops shooting two civilians outside of Kiev in March. Ukraine has sentenced a 21-year old POW to life in prison for shooting a civilian who was talking on his phone. Ukraine is now charging 48 more Russian soldiers (currently POWs) and investigating around 13,000 alleged offenses. The Ukrainian officials have a list of about 6000 suspects. Two POWs pleaded guilty on 26 May of firing Grad rockets from Russia’s Belgorod region towards Kharkov on 24 Feb.

Meanwhile, the head of the DPR is saying that the fighters who surrendered at the Azovstal steel mill are to be put on trail. Somehow, this response does not surprise me.

There is also a video out there of Ukrainian soldiers shooting several Russian prisoners in their legs. There is a second video showing Ukrainian troops executing what appears to be four Russian prisoners seven miles SW of Bucha. See: https://news.yahoo.com/video-appears-show-ukrainian-soldiers-192219323.html. More detailed description from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/61025388. It is on Youtube, if you want to look it up. I believe they are members of the Georgian Legion, a group of Georgian volunteers fighting for Ukraine.

There are also some retribution killings going on: Ukrainian Chief Intelligence Directorate: another traitor of Ukraine found shot.

Other Issues: Azerbaijani troops have occupied an area in Nagorno-Karabakh that they are claiming is theirs. The Russian peacekeeping troops there have not expelled them. Widespread protests in Armenia this weekend over Nagorno-Karabakh followed by 180 detentions. There were more protests this Sunday and another 237 protesters were detained. On 10 May another 61 protesters were detained.

NATO has confirmed 18 May that both Finland and Sweden have officially applied to join NATO. NATO has said it will welcome them with open armsThe process of accepting them is expected to take about two weeks and they could be members within a few months. It does require unanimous consent of all 30 members for them to join NATO. Turkey is withholding consent until there is some resolution concerning some weapons embargoes against Turkey and the presence in Sweden of Kurdish refugees wanted by Turkey. It does add an 810-mile (1300 km) border with Russia, but NATO already abuts Russian and Belarussian territory in the Baltic states. 

Ukraine was supposed to be on the fast track to join the European Union (EU), which was the issue that started all the turmoil in 2013. But EU member Austria has objected, and now France is saying that it may take years. All EU members must unanimously agree for a country’s membership negotiations to begin. This is the issue that fueled all the conflict over the last nine years, for the Euromaidan revolt occurred when Ukrainian President Yanukovich decided to join Putin’s Eurasian Union vice the EU. The subsequent conflicts included the whole three-month Euromaidan revolt in the dead of winter of 2013-2014 that led to over 100 Ukrainians being killed, many protesters shot in the street by President Yanokovich’s security forces; the seizure of Crimea; the creation of LPR and DPR; the subsequent war; and now this war. Ukraine certainly has paid a much higher cost to join the EU than anyone else ever has. Current polling (Reuters April 5) shows that 91% of the Ukrainians support joining the EU. 

A Ukrainian court on 23 May order the arrest of former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich. He is accused of treason over the agreement he signed in 2010 (The Kharkiv Pact) to extend Russian leave on naval facilities in Crimea. In 2014 Russian forces in Sevastopol seized all of Crimea and Victor Yanukovich left Ukraine for Russia and was in Moscow by 25 February 2014. He has remained in Russia ever since. He had already received a 13-year jail sentence over a letter he sent to Vladimir Putin on 1 March 2014 asking for Russia to use Russian army and police forces to restore order in Ukraine. 

The Map: The attached map is from Wikipedia. It is dated 1 June. It does not appear to have been updated since 30 May.

Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 7

Below is the provisional schedule for the first Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC). We currently have set up two conference rooms for use and are issuing out a call for presentations. We do have 30 presentations scheduled by 20 speakers. We have slots available for at least another dozen presentations. Each slot is an hour long, so planning for a 45-minute presentation and 15 minutes of discussion.

If we get more requests than that, my bias is to either rent a third conference room at the facility or to reduce some presentations to 20 minutes with 10 minutes of discussion. This would allow us to do two presentations in an hour slot. We are probably not going to turn away any quality presentations.

We have created a new section called “Researching Operations,” which is somewhat related to but not quite the same as Operations Research. We are looking to add to that section presentations on Georgia in 2008, Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and Ukraine in 2022. Looking for volunteers for those, or for any other conflicts worth looking at.

Conference description is here: The First Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 in Tysons Corner, VA – update 3 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Costs, Hotels and Call for Papers: The Costs, Hotels and Call for Papers – update 3 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The current schedule has not changed much. We now have three virtual presentations and we are set up for virtual attendees:

Schedule: Pike and Gallows Conference Center

Updated: 24 May 2022

 

 

Day 1: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 0930    Introductory remarks (new)                Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

0930 – 1030    Studying Combat (old)                       Dr. Shawn Woodford (TDI)

1030 – 1130    Data for Wargames (recent version) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1130 – 1230    How Lanchester modelling fits the historical data

                                                                                    Dr. Paul R. Syms (Dstl)

1230 – 1400    Lunch

1400 – 1500    Research fitting Lanchester Models to Battle Data

                                                                                    Dr. Tom Lucas (NPS)

1500 – 1600    How Important are Superior Numbers?                     

Dr. David Kirkpatrick (University College London) – virtual

1600 – 1700    Killing Captain Hindsight: Quantifying Chance in Military History

Dr. Niall MacKay (University of York)        

 

Evening (1900):          Group Dinner – Rangos

 

 

Day 2: Analysis of Unconventional Warfare

0900 – 1000    Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (old)

Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1000 – 1100    History as an Enemy and an Instructor: Lessons Learned from Haiti 1915-1934                             Dr. Christopher Davis (UNCG)

1100 – 1200   

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400   

1400 – 1500    Infantry Support Weapon                   Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.) – ?

1500 – 1600   

1600 – 1700    The Silent Killers: A Quick Historical Review of Biological Threats.

                                                                        Dr. Douglas A. Samuelson (InfoLogix, Inc.) 

 

Evening (1900):          Group Dinner – BJs

 

 

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000    The Application of the Scientific Method to Military History

Clinton Reilly (Computer Strategies. Australia)

1000 – 1100    Risk Tolerance in Combat Decision Making             Matt Tompkins

1100 – 1200    Quantitative Risk Assessment in Military Decisions

                                                                           Dr. Douglas A. Samuelson (InfoLogix, Inc.)

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400    HA support for our Directorate of Land Warfare

Dr. Paul L. Syms (Dstl)

1400 – 1500    Quantitative Analysis of History of Direct Fire Weapons

                                                                                    Dr. Alexander Kott (ARL)

1500 – 1600    The Criticality of Resurrecting TDI & TNDM

                                                                                    Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.)

1600 – 1700    The Future of TDI and work of the conference (new)

Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

 

Evening:          Happy hour  – Rangos and/or Hawk and Griffin 

 

Schedule: Einstein Conference Room

 

Day 1: Poster and Book Room

Opened at 0800

 

Afternoon Day 1: Other Analysis of Warfare

1400 – 1500    Estimating War Deaths (in Iraq) – virtual

Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University of London)

1500 – 1600    Midway and the Aleutians                  Dr. Michael Johnson (CNA)

1600 – 1700

 

 

Day 2: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 1000    A Statistical Analysis of Land Battles: What is Associated with Winning?

                                                                                                Dr. Tom Lucas (NPS)

1000 – 1100    The Combat Assessment Technique               William Sayers

1100 – 1200    Machine Learning the Lessons of History      Dr. Robert Helmbold – virtual

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400    Penetration Division: Theory, History, Concept

                                                                                    LtC. Nathan A Jennings, PhD

1400 – 1500   

1500 – 1600    War by Numbers (old)                        Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI) – ?

1600 – 1700    Urban Warfare (old)                           Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI) – ?

 

 

Day 3: Researching Operations

0900 – 1000    The AEF and Consolidation of Gains Operations during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 1918                                                            Dr. Christopher Davis (UNCG)

1000 – 1100    Evaluating German Aerial Photography at the Battle of Kursk, 1943

                                                                                    Eugene Matyukhin

1100 – 1200    The Red Army’s War in Ukraine 1943-44

                                                                                    Dr. Richard Harrison

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400    The Decline of War Since 1950        

Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University of London)

1400 – 1500    Donbas Campaign 2014-2015                        Amos Fox (Major, USA)

1500 – 1600   

1600 – 1700   

 

 

Or Day 2 or 3: Combat Modeling

 

Or Day 2 or 3: Urban Warfare

 

Or Day 2 or 3: Air Combat Analysis

 

Or Day 2 or 3: Naval Combat Analysis

 

 

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – Day 96 (ground actions)

Fighting going on in around eight locales along the front, but no major changes in the lines over the last two days (my last post was on day 93). Russia took back some area north of Kharkov and lost some other territory in the area nearby as Ukraine again pushed to another part of the Russia border. In Lugansk/Donetsk area Russia continues operations towards Barvenkove, from Lyman towards Slovyansk, on the edge of Sievierodonetsk, and around Poposna. Around Kherson, Ukraine is conducting two offensives, one towards Kherson and one to the NE of Kherson looking to drive behind it. 

Lyman is now in Russian hands. They claim they took it on 25 May. Ukraine was saying it had forces holding on in parts of it on the 27 May. It appears they withdrew. This brings all the area on the northern side of the Seversky Donets River under Russian control. The Ukrainians still have the river between them and Slovyansk.

Russian forces have entered the northeastern and southeastern outskirts of Sievierodonetsk. 

The Russian attacks pushing out from Poposna (south of Sievierodonetsk) is the biggest threat to surround Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk. They have expanded in this area and towards Bakhmut but no towns have been confirmed to have changed hands since 24 May. Not sure who controls Zolote, but I think it is still in Ukrainian hands as of 29 May. The Ukrainians retook Toshkivka on 29 May. Both of these locales are just south of Sievierodonetsk.

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia map

The map below from 20 May is borrowed from Dr. Michael Mackay @mhmck. The area threatened with encirclement contain the cities of Sievierdonetsk and Lysychansk and surrounding areas which had a population in excess of 350,000. One can see the expansion around Popasna.

The sense I have is that Ukraine has decided to completely defend and hold this area and Russia is only slowly advancing. We are not seeing anything that looks like a major offensive being launched. Lots of limited but local advances. There is a little back and forth going on around Kharkov that is not particularly meaningful and there are the two Ukrainian offensives around Kherson which may become meaningful. We shall see how they develop. It does not appear that Russia is going to launch any major spring/summer offensive, or more to the point, this is it. Rain is being forecasted for today and next four days, which should probably slow operations.

The Russians can gain a negotiating advantage if they take Sievierodonetsk and Lysychank, but I am not sure they can. The Ukrainians can get a big negotiating advantage if they can take or isolate Kherson. Not sure they can.

The larger Russian objective of taking all of the Lugansk/Donetsk provinces seems to be out of their reach in the next couple of weeks. This would include the cities of Siervierodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Sloviansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084). It appears that the war has been reduced to 1) a fight over Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk and 2) a fight over Kherson. We shall see if any other major operations develop.

We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only two appear to be active right now. Russia now occupies four cities, Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928), Melitopol (pop. 150,768) and Kherson (pop. 283,649). 

1. Kiev – secure

2. Odessa – secure

3. Kharkov – secure

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces
5. Mariupol – operations completed
6. Crimean border/Kherson

It appears that Kiev, Chernigov, Sumy and the northeast part of Ukraine are secure. Of course, Russia can always reintroduce troops later from Russia or Belarus. They are supposed to have around 20 BTGs in Russia. A Ukranian border guard was killed on 16 May near Sumy.

The U.S. DOD is reporting that the Russian forces in Ukraine are being reinforced, with the count of BTGs going up from 92 to 105 (now 106). It this preparation for a big push in a week or two?

Here is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kiev is secure. 

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secure.

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkov looks to be securely held but is still being hit by both missiles and artillery. Nine people were killed 26 May. Russia took back some area to the north/NW of Kharkov and lost some other territory in the area nearby as Ukraine again pushed to another part of the Russia border to the north/NE of Kharkov. This kind of just seems to some back-and-forth operations using limited forces. Suspect Ukraine has transferred some assets to the fighting in the south. 

Map showing front lines near Kharkov on 27 April and 17 May (cribbed from @War_Mapper), with the 17 May map showing the taking of Dementiivka.

The Russians do appear to have been pushing to the southwest towards Barvinkove (pop. 8,110), vice the south or southeast. So it is either a broader encirclement of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, or the rumored drive on Dnipro (which I really don’t believe they are going to try). Still, no villages have been reported taken in this area for the last week or so. A video from Sky News from Barvinkove (3:58): Ukraine War: Ukrainian soldiers stand firm in Barvinkove. Trench warfare (2:14)?

Russia did take the village of Lyman (pop. 20,469) on 27 May (although they claimed they took it on 25 May). On 23 May, the mayor there said the town was down to 7,000-8,000 residents. Another map cribbed from @War_Mapper dated 9 May: 

As can be seen from this map, this brings all the area on the northern side of the Seversky Donets River under Russian control. The Ukrainians still have the river between them and Slovyansk.

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces: The Russians have advanced to the northern outskirts of Sievierdonetsk. The city is being surrounded on three sides. The city is being shelled and according to Ukraine only 15,000 civilians remain in the city.

Sievierodonetsk (pop. 101,135) is under direct assault with a Russian group having broke into the Myr Hotel in Sievierodonetsk on 27 May. They have entered the northeastern and southeastern parts of Sievierodonetsk. Is this going to turn into an extended urban fight?

Some maps are still show Zolote in Ukrainian hands, although it is claimed by some that it was taken on 23 May. The Ukrainian government is still reporting on 29 May that buildings were destroyed there from shelling. The Ukrainians retook Toshkivka on 29 May. Both of these locales are just south of Sievierodonetsk and this is helping secure the city from envelopment from the south.

The danger of being surrounded is coming from the Russian operations around Popasna (pop. 19,672), which has been in Russian hands since 7 May. They are theatening Bakhmut (pop. 72,310) and Soledar (pop.10,692). The Russian forces have advanced to within 10 miles (16 kilometers) of Bakhmut.

The map below is from 20 May by @War_Mapper.

Further south Avdiyivka (31,940) is still in Ukranian hands but is being shelled. Ukraine claimed on 27 April that Avdiyivka was hit twice by phosphorus munitions. They are reported pushing towards Kamyanka and Novoselivka, to its north.

Slovyansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084) appear safe for now. Kramatorsk had its rail station hit on 9 April with over 50 civilians killed.

To the southwest of this fight, the Ukrainians have retaken Maryinka (pop. 9,256) on 19 April, which had been taken by the DPR on 17 March. 

The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 26 May that they had 1,912 soldiers killed and 7,919 wounded (4.14-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio) out of a supposed strength of 20,000. This is 49% casualties out of an estimated force of 20,000, which is pretty serious. They have been surprisingly diligent about regularly reporting their casualty figures. One wonders if some Russian losses or contractors are being included in these figures. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio. Don’t know how many of DPR and LPR forces are Russians from Russia as opposed to locals.

Zelensky in an interview on CNN on 17 April said they had 44,000 professional military men in the Donbas.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): The siege lasted seventy-seven days. As of 17 May, Mariupol is under control of Russia although they declared on 20 May that they had “completely liberated” the steel works. It apparently took a couple of days for everyone to surrender, including the final 531 Ukranian troops. The Alamo held out for 13 days. The Germans surrounded in Stalingrad held out for 72 days. The Russian defense minister said 1,908 at that same time, and they have now upped their claimed prisoners to 2,439 (note that 1908 + 531 = 2,439). This is more prisoners that some of the previous Russian claims of defender strength. So far, none have been exchanged. Denys Prokopenkop, the senior commander in the Azovstal steel mill, is being held in Russian controlled territory and was able to have brief conversation with his wife. 

The population of the city is down to 100,000 or less. I assume the civilians are not planning to return. The mayor, who is no longer in the city, claimed that more than 10,000 people have been killed. The head of DPR (Donets People’s Republic) has said over 5,000 people have been killed. The city has been decimated, lots of buildings and houses destroyed. Mariupol has no power, gas or water. 

According to the DOD on 18 April there are almost a dozen BTGs in Mariupol. The U.S. DOD claimed a couple of weeks ago that 2,000 troops and some Chechen fighters are still in Mariupol and that 10 BTGs were now moving north. The Chechen fighters are still reported (as of 23 May) to still be in the area. Does this portend an offensive south of Sievierdonetsk pushing north? They do indicate that some of the BTGs appears to have paused to be refitted, which is not all that surprising.

There is a mass grave being reported outside of Mariupol near the town of Manhush. It looks like around 200 graves have been dug. Another mass grave is also being reported on 23 April. So far, they appear to be graves for hundreds of people, vice thousands. A third mass grave has been reported. There has been no new reports on this for a while.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is under Russian control. Are the Ukrainians going to make a push to take back Kherson? The Ukrainians are conducting offensive operations around Kherson, but not major territory has exchanged hands. The more interesting operation is the one to the NE of Kherson, where Ukraine has driven down a road that goes behind the city. towards the Dnipro River. This advance towards Kostromka threatens to cut off the Russian forces to the NE of there. This could result is a significant gain of ground by Ukraine. It also could start the process of isolating Kherson. We shall see if this advance continues.

Russians are transporting T-62M tanks, a 1980s upgrade, to Melitopol.

 

Weather: Kharkov at 3 PM: 76 degrees (24 Celsius) and mostly cloudy. Low tonight 61 degrees (16 Celsius). Rain is forecasted for today (80%), Tuesday (80%), Wednesday (70%), Thursday (50%) and Friday (60%). 

Ukrainian Army Build-up: 

The big news is what is occurring off the battlefield, where U.S. and other international aid is now providing more than $90 billion in aid to Ukraine. Over the long run this will change the military balance between Ukraine and Russia, unless Russia fully mobilizes for war. They seem hesitant to do this.

Not sure how large the army now is (assume over 200,000). There is a Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force of 100,000 to 200,000. Wikipedia was reporting 209,000 in their armed forces and 102,000 paramilitary. They are now reporting their armed forces at 196,600. President Zelensky said on 21 May that 700,000 soldiers are defending Ukraine. Most of those are militia. The Ukrainian army is around 200,000 and I gather is going to grow to 300,000. It does take a while to build up an army. The upper limited of mobilization is around 5% of the population (there have been cases where it has been higher). So Ukraine with a population of 40 million can build up an army of 2 million, especially if it continues to receive significant outside help. The Russia commentor Col. Kodaryonok stated in his outburst on Russian TV a couple of days ago that “But the situation from the overall strategic position is that the Ukrainian armed forces are able to arm a million people. They’re saying it themselves, that for us, there’s no difficulty in mobilizing a million people. The whole issue is to what extent they’re able to supply this army of modern weapons and military hardware… so a million armed Ukrainian soldiers needs to be viewed as a reality of the very near future.” I would also add that they need to be trained, which takes a while.

The Azov Regiment that was holding in Mariupol was actually a militia unit. That is the case with some of the foreign volunteer battalions also. There are some foreign volunteer units that have been there a while, including two Chechen battalions and a Georgian unit. I have yet to any statistics as to how many other foreign volunteers have been deployed, just individual stories.

There also the independent Belarussian Kastus Kalinouski Battalion, which as of 5 March is reported to have 200 members. They were serving in Irpin (near Kiev). It is reported that they have had thousands of volunteers. The deputy commander of the battalion (age 31) was killed on action on 13 March and another member was lost on 24 March in Irpin. On 16 May it was reported that a company commander had been killed. They state that a total of six Belarussians had died in this battalion since February. This, of course, threatens to bring the war into Belarus at some point.

Outside support for Ukraine is considerable and reported in a separate blog post: Outside Support for Ukraine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Not sure I am going to update this. Additional material is being sent, including Harpoon anti-ship missiles from Denmark.

The U.S. is now admitting that it helped target Russian generals. See: American intel used to kill Russian generals in Ukraine: US officials. This is something we had assumed for a while. See:  How Much is U.S. Intelligence helping Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and How Much is U.S. intelligence helping Ukraine? – part 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). And then yesterday they admitted that U.S. intel helped with tracking the sunk Russian cruiser Moskva, some we also assumed: Official: US gave intel before Ukraine sank Russian warship. Apparently, they did not provide specific targeting information. A group of Russian officers were hit 17 May in the Russian occupied city of Melitopol. Ukraine claims it was done by “partisans.” They are also reporting attacking an armored train. If true, this opens a whole new dimension to this war, although other reports indicate that this was a “special operation” as opposed to partisans. Major General Kanamat Botashev was reported killed while flying an Su-25. This has not been confirmed. So far seven named generals have been reported killed in this war, with only two deaths confirmed. Three additional claims have been disputed and are probably incorrect.

Russian Army Build-up:  I have yet to see many reports of Russia expanding its army or calling up more reserves and conscripts. Their biannual call-up starts on 1 April, and Putin just signed a decree ordering up 134,500 new conscripts into the army. See the comments in the Day 35 for a discussion on the significance of this. We are now in the tenth week of the war. Are they going to expand their army as Ukraine is clearly expanding theirs, or are they expecting that this war will end shortly? It looks like the Russian Army is adding a couple of thousand volunteers. The U.S. DOD told reporters on 8 April that the Russia could be looking to recruit as many as 60,000 soldiers to join the fight. Still have not seen any indications of major build-up, although they are rebuilding and refitting their units.

Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000 (up to 190,000). Donetsk PR is estimated at 20,000 and Lugansk at 14,000. Russia may be able to add more forces from their own resources, but not much more. If they want to add more, they are going to have to mobilize. Russia appears to be hesitant to do so. I suspect with full mobilization; we could be looking at a Ukrainian army larger than 300,000. People are now even talking about a Ukrainian armed force of 700,000 to 1,000,000. At some point, Russia will have to mobilize to continue this war. I do not think Russia can win this war without further mobilization. If fact, with the increased aid flowing into Ukraine, Russia may very well end up losing territory it currently holds without additional mobilization. The failure to mobilize is hard to explain from a military point of view. It is clearly a result of domestic political concerns.

Economics and the Home Fronts: The U.S. congress has approved a $40 billion aid bill for Ukraine. That along with previous aid from dozens of other countries ($20-$25 billion), new economic aid from the G-7 (now reported at $19.8 billion), the previous U.S. aid bill in March ($13 billion), and so forth, is pushing the amount of aid this year towards $100 billion (40.1 + 25 + 19.8 + 13 = 98). This is enough to match the entire Russian 2021 defense budget of 61.7 billion and keep the Ukrainian economy afloat. It means that Ukraine can stay in this war for an extended fight. It changes the strategic balance and strategic considerations.

The discussion of the economic situation and the home fronts has been updated in a separate rambling blog post: The Home Fronts during the Russo-Ukrainian War – update 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Price of oil is up to 116.31 as of 8:54 AM and the ruble is at 64.64 to the dollar.

Casualties: Ukraine admitted on 29 April that they have suffered “serious losses” in battles. Zelensky is now saying that between “50 to 100 Ukrainians could be killed”  each day in the Battle for Donbas. We take these claims at face value. They also claim that Russian losses are “colossal.” That claim has not been confirmed. Zelensky told CNN on 15 April that Ukrainian Army had lost between 2,500-3,000 troops since the fighting has begun and about 10,000 have been wounded (wounded-to-killed ratio of 4.00- or 3.33-to-1). According to NYT the U.S. intelligence estimates as of 19 April are between 5,500 to 11,000 Ukrainians killed and between 7,000 to 10,000 Russians killed.

Ukraine is claiming as of 19 April that 20,800 Russian and DPR soldiers have been killed, Russians are claiming as of 16 April that 23,367 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed. Are both sets of figures similarly inflated? It does argue that losses on both sides are similar in size.

Prisoner swap of wounded Ukrainians trapped in Mariupol appeared to have been negotiated, but so far nothing has been reported. I gather that the 53 seriously wounded prisoners are being swapped. Don’t know about the rest of the people.

The UN is reporting on 26 May at least 4,031 civilians confirmed dead in the war. Of those 2,274 of the deaths are in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk with 129 killed in territory controlled by Russian separatists. Ukraine is reporting that as of 25 April, 3,818 civilians were killed in Ukraine. This is not that far from the UN figure. One wonders if the claimed Mariupol casualties are included in these figures. The rate of accrual of reported civilian casualties has gone down. 

It is clear that more than 13,000 people have died in this conflict (1,351 (Russian Army) + at least 2,000 more (Russian Army) + 3,000 (Ukrainian Army) + 4,031 (Civilians) + 1,912 (DPR) + 600 (LPR) = 12,894). It is probably in excess of 20,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. The number of deaths of Mariupol are unverified and unknown and could add thousands to these totals.

A more detailed discussion is provided here. It will be updated soon: Losses during the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Air Power: The Pentagon on 12 March is reporting that Russia is flying about 200 sorties a day. The Ukrainian air force has 56 operational jets flying 5 to 10 hours a day. March 22 it was reported by the U.S. that Russia flew more than 300 sorties into Ukraine. March 24 it was reported that more than 250 Russian sorties were flown, mostly around Kiev and Kharkov. On 12 May, the U.S. was claiming that the Russians flew 300 sorties over Ukraine in the last 24 hours. On 14 May they were claiming 250 Russian sorties. It has been pretty consistent reporting of 250-300 sorties a day for quite some time now.

Missile Defense: According to Zelenskyy the missile barrage near Lvov on 12 March consisted of 30 missiles, 8 missiles that landed and 22 missiles that were intercepted and shot down. On the morning of 16 April in the Lvov region, Ukraine claimed it downed four cruise missiles fired by Su-35s operating from Belarus. Zelensky claimed on 26 April that Russians have fired more than 1,100 missiles at Ukraine. The U.S. DOD claimed on 29 April that more than 1,950 missiles have been fired at Ukraine since the start of the war and they are currently firing about 50 a day.

End of the War: It does look like Russia intends to take and hold onto all of Donetsk and Lugansk provinces, and possibly all of Kherson province and four-fifths of Zaporizhzhia province. The capital Zaporizhzhia (pop. 722,713) may not be on their list of areas to take. So, four out of Ukraine’s 24 provinces and Crimea.

Populations of partly or completely occupied areas (2019 estimates):

Donetsk: 4,165,901

Lugansk: 2,151,833

Crimea: 2,033,700 (2001 census)

Zaporizhzhia: 1,705,836

Kherson: 1,037,640

Sevastopol: 509,992 (2021 estimate)

 

Population of Ukraine (excluding Crimea), 2022 estimate: 41,167,336

What they are willing to later negotiate away to achieve peace or a ceasefire is unknown. What Ukraine is willing to negotiate away is also unknown, although they are now saying the war will continue until all areas are freed. Does that include the LPR, DPR and Crimea? When they are ready to return to talks is unknown. This looks like an extended war and I don’t think will be over before the end of summer. At this point, unless Russia mobilizes, it will slowly turn to Ukraine’s advantage.

Atrocities:  Reports from Ukraine have put the body count of civilians found in the towns and villages surround Kiev at 1,222. Not sure if this has been independently confirmed, but I assume the UN counting efforts have now picked up most of these civilian deaths. Ukraine has identified ten Russian soldiers wanted for “pre-mediated murder” in Bucha. They are all enlisted from the 64th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. These are the first charges unveiled of over 8,000 criminal investigations. The U.S. is claiming it has “credible information” of Russians killing Ukrainians in the vicinity of Donetsk who were trying to surrender.

There are also various accusations against the Russian Army Chechen unit operating around Bucha: Brutal Sect of Putin’s Army Accused of Murdering Their Own Comrades.

More claims of atrocities coming out with videos of Russian troops shooting two civilians outside of Kiev in March. Ukraine has sentenced a 21-year old POW to life in prison for shooting a civilian who was talking on his phone. Ukraine is now charging 48 more Russian soldiers (currently POWs) and investigating around 13,000 alleged offenses. The Ukrainian officials have a list of about 6000 suspects. Two POWs pleaded guilty on 26 May of firing Grad rockets from Russia’s Belgorod region towards Kharkov on 24 Feb.

Meanwhile, the head of the DPR is saying that the fighters who surrendered at the Azovstal steel mill are to be put on trail. Somehow, this response does not surprise me.

There is also a video out there of Ukrainian soldiers shooting several Russian prisoners in their legs. There is a second video showing Ukrainian troops executing what appears to be four Russian prisoners seven miles SW of Bucha. See: https://news.yahoo.com/video-appears-show-ukrainian-soldiers-192219323.html. More detailed description from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/61025388. It is on Youtube, if you want to look it up. I believe they are members of the Georgian Legion, a group of Georgian volunteers fighting for Ukraine.

There are also some retribution killings going on: Ukrainian Chief Intelligence Directorate: another traitor of Ukraine found shot.

Other Issues: Azerbaijani troops have occupied an area in Nagorno-Karabakh that they are claiming is theirs. The Russian peacekeeping troops there have not expelled them. Widespread protests in Armenia this weekend over Nagorno-Karabakh followed by 180 detentions. There were more protests this Sunday and another 237 protesters were detained. On 10 May another 61 protesters were detained.

NATO has confirmed 18 May that both Finland and Sweden have officially applied to join NATO. NATO has said it will welcome them with open armsThe process of accepting them is expected to take about two weeks and they could be members within a few months. It does require unanimous consent of all 30 members for them to join NATO. Turkey is withholding consent until there is some resolution concerning some weapons embargoes against Turkey and the presence in Sweden of Kurdish refugees wanted by Turkey. It does add an 810-mile (1300 km) border with Russia, but NATO already abuts Russian and Belarussian territory in the Baltic states. 

Ukraine was supposed to be on the fast track to join the European Union (EU), which was the issue that started all the turmoil in 2013. But EU member Austria has objected, and now France is saying that it may take years. All EU members must unanimously agree for a country’s membership negotiations to begin. This is the issue that fueled all the conflict over the last nine years, for the Euromaidan revolt occurred when Ukrainian President Yanukovich decided to join Putin’s Eurasian Union vice the EU. The subsequent conflicts included the whole three-month Euromaidan revolt in the dead of winter of 2013-2014 that led to over 100 Ukrainians being killed, many protesters shot in the street by President Yanokovich’s security forces; the seizure of Crimea; the creation of LPR and DPR; the subsequent war; and now this war. Ukraine certainly has paid a much higher cost to join the EU than anyone else ever has. Current polling (Reuters April 5) shows that 91% of the Ukrainians support joining the EU. 

A Ukrainian court on 23 May order the arrest of former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich. He is accused of treason over the agreement he signed in 2010 (The Kharkiv Pact) to extend Russian leave on naval facilities in Crimea. In 2014 Russian forces in Sevastopol seized all of Crimea and Victor Yanukovich left Ukraine for Russia and was in Moscow by 25 February 2014. He has remained in Russia ever since. He had already received a 13-year jail sentence over a letter he sent to Vladimir Putin on 1 March 2014 asking for Russia to use Russian army and police forces to restore order in Ukraine. 

The Map: The attached map is from Wikipedia. It is dated 30 May. 

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – Day 93 (ground actions)

Still fighting around Poposna (south of Sievierodonetsk) and towards Bakhmut but no towns have been confirmed to have changed hands since 24 May. There are claims that Lyman was taken 25 May and that Zolote has been taken. Russian forces have entered Sievierodonetsk. Russia is still gaining ground around Sievierodonetsk and it appears that this will continue.

The industrial town of Svitlodarsk (pop. 11,281) south of Popasna was taken by the Russian on 24 May. They are also advancing on Vasuylivka to the north of Popasna. I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia map

The map below from 20 May is borrowed from Dr. Michael Mackay @mhmck. The area threatened with encirclement contain the cities of Sievierdonetsk and Lysychansk and surrounding areas which had a population in excess of 350,000. One can see the expansion around Popasna.

Rain forecasted for Kharkov on Sunday (80%) and two days out of the next three.

Still waiting for Russia to start its main offensive in earnest. It does appear that they thinned their forces around Kharkov and concentrated everything around Izium, Lyman, Sivierodnoetsk and Popasna. 

The real objective here seems to be the cities of Siervierdonetsk (pop. 101,135), Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Sloviansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084) in the Lugansk and Donetsk provinces. These are all very close to each other. Is Russia going to limit themselves to cleaning up the rest of the areas claimed by the LPR and DPR (and then try to negotiate a cease fire)?

 

We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only two appear to be active now. Russia now occupies four cities, Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928), Melitopol (pop. 150,768) and Kherson (pop. 283,649). 

1. Kiev – secure

2. Odessa – secure

3. Kharkov – secure

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces
5. Mariupol – operations completed
6. Crimean border/Kherson

It appears that Kiev, Chernigov, Sumy and the northeast part of Ukraine are secure. Of course, Russia can always reintroduce troops later from Russia or Belarus. They are supposed to have around 20 BTGs in Russia. A Ukranian border guard was killed on 16 May near Sumy.

The U.S. DOD is reporting that the Russian forces in Ukraine are being reinforced, with the count of BTGs going up from 92 to 105 (now 106). It this preparation for a big push in a week or two?

Here is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kiev is secure. 

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secure.

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkov looks to be securely held but is still being hit by both missiles and artillery. Nine people were killed yesterday. Ukraine still has not completely pushed the Russian army back to the border. Suspect they have transferred some assets to the fighting in the south. 

Ukraine made some advances around Kharkov. Not sure if this is because they have put together a powerful offensive force, the Russian morale is collapsing, or because the Russians have thinned this out to mass elsewhere for an offensive. Suspect the latter. Map showing front lines near Kharkov on 27 April and 17 May (cribbed from @War_Mapper), with the 17 May map showing the taking of Dementiivka.

The Russians continued to expand southward from Izium, which is listed here as it is in the Kharkov Province even though their advance is heading south. They have captured the town of Zavody and the NE outskirts of Velyka Komyshuvakha. The Russians do appear to have been pushing to the southwest towards Barvinkove (pop. 8,110), vice the south or southeast. So it is either a broader encirclement of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, or the rumored drive on Dnipro (which I really don’t believe they are going to try). Still, no villages have been reported taken in this area for the last few days. A video from Sky News from Barvinkove (3:58): Ukraine War: Ukrainian soldiers stand firm in Barvinkove. Trench warfare (2:14)?

Around Izium, Russia took one village near Lyman on 8 May and on 9 May took Velyka Komyshuvahka. They appear to be fighting over Lyman now, with some reports saying it was taken on 25 May. Another map cribbed from @War_Mapper dated 9 May: 

The Russians have two options for an encirclement of the Ukrainian areas of Lugansk and Donetsk province. One is the “smaller option” of striking from Kreminna and near Soledar to surround Sieverierodonesk and Lysychansk. The other is a “larger option” to strike from Izium and surround Sloviansk and Kramatorsk also. They may try both. If they are doing that, then I assume options like a renewed assault on Kharkov or a drive towards Dnipro (which is a good distance away) are off the table. 

On the other hand, depending on how the Ukrainian offensive develops around Kharkov and if any forces are freed from it, it is possible that some Ukranian forces (i.e. 92nd and 93d Mechanized Brigades) could be turned south towards Izium, greatly complicating the Russian offensive there. Izium is only 60 miles southeast of Kharkov. According to one newspaper account (Forbes), advancing out of Izium are a dozen of Russia’s “best” BTGs. The Ukrainian forces defending south of Izium include the 4th and 17th Tank Brigades and 95th Air Assault Brigade. 

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces: The Russians have advanced to the northern outskirts of Sievierdonetsk. The city is being surrounded on three sides. The city is being shelled and according to Ukraine only 15,000 civilians remain in the city.

To the west Sievierodonetsk, on the route to Slovansk, the town of Lyman (pop. 20,469) continues to be under assault. On 23 May, the mayor there said the town was down to 7,000-8,000 residents.

Sievierodonetsk (pop. 101,135) is already in danger of being surrounded, with Russian or DPR forces near Bakhmut (pop. 72,310) and Soledar (pop.10,692) and pushing down from the north from Kreminna and Rubizhne and from the south from Novotoshkivske. A Russian group broke into the Myr Hotel in Sievierodonetsk but retreated. The Russian forces have advanced to within 10 miles (16 kilometers) of Bakhmut.

Due west of Sievierodonesk Russia did erect a pontoon bridge across the Siversky Donets River near Bilohorivka (pop. 828), where an airstrike on 7 May killed around 60 civilians. The Ukrainians did take down the ponton bridge at Bilohorivka on 9 May and pictures show a second pontoon bridge also taken down thereNot sure if a third bridge was erected and taken down. This has been done with heavy Russia losses, perhaps the better part of one BTG. People have been counting destroyed vehicles from satellite and aerial images, with some estimates (Forbes) as high as 50 “tanks” lost. Other reports estimate Russian losses at 485 out of 550 soldiers and 80 armored vehicles from the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade. While these are estimates, it does seem that some people are reporting it as fact.

The Russians are reported to be advancing to the south of Sievierodonetsk. Popasna (pop. 19,672) has been in Russian hands since 7 May. Oleksandropillia did fall to the Russians, probably around 12 May. The Ukrainian general staff report today (20 May) said “Russian occupants suffered losses in the area of the settlement of Oleksandropillia.” While lot of people are leaning on these daily reports to determine what it happening, it is clear that they do not always immediately report losses of areas. On the other hand, the latest maps from @mhmck are still showing Oleksandropillia in Ukrainian hands. The industrial town of Svitlodarsk (pop. 11,281) south of Popasna was taken by the Russian on 24 May. They are also advancing on Vasuylivka to the north of Popasna

The Russians are reported pushing in the direction of Zolote (pop. 13,203) and Komyshuvakha. Reports have also indicated that they have expanded in the area just south of Poposna, sort of fattening the finger pushing into Ukrainian lines. The Russians are reported to have captured Vrubivka (pop. 889), just north of Popasna, and Druzhba, just west of Popasna (see @war_mapper). Do not have confirmation of those two villages being taken. The map below is from 20 May by @War_Mapper. The advance out of Popasna looks particularly threatening.

Article in Forbes about the fighting around Popasna. The Russians are throwing everything they’ve got at one Ukrainian garrison. They do claim that Sievierodonetsk is defended by “three or so” Ukrainian brigades that “included 5,000 or more troops.” Don’t know the size of a Ukrainian brigade right now, but those manpower figures seem low. A resident of Bakhmut was arrested recently for providing Ukrainian troop locations to Russia.

Further south Avdiyivka (31,940) is still in Ukranian hands but is being shelled. Ukraine claimed on 27 April that Avdiyivka was hit twice by phosphorus munitions. They are reported pushing towards Kamyanka and Novoselivka, to its north.

Slovyansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084) appear safe for now. Kramatorsk had its rail station hit on 9 April with over 50 civilians killed.

To the southwest of this fight, the Ukrainians have retaken Maryinka (pop. 9,256) on 19 April, which had been taken by the DPR on 17 March. 

The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 19 May that they had 1,808 soldiers killed and 7,536 wounded (4.17-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio) out of a supposed strength of 20,000. This is 47% casualties out of an estimated force of 20,000, which is pretty serious. They have been surprisingly diligent about regularly reporting their casualty figures. One wonders if some Russian losses or contractors are being included in these figures. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio. Don’t know how many of DPR and LPR forces are Russians from Russia as opposed to locals.

Zelensky in an interview on CNN on 17 April said they had 44,000 professional military men in the Donbas.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): The siege lasted seventy-seven days. As of 17 May, Mariupol is under control of Russia although they declared on 20 May that they had “completely liberated” the steel works. It apparently took a couple of days for everyone to surrender, including the final 531 Ukranian troops. The Alamo held out for 13 days. The Germans surrounded in Stalingrad held out for 72 days. The Russian defense minister said 1,908 at that same time, and they have now upped their claimed prisoners to 2,439 (note that 1908 + 531 = 2,439). This is more prisoners that some of the previous Russian claims of defender strength. So far, none have been exchanged. Denys Prokopenkop, the senior commander in the Azovstal steel mill, is being held in Russian controlled territory and was able to have brief conversation with his wife. 

The population of the city is down to 100,000 or less. I assume the civilians are not planning to return. The mayor, who is no longer in the city, claimed that more than 10,000 people have been killed. The head of DPR (Donets People’s Republic) has said over 5,000 people have been killed. The city has been decimated, lots of buildings and houses destroyed. Mariupol has no power, gas or water. 

According to the DOD on 18 April there are almost a dozen BTGs in Mariupol. The U.S. DOD claimed a couple of weeks ago that 2,000 troops and some Chechen fighters are still in Mariupol and that 10 BTGs were now moving north. The Chechen fighters are still reported (as of 23 May) to still be in the area. Does this portend an offensive south of Sievierdonetsk pushing north? They do indicate that some of the BTGs appears to have paused to be refitted, which is not all that surprising.

There is a mass grave being reported outside of Mariupol near the town of Manhush. It looks like around 200 graves have been dug. Another mass grave is also being reported on 23 April. So far, they appear to be graves for hundreds of people, vice thousands. A third mass grave has been reported. There has been no new reports on this for a while.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is under Russian control. Are the Ukrainians going to make a push to take back Kherson? My suspicion is that Ukraine is going to launch an operation to try to reclaim Kherson and Kherson Province. Reports are that the fighting is getting heavier there. Ukraine reports fighting around Chornobaivka (pop, 9275 in 2001). It is near Kherson.

Russians are transporting T-62M tanks, a 1980s upgrade, to Melitopol.

 

Weather: Kharkov at 3 PM: 70 degrees (21 Celsius) and raining. Low tonight 57 degrees (14 Celsius). The weather has been relatively clear this month, with the precipitation mostly sprinkles. Rain is forecasted for Sunday (80%), Tuesday (80%) and Wednesday (50%). 

Ukrainian Army Build-up: 

The big news is what is occurring off the battlefield, where U.S. and other international aid is now providing more than $90 billion in aid to Ukraine. Over the long run this will change the military balance between Ukraine and Russia, unless Russia fully mobilizes for war. They seem hesitant to do this.

Not sure how large the army now is (assume over 200,000). There is a Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force of 100,000 to 200,000. Wikipedia was reporting 209,000 in their armed forces and 102,000 paramilitary. They are now reporting their armed forces at 196,600. President Zelensky said on 21 May that 700,000 soldiers are defending Ukraine. Most of those are militia. The Ukrainian army is around 200,000 and I gather is going to grow to 300,000. It does take a while to build up an army. The upper limited of mobilization is around 5% of the population (there have been cases where it has been higher). So Ukraine with a population of 40 million can build up an army of 2 million, especially if it continues to receive significant outside help. The Russia commentor Col. Kodaryonok stated in his outburst on Russian TV a couple of days ago that “But the situation from the overall strategic position is that the Ukrainian armed forces are able to arm a million people. They’re saying it themselves, that for us, there’s no difficulty in mobilizing a million people. The whole issue is to what extent they’re able to supply this army of modern weapons and military hardware… so a million armed Ukrainian soldiers needs to be viewed as a reality of the very near future.” I would also add that they need to be trained, which takes a while.

The Azov Regiment that was holding in Mariupol was actually a militia unit. That is the case with some of the foreign volunteer battalions also. There are some foreign volunteer units that have been there a while, including two Chechen battalions and a Georgian unit. I have yet to any statistics as to how many other foreign volunteers have been deployed, just individual stories.

There also the independent Belarussian Kastus Kalinouski Battalion, which as of 5 March is reported to have 200 members. They were serving in Irpin (near Kiev). It is reported that they have had thousands of volunteers. The deputy commander of the battalion (age 31) was killed on action on 13 March and another member was lost on 24 March in Irpin. On 16 May it was reported that a company commander had been killed. They state that a total of six Belarussians had died in this battalion since February. This, of course, threatens to bring the war into Belarus at some point.

Outside support for Ukraine is considerable and reported in a separate blog post: Outside Support for Ukraine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Not sure I am going to update this. Additional material is being sent, including Harpoon anti-ship missiles from Denmark.

The U.S. is now admitting that it helped target Russian generals. See: American intel used to kill Russian generals in Ukraine: US officials. This is something we had assumed for a while. See:  How Much is U.S. Intelligence helping Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and How Much is U.S. intelligence helping Ukraine? – part 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). And then yesterday they admitted that U.S. intel helped with tracking the sunk Russian cruiser Moskva, some we also assumed: Official: US gave intel before Ukraine sank Russian warship. Apparently, they did not provide specific targeting information. A group of Russian officers were hit 17 May in the Russian occupied city of Melitopol. Ukraine claims it was done by “partisans.” They are also reporting attacking an armored train. If true, this opens a whole new dimension to this war, although other reports indicate that this was a “special operation” as opposed to partisans. Major General Kanamat Botashev was reported killed while flying an Su-25. This has not been confirmed. So far seven named generals have been reported killed in this war, with only two deaths confirmed. Three additional claims have been disputed and are probably incorrect.

Russian Army Build-up:  I have yet to see many reports of Russia expanding its army or calling up more reserves and conscripts. Their biannual call-up starts on 1 April, and Putin just signed a decree ordering up 134,500 new conscripts into the army. See the comments in the Day 35 for a discussion on the significance of this. We are now in the tenth week of the war. Are they going to expand their army as Ukraine is clearly expanding theirs, or are they expecting that this war will end shortly? It looks like the Russian Army is adding a couple of thousand volunteers. The U.S. DOD told reporters on 8 April that the Russia could be looking to recruit as many as 60,000 soldiers to join the fight. Still have not seen any indications of major build-up, although they are rebuilding and refitting their units.

Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000 (up to 190,000). Donetsk PR is estimated at 20,000 and Lugansk at 14,000. Russia may be able to add more forces from their own resources, but not much more. If they want to add more, they are going to have to mobilize. Russia appears to be hesitant to do so. I suspect with full mobilization; we could be looking at a Ukrainian army larger than 300,000. People are now even talking about a Ukrainian armed force of 700,000 to 1,000,000. At some point, Russia will have to mobilize to continue this war. I do not think Russia can win this war without further mobilization. If fact, with the increased aid flowing into Ukraine, Russia may very well end up losing territory it currently holds without additional mobilization. The failure to mobilize is hard to explain from a military point of view. It is clearly a result of domestic political concerns.

Economics and the Home Fronts: The U.S. congress has approved a $40 billion aid bill for Ukraine. That along with previous aid from dozens of other countries ($20-$25 billion), new economic aid from the G-7 (now reported at $19.8 billion), the previous U.S. aid bill in March ($13 billion), and so forth, is pushing the amount of aid this year towards $100 billion (40.1 + 25 + 19.8 + 13 = 98). This is enough to match the entire Russian 2021 defense budget of 61.7 billion and keep the Ukrainian economy afloat. It means that Ukraine can stay in this war for an extended fight. It changes the strategic balance and strategic considerations.

The discussion of the economic situation and the home fronts has been updated in a separate rambling blog post: The Home Fronts during the Russo-Ukrainian War – update 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Price of oil is up to 117.

Casualties: Ukraine admitted on 29 April that they have suffered “serious losses” in battles. Zelensky is now saying that between “50 to 100 Ukrainians could be killed”  each day in the Battle for Donbas. We take these claims at face value. They also claim that Russian losses are “colossal.” That claim has not been confirmed. Zelensky told CNN on 15 April that Ukrainian Army had lost between 2,500-3,000 troops since the fighting has begun and about 10,000 have been wounded (wounded-to-killed ratio of 4.00- or 3.33-to-1). According to NYT the U.S. intelligence estimates as of 19 April are between 5,500 to 11,000 Ukrainians killed and between 7,000 to 10,000 Russians killed.

Ukraine is claiming as of 19 April that 20,800 Russian and DPR soldiers have been killed, Russians are claiming as of 16 April that 23,367 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed. Are both sets of figures similarly inflated? It does argue that losses on both sides are similar in size.

Prisoner swap of wounded Ukrainians trapped in Mariupol appeared to have been negotiated, but so far nothing has been reported. I gather that the 53 seriously wounded prisoners are being swapped. Don’t know about the rest of the people.

The UN is reporting on 25 May at least 3,974 civilians confirmed dead in the war. Of those 2,234 of the deaths are in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk with 128 killed in territory controlled by Russian separatists. Ukraine is reporting that as of 25 April, 3,818 civilians were killed in Ukraine. This is not that far from the UN figure. One wonders if the claimed Mariupol casualties are included in these figures. The rate of accrual of reported civilian casualties has gone down. 

It is clear that more than 12,000 people have died in this conflict (1,351 (Russian Army) + at least 2,000 more (Russian Army) + 3,000 (Ukrainian Army) + 3,974 (Civilians) + 1,808 (DPR) + 600 (LPR) = 12,733). It is probably in excess of 18,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. The number of deaths of Mariupol are unverified and unknown and could add thousands to these totals.

A more detailed discussion is provided here. It will be updated soon: Losses during the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Air Power: The Pentagon on 12 March is reporting that Russia is flying about 200 sorties a day. The Ukrainian air force has 56 operational jets flying 5 to 10 hours a day. March 22 it was reported by the U.S. that Russia flew more than 300 sorties into Ukraine. March 24 it was reported that more than 250 Russian sorties were flown, mostly around Kiev and Kharkov. On 12 May, the U.S. was claiming that the Russians flew 300 sorties over Ukraine in the last 24 hours. On 14 May they were claiming 250 Russian sorties. It has been pretty consistent reporting of 250-300 sorties a day for quite some time now.

The pilot Major Stepan Tarabalka, age 29, died on 13 March piloting a MiG-29. Some claimed he was the “Ghost of Kiev.” The Ukrainians claim as of 30 April 190 Russian aircraft destroyed, and the “Ghost of Kiev” is credited with 40 kills. The videos evidence has confirmed as of 2 May that 23 Russian jets destroyed. 

Somewhat relevant (23 x 8 = 184): 

Soviet versus German kill claims at Kursk | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The publisher has posted a publication date of 6 November on Amazon.com:

Aces at Kursk – Summation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Missile Defense: According to Zelenskyy the missile barrage near Lvov on 12 March consisted of 30 missiles, 8 missiles that landed and 22 missiles that were intercepted and shot down. On the morning of 16 April in the Lvov region, Ukraine claimed it downed four cruise missiles fired by Su-35s operating from Belarus. Zelensky claimed on 26 April that Russians have fired more than 1,100 missiles at Ukraine. The U.S. DOD claimed on 29 April that more than 1,950 missiles have been fired at Ukraine since the start of the war and they are currently firing about 50 a day.

End of the War: It does look like Russia intends to take and hold onto all of Donetsk and Lugansk provinces, and possibly all of Kherson province and four-fifths of Zaporizhzhia province. The capital Zaporizhzhia (pop. 722,713) may not be on their list of areas to take. So, four out of Ukraine’s 24 provinces and Crimea.

Populations of partly or completely occupied areas (2019 estimates):

Donetsk: 4,165,901

Lugansk: 2,151,833

Crimea: 2,033,700 (2001 census)

Zaporizhzhia: 1,705,836

Kherson: 1,037,640

Sevastopol: 509,992 (2021 estimate)

 

Population of Ukraine (excluding Crimea), 2022 estimate: 41,167,336

What they are willing to later negotiate away to achieve peace or a ceasefire is unknown. What Ukraine is willing to negotiate away is also unknown, although they are now saying the war will continue until all areas are freed. Does that include the LPR, DPR and Crimea? When they are ready to return to talks is unknown. This looks like an extended war and I don’t think will be over before the end of summer. At this point, unless Russia mobilizes, it will slowly turn to Ukraine’s advantage.

Atrocities: The stories coming out of Bucha are pretty appalling. At least seven civilians have been reported killed in incidents not related to combat, 18 civilians were found dead in a basement, and another 20 civilians were found lying dead in the street, two with hands bound. The mayor of Bucha says they were executed. There are other claims scattered about Ukraine. How extensive and widespread this is still not certain, but this appears to be well beyond what one would expect from “collateral damage” from combat, and some appears to be deliberate. It does indicate, as a minimum, a lack of military discipline in some Russian units. This story is continually being updated right now. The latest figure (12 April) is that 403 civilians were killed in Bucha. The deputy mayor of Bucha says that 50 of the victims have been confirmed as extrajudicially executed. Additional reports from Ukraine have put the body count of civilians found in the towns and villages surround Kiev at 1,222. This has not been independently confirmed. Ukraine has identified ten Russian soldiers wanted for “pre-mediated murder” in Bucha. They are all enlisted from the 64th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. These are the first charges unveiled of over 8,000 criminal investigations. The U.S. is claiming it has “credible information” of Russians killing Ukrainians in the vicinity of Donetsk who were trying to surrender.

There are also various accusations against the Russian Army Chechen unit operating around Bucha: Brutal Sect of Putin’s Army Accused of Murdering Their Own Comrades.

More claims of atrocities coming out with videos of Russian troops shooting two civilians outside of Kiev in March. Ukraine has sentenced a 21-year old POW to life in prison for shooting a civilian who was talking on his phone. Ukraine is now charging 48 more Russian soldiers (currently POWs) and investigating around 13,000 alleged offenses. The Ukrainian officials have a list of about 6000 suspects. Two POWs pleaded guilty yesterday for firing Grad rockets from Russia’s Belgorod region towards Kharkov on 24 Feb.

Meanwhile, the head of the DPR is saying that the fighters who surrendered at the Azovstal steel mill are to be put on trail. Somehow, this response does not surprise me.

There is also a video out there of Ukrainian soldiers shooting several Russian prisoners in their legs. There is a second video showing Ukrainian troops executing what appears to be four Russian prisoners seven miles SW of Bucha. See: https://news.yahoo.com/video-appears-show-ukrainian-soldiers-192219323.html. More detailed description from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/61025388. It is on Youtube, if you want to look it up. I believe they are members of the Georgian Legion, a group of Georgian volunteers fighting for Ukraine.

There are also some retribution killings going on: Ukrainian Chief Intelligence Directorate: another traitor of Ukraine found shot.

Other Issues: Azerbaijani troops have occupied an area in Nagorno-Karabakh that they are claiming is theirs. The Russian peacekeeping troops there have not expelled them. Widespread protests in Armenia this weekend over Nagorno-Karabakh followed by 180 detentions. There were more protests this Sunday and another 237 protesters were detained. On 10 May another 61 protesters were detained.

NATO has confirmed 18 May that both Finland and Sweden have officially applied to join NATO. NATO has said it will welcome them with open armsThe process of accepting them is expected to take about two weeks and they could be members within a few months. It does require unanimous consent of all 30 members for them to join NATO. Turkey is withholding consent until there is some resolution concerning some weapons embargoes against Turkey and the presence in Sweden of Kurdish refugees wanted by Turkey. It does add an 810-mile (1300 km) border with Russia, but NATO already abuts Russian and Belarussian territory in the Baltic states. 

Ukraine was supposed to be on the fast track to join the European Union (EU), which was the issue that started all the turmoil in 2013. But EU member Austria has objected, and now France is saying that it may take years. All EU members must unanimously agree for a country’s membership negotiations to begin. This is the issue that fueled all the conflict over the last nine years, for the Euromaidan revolt occurred when Ukrainian President Yanukovich decided to join Putin’s Eurasian Union vice the EU. The subsequent conflicts included the whole three-month Euromaidan revolt in the dead of winter of 2013-2014 that led to over 100 Ukrainians being killed, many protesters shot in the street by President Yanokovich’s security forces; the seizure of Crimea; the creation of LPR and DPR; the subsequent war; and now this war. Ukraine certainly has paid a much higher cost to join the EU than anyone else ever has. Current polling (Reuters April 5) shows that 91% of the Ukrainians support joining the EU. 

A Ukrainian court on 23 May order the arrest of former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich. He is accused of treason over the agreement he signed in 2010 (The Kharkiv Pact) to extend Russian leave on naval facilities in Crimea. In 2014 Russian forces in Sevastopol seized all of Crimea and Victor Yanukovich left Ukraine for Russia and was in Moscow by 25 February 2014. He has remained in Russia ever since. He had already received a 13-year jail sentence over a letter he sent to Vladimir Putin on 1 March 2014 asking for Russia to use Russian army and police forces to restore order in Ukraine. 

The Map: The attached map is from Wikipedia. It is dated 27 May. Last dated update was 10 May, except for Mariupol which is dated 17 May. It is showing an advance to just outside of Barvinkove, showing advances to the east of Sievierodonetsk, and showing advances around Popasna and Zolote, with Zolote being shown in Russian hands. We have no clear reports that Zolote has been taken. The maps by @mhmck does not show the advance going all the way to Barvinkove. @war_mapper and Wikipedia is claiming that Lyman was taken on 25 May. No two maps are the same.