Mystics & Statistics

Ukraine to develop nukes ?

Ukraine once had nukes. It gave them up in the 1990s in exchange for an agreement with the U.S., Russia and UK securing their borders and sovereignty. That did not work out so well (will probably do a post on this later).

Now, Zelenskyy has recently talked about Ukraine developing a nuclear weapon. It was supposedly first addressed in his meeting with Donald Trump on 27 September. It was also addressed in at a European Council summit in Brussels on 17 October.

See:

Ukraine capable of developing nuclear weapons within few months

Zelenskyy: We need NATO or nukes … and we want NATO – POLITICO

Ukraine Issues Nuclear Ultimatum to NATO – Newsweek

Later discussion:

Is Ukraine ‘months away’ from building a nuclear bomb? – Firstpost

Under what conditions Ukraine could raise its nuclear status and attempt to defend itself? — Popovych

Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry denies that Ukraine plans to make nuclear weapons

Could Zelensky use nuclear bombs? Ukraine’s options explained

May post more on this later.

Modern Air Combat Data

We are going to hand the forum over to Geoffrey Clark for one day a week. Mr. Clark has posted here before and presented at the last two HAACs. He will end up doing a series of posts each Wednesday on Modern Air Combat Data. This is his introductory post:

—————————-

Air Combat Data, modern Air Warfare, Ukraine and AI

Many are following the war in Ukraine, with intense detail. I have attempted to gather meaningful statistics for a cliometrical analysis, to add some analytical rigor to the debates about the relative effectiveness of the new F-16 aircraft recently deployed by the Ukrainian Air Force. I’ve been looking at the sources available for this type of analysis, for example the Wikipedia page, or the Statista comparison page, and I have been sorely disappointed in what is currently available.  There is a wealth of information available about what was lost, including serial numbers, etc., but the process by which it was lost, or the why, is so far simply not available. This type of information is typically not shared at all for years or decades after a conflict, as it might compromise the effectiveness of the related Air Forces in a future conflict. This is why there remains ongoing analysis of the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts, as new information emerges, and allows for the better correlation and cross-checking of Claims and Losses.

I’m following in the footsteps of John Stillion, referencing his famous RAND “clubbing baby seals” brief on the F-35, as well as his more accessible work at CBSA, Trends in Air-to-Air Combat (2015). I’ve been gathering the detailed claims and losses data for air combat in the jet age. Sometimes, this data is made openly available by the participating Air Forces and Air Defense Forces, but often comes from some less than official sources, like hobbyist websites, or even ejection seat manufacturer websites. Nonetheless, with proper scrutiny and comparison across sources, it can produce some important insights into the air combat process, and thereby give some predictive power for future conflict in the air.

It is also important to get the first-hand narratives by the pilots, airmen and soldiers involved in the conflict. I believe this is exceedingly important to understand the context of the combat situation and what was known at the time that decisions were made, and how this led to the outcomes. The idea that AI based on LLMs with a lot of data (from the internet? From a bunch of air combat games or simulations?) can produce a fighter pilot like capability to make decisions in the heat of battle … is fraught at best. A clean, curated, reliable, accurate dataset is needed now more than ever. I’ve recently watched a presentation by Admiral Grace Hopper from 1982, excellent foresight into data processing and information flows! In order to train future AI agents effectively, the relative value of actual combat data from real war must be prioritized much more than data from exercises, and especially above simulation data, and “internet” data, whatever that is.

Therefore, I’ll start a series of blog posts to explore this topic, as I progress through the analysis of data available on various conflicts in the 20th and 21st centuries. I’ll develop some primitive AI agents for air combat and simulate air combat based upon this solid data foundation. I’ll also postulate various what-ifs and wargame scenarios, both in the air domain, and multi-domain combat scenarios.

I’m pleased this year to be able to attend in person the HAAC 2024 conference to present these ideas and get some insight and support from the other attendees. 

Thanks for reading, and for your comments!

U.S. Military Contractors in Ukraine

Not sure how significant this story is, but it came out this weekend, so I thought I would repost it: Biden administration to allow American military contractors to deploy to Ukraine for first time since Russia’s invasion.

I gather this came about because of the need to provide maintenance and logistic support for the F-16s and Patriots, even though the F-16 are provided by Holland, not by us (the cost to Russia of shooting down flight MH-17 on 17 July 2014).  Of course, one of arguments against deploying F-16s to Ukraine was the maintenance and support issues. This probably helps to solve that problem, but potentially puts American contractors in danger (although I am guessing the majority of the people employed on these American contacts will not be from the USA). They are talking about a few dozen to a couple of hundred contractors working in Ukraine (I will go with the higher figure).

I suspect Russia will take issue with this, although there were Soviet citizens in Hanoi providing air defense assistance during the Vietnam War.

The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud ?

Below is a link to a 2008 article by William F. Owen called “The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud.” Definitely worth a read no matter where you stand in the debate. This is a debate I am aware of, although I tend to stay out of. It is difficult in some discussions to add much of quantitative value, although I do have a chapter on Surprise in War by Numbers that people discussing maneuver warfare or MDO (multi-domain operations) should take a look at.

Anyhow the article is here: The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud | Small Wars Journal

William F. Owen will be presenting an update of this article at the Fourth HAAC in October 2025. Hopefully it will be in person but he cannot confirm that yet.

One of the best articles I have read in the last year was by William F. Owen called the False Lessons of Modern War. I have blogged about it before: The False Lessons of Modern War – The Dupuy Institute. Would strongly recommend reading that article. 

Project SKYSWEEPER

This is a new blog post from TDI associate Chip Sayers, who has able to make the Third HAAC in person this time:


Project SKYSWEEPER

Armed First-Person Point of View (FPV) drone use in war zones has become a major topic of discussion in the last number of months and news this week of multiple breaches of security at U.S. military bases in the homeland have brought home the point that we need a general strategy for use against drones anywhere, but that also works in U.S. airspace.  In a war zone, a solution could be relatively straight-forward in that use of “lethal force” on the battlefield is expected.  That doesn’t hold true for use in U.S. airspace.

While this photo is almost certainly for propaganda purposes — it beggars’ belief that such small drones could lift off while burdened so outrageously — this photo does generally illustrate the armed FPV drone concept.

This FPV quadcopter sports twin M-72 -class light anti-tank weapons fixed to fire straight down on unsuspecting armored vehicles. 

The title of this post is an homage to the scale model I built as a 9-year-old of a US Army M-51 “Skysweeper” 75mm automatic antiaircraft gun. The Skysweeper had revolver magazines giving it a rate of fire of 45 rounds per minute, and an on-mount gun-laying radar and fire-control computer that ensured its proximity-fused shells would be placed with deadly accuracy. A similar system could put paid to the drone threat in areas where firing artillery is acceptable. 

In the 1990s, Oerlikon created Advanced Hit Efficiency And Destruction (AHEAD) ammunition for its line of 35mm antiaircraft guns. AHEAD, when fired, passes through three coils on the end of the gun’s barrel.  The first two measure the muzzle velocity of the round and compares that to the measured range of the target from its fire-control computer. The third sets the shell’s fuse to burst at the optimal point to damage the target. AHEAD rounds carry a payload, depending on the shell, of between 152 and 860 tungsten projectiles that can effectively shred anything in its path.

This proof plate from an AHEAD round detonation should be terrifying to anyone on the receiving end of its wrath, especially low-flying aircraft — manned, or unmanned.

A Gepard Flakpanzer. The 35mm AAA system is self-contained with search and target tracking radars, fire-control computer and guns on a turret with a Leopard tank chassis.  Note the coils at the ends of the gun barrels for programming AHEAD rounds.

The German Gepard 35mm Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun (SPAAG) has been sent to Ukraine and, according to reports, the Gepard has proven to be highly effective against Russian drones. NATO countries have managed to scrape together 52 Gepards to cover potentially 1,100 kilometers of frontage, leaving an average density of one Gepard for every 20 kilometers in a simplistic, but illustrative calculation. Ammunition has also been a problem because Switzerland — the country of origin — objected to “violating their neutral status” by selling it to combatants. It begs the question of what they thought their weapons and ammunition were going to be used for — Fourth of July celebrations?  NATO has obtained through hook and by crook a quarter-million rounds, but that’s less than 4.4 minutes of fire, across the force. 

However, AAA is of no use against drones operating in U.S. airspace.  This brings to mind “the Battle of Palmdale” when a Navy drone went rogue and overflew Los Angeles in August 1956. Air Defense Command interceptors attempted multiple times to down the drone with unguided rockets, only to have the rockets’ high-explosive warheads wreak havoc on the ground below.

As we saw in last year’s shootdown of a Chinese balloon which crossed the entire breadth of the Continental U.S. (or CONUS), once the aircraft enters U.S. airspace, we must be concerned with wreckage crashing on the good citizens of Muleshoe, TX or other sparsely populated points of the country. Gone are the days when USAF Air Defense Command envisioned using rockets with nuclear warheads in U.S. airspace to defend against Soviet bombers with much larger nuclear payloads aboard. In last year’s incident, once the decision was made to finally bring down the Chinese balloon, USAF interceptors were held back until the balloon had cleared the U.S. coast, but not so far as to cause the wreckage to land in deep water.  While the high-altitude interception went off like clockwork (believe me, it was not as easy as it looked) we obviously need a means of dealing with threats that don’t risk causing physical harm to bystanders.

In Southeast Asia, reconnaissance drones were used in large numbers to photograph denied areas of North Vietnam.  Usually, they were launched from DC-130 motherships, flew over their North Vietnamese objectives, and were recovered over the South China Sea by waiting CH-3 helicopters that snared the drones’ recovery parachutes, lest they be damaged on landing. The system proved incredibly reliable with one source claiming that in 2,700+ attempts, over 2,600 were successful — a remarkable recovery rate.

A USAF C-119J demonstrates the parachute recovery technique.

USAF CH-3 helicopter with a Ryan AQM-34R Lightning Bug reconnaissance drone in tow.

The sad end of a happy warrior (he’s seemingly smiling). The North Vietnamese took the drone threat seriously and VPAF interceptor pilots were given full victory credit for shooting down a drone.

In a similar manner, helicopters or small cargo planes could use capture nets to sweep up drones fairly cheaply. Obviously, this would require a fairly permissive air defense environment, such as that found in U.S. airspace, Israel and parts of Ukraine. It is a simple, but likely effective technique when used appropriately. The most difficult part of this scheme is having the helicopter (or cargo plane) on station when drones are in the air.  Aircraft could be put up preemptively when the likelihood of drone incursions is high and aircraft available for other missions — such as aircrew recovery — could be ready as quickly as attaching the catch apparatus to an external cargo hook. In Israel’s current situation, one could envision a lot of helicopters and other aircraft being very busy, indeed. However, by using aircraft already on hand, there would be little sunk cost other than aircrew training.

Another approach would be to jam the drone’s control signal. This, of course, would not work on drones that have an autonomous guidance system similar to the U.S. Lightning Bugs flying over North Vietnam, though that carries its own set of issues. Rather infamously, the Lightning Bug that was to provide the final reconnaissance for the raid to free prisoners from the North Vietnamese POW camp at Son Tay in 1970 went astray because the drone turned to soon and didn’t see that the camp had been flooded by monsoon rains and evacuated. In any event, jamming drones in the CONUS could potentially interfere with civilian bandwidths, causing the same kind of complaints that caused sonic booms to be banned over the U.S. mainland. Nevertheless, relatively low-powered jammers that could be located in the center of a large military installation might still be useful.

High-power microwave generators can be highly directional and could interfere with a drones electronics to the point that its circuit boards are “fried,” knocking the aircraft out of the sky. While purpose-built HPM weapons may appear on the battlefield in the very near future, the primary radar of the Lockheed F-35 Lightning II is believed to be capable of performing such duties and are becoming operational at such rates that they could be tasked for this under certain circumstances.

Air defense lasers may be an ideal weapon for dealing with drones, but they have been long promised and thus far failed to achieve operational status. Whatever their issues, particle beam weapons are probably further out on the technology horizon than lasers.  In the meantime, laser “dazzlers,” designed to temporarily blind pilots, have been out there — and effective — since the Falklands War, 42 years ago. Laser dazzlers could at least keep the drones from getting good optical reconnaissance data and deter amateurs from overflying facilities that may easily ruin their drone’s optics (whether or not they really can).

While we wait for these perfect weapons, rather more primitive arms may just fill the bill: just prior to WWII, the British developed an antiaircraft weapon the consisted of a multiple rocket launcher where the rockets trailed cables to ensnare German Stukas trying to bomb Royal Navy capital ships at sea. A similar system might be effective against drones that would be brought down by hitting or being hit by the streaming cable. Better still would be if they could successfully boost a net into the air. This approach would be particularly attractive as the threat drones are generally relatively slow and are unlikely to see such an attack unless it is launched from directly in the drone’s flight path. It would also be a relatively low threat for accompanying infantry. Such a “monkey catcher” could be mounted in pairs on an armored vehicle’s turret. On the platoon or company command net, the order “drone left,” “drone forward,” or “drone right,” the unit’s vehicles could slew their turrets to face the threat and each fire a net in that direction. An individual monkey catcher might not have a high probability of success, but multiples firing from different angles would have a much higher chance of knocking down the offending drone.

At some point, laser air defense weapons will mature and be fielded, ending the current threat. Until that time, “out-of-the-box” thinking may provide a more near-term solution to the threat we face today.


 

October’s Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC) 8 – 10 October 2024

The Third HAAC is next week. Currently there are 40 presentations (and 2 group discussions). The current schedule is:

Schedule: Pike and Gallows Conference Center
Revised 7 October 2024

Day 1: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 0930 Introductory remarks – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

0930 – 1030 Studying Combat: The “Base of Sand” Problem – Dr. Shawn R. Woodford

1030 – 1130   Urban Warfare (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1130 – 1230 Redux: Quantifying Warfare – Alexandru Filip (Canadian Center for Strategic Studies)

1230 – 1400 Lunch

1400 – 1500 Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII – Sasho Todorov, esquire

1500 – 1600 Validation Challenges in Wargaming: What’s Real Here? – Dr. Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1600 – 1700 New Findings on Artillery Suppression – Dr. Dermot Rooney (Wapentakes) – virtual

1700 – 1800 Gun, Baby, Gun – Dr. Iain Overton (AOAV) – virtual

Evening (1900): Group Dinner – Rangos

Day 2: Analysis of Unconventional Warfare

0900 – 1000    Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1000 – 1100    Close Combat Overmatch Weapons (SLAMMER) – Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.)

1100 – 1200 Native American Wars and Conflicts, 1500-1900 – Dr. David Cuberes – virtual

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1400   Haiti: The Risks of a Failed State in the Western Hemisphere – Dr. Christopher Davis

1400 – 1500   The Gaza Death Numbers – Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University) – virtual

1500 – 1600  The Islamic State of Khorasan: The Evolution of Terrorism – Dr. Christopher Davis

1600 – 1700   Group Discussion: The Next Middle East Wars

Evening (1900): Group Dinner – BJs

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000   Musicians of Mars – Michael McCarthy

1000 – 1100   Force Ratios – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1100 – 1200 Ground Warfare in 2050: How it Looked in 2017 – Dr. Alexander Kott

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1400 The Red Army’s Offensive Operations in Ukraine, 1943-44 – Dr. Richard Harrison

1400 – 1500 Critique of Western Wargames of NATO-WP Conflict – Walker Gargagliano

1500 – 1600 Capabilities of FPV drones in Ukraine: Revolution or Continuation of Historical Quantitative Trend? – Dr. Alexander Kott

1600 – 1700 Group Discussion: Russo-Ukrainian War

Evening: Happy hour – Rangos

Schedule: Einstein Conference Room

Day 1: Naval Warfare Analysis

0930 – 1030 A Naval Power Index: The U.S. Navy vs three challengers – Imperial Japan, USSR and PRC China – Geoffrey Clark

1030 – 1130 U-boats in the Atlantic: The Unseen and Unheard – Dr. John Magill – virtual

1130 – 1230   Open

1230-1400   Lunch

1400 – 1500 Surveying and Quantifying Naval Warfare – Alexandru Filip

1500 – 1600 Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII (part 2 or overflow presentation) – Sasho Todorov, esquire

1600 – 1700   A Modest Proviso – National Guard Bureau Chief George Leach and his Role as Catalyst in Motorizing Artillery – Dr. Johannes Allert (Swansea University, Wales)

Day 2: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 1000   Designing Computer Based AI Wargaming Systems for Simulating and Investigating Historical Battles – Clinton Reilly (Computer Strategies, Australia) – virtual

1000 – 1100   Theory of Victory: The Ideas, Doctrine and Education of the U.S. Army from 1814-1941 – Dr. Michael Bonura (CGSC) – virtual

1100 – 1200   Winfield Scott: Architect of American Joint Warfare – LtC. Nathan A. Jennings (CGSC) – virtual

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1400   open

1400 – 1500   open

1500 – 1600    Making Military Decisions in Plateau Eras – Michael Benhamou (Director, OPEWI) – virtual

1600 – 1700   open

Day 2: Air Warfare Analysis

0900 – 1000   Mass Egress after an IED Explosion: Lessons Learned about Validation – Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1000 – 1100  Dogfight: Were US pilots in Korea really better than those in Vietnam? – Chip Sayers

1100 – 1200 The WW2 USAAF Strategic Bombing Campaign: Strategy and Operational Imperatives – Dr. Sorin Adam Matei & Dr. Robert Kirchubel (Purdue University) 

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1400   VPAF Aces: As good as they claimed? – Chip Sayers

1400 – 1500   Data for Air Combat Modeling in Network Centric Warfare – Geoffrey Clark

1500 – 1600   Open

1600 – 1700   Open

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000   Urban Warfare: Myths and Reality – Dr. James Storr (UK) – virtual

1000 – 1100   The Red Army’s Plans for a Preemptive Attack in 1941 – Dr. Richard Harrison

1100 – 1200   Analyzing Barbarossa: By the Numbers – Dr. Robert Kirchubel & Sorin Adam Matei (Purdue)

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1400    The Debate over French Armored Warfare Doctrine 1935 to 1940 – Dr. James Slaughter

1400 – 1500    Ukrainian-German spies of the Cold War – David Nelson Black – virtual

1500 – 1600   Chernobyl compromised: The story of a Russian cyber attack – Joseph Weiss (Applied Control Solutions, LLC) – virtual

1600 – 1700   Political Science Pedagogy in Strategic Studies (A Contrast in Quantified History) – Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill – virtual 

Friday, October 11: Tour of a Civil War Battlefield – Antietam: bloodiest day of the U.S. Civil War (and in the Western Hemisphere?). – we will arrange transport there and back ($20 charge for tour).

See this link below for costs ($150), address, conference description, hotels, and call for presentations: Announcements for the Third HAAC, 8-10 October – The Dupuy Institute

Five presentations from the second day of the First HAAC (2022)

Below are the five recorded presentations from the second day of the first HAAC in 2022. These are all the presentations from the Einstein Conference Room. We do not have videos of the presentations done that day from the Pike & Gallows Conference Room. We do have hard copies of them (see link below).

What was presented that day is:

Day 2: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 1000    A Statistical Analysis of Land Battles: What is Associated with Winning?                                                                Dr. Tom Lucas (NPS)

1000 – 1100    The Combat Assessment Technique       William Sayers – virtual

1100 – 1200    Machine Learning the Lessons of History      Dr. Robert Helmbold – virtual

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400    Penetration Division: Theory, History, Concept                LtC. Nathan A Jennings, PhD

1400 – 1500    Learning from History: The Army’s Future Study Program       LtC. Adam. L. Taliaferro

 

They are here:

  1. Statistical Analysis of Land Battles: What is Associated with Winning? by Dr. Tom Lucas (NPS) (youtube.com)
  2. Combat Assessment Technique (youtube.com)
  3. Machine Learning The Lessons of History (youtube.com)
  4. Penetration Division: Theory, History, Concept by LtC. Nathan A. Jennings, PhD (youtube.com)
  5. Learning from History: The Army’s Future Study Program by LtC. Adam L. Taliaferro (youtube.com)

 

The presentations from the first day are here: Video presentations from the first day of the First HAAC – The Dupuy Institute. They are all also on The Dupuy Institute YouTube channel.

The schedule for the 2022 conference is here: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 16 – The Dupuy Institute. Two of the presentations on the 28th were cancelled. The presentation on Urban Warfare is going to be given at the 2024 conference.

The schedule for the 2024 conference on 8-10 October is here: September’s Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute and here: HAAC 2024: Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8-10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute

September’s Announcement for the Third HAAC, 8-10 October

The Third HAAC is occurring on 8 – 10 October in Tysons Corner. There are currently 43 presentations planned and two group discussions.

The current schedule is here (updated 17 September): September’s Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute

The conference is also posted on Eventbrite: Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC) Tickets, Tue, Oct 8, 2024 at 9:00 AM | Eventbrite

They choose the picture, but it was kind of perfect for a Historical Analysis conference. You can pay for the conference through Eventbrite.

The cost of the conference is $150 for three days or $60 per day. It is a $60 discount if you present. There is a student discount of $20 a day for “real students.” There are now multiple ways to pay 1) though Paypal via SRichTDI@aol.com, 2) by calling (703) 289-0007 and paying by credit card, 3) our you can mail me a check (very retro), 4) or pay cash, 5) or pay through Eventbrite.

Cost is here: Cost of the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17 -19 October 2023 – The Dupuy Institute

Hotels are here: Hotels for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 – The Dupuy Institute

Call for presentations is here: Call for Presentations for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 – The Dupuy Institute

Conference description is here: The Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 in Tysons Corner, VA – The Dupuy Institute

The conference is at 1934 Old Gallows Road, Suite 350, Vienna, VA 22182. This is basically across the street by Tysons Corner Shopping mall and the Marriot Hotel on Route 7. It is right off the Route 7 exit from 495 (the Beltway). It is at the corner of Route 7 (Leesburg Pike) and Old Gallows Road. It is in the building above the restaurant called Rangos. Parking is in the parking garage next door to it.

We do have virtual presentations and we do accept virtual attendees. Conference works better if lots of people attend in person. People will connect via Zoom. We will send out Zoom links to all virtual attendees just before the conference starts.

We are slowly posting up videos from the previous conferences, we are halfway through the 2022 conference. They are here: The Dupuy Institute – YouTube

If there are any questions you can email me at LawrenceTDI@aol.com or call me at (703) 289-0007. Look forward to seeing you all there.

What is happening with the Pokrovsk offensive?

Of course, the main offensive this summer has been the Russian offensive towards Pokrovsk. The Second Battle of Kursk is kind of a sideshow. But this offensive toward Pokrovsk has been dragging on all summer, advancing very slowly across ground of no particular significance towards an objective of no particular significance. Lately, as they get nearer to Pokrovsk, the Russian offensive has slowed down from a crawl to a snail’s pace (these are precise technical terms). The Russians are currently from 7 to 12 kilometers from Pokrovsk.

The significance of this ground is that it is clear that Russian expects a ceasefire to be negotiated at some point (this fall, next fall, the fall after next fall?). When a ceasefire is negotiated, Russia expects to keep anything it has taken. Over the course of this entire summer, it has taken about 1,000 square kilometers (an area about the size of Fairfax County). I gather they are assuming that this will be part of their gains for “new Russia.” So, while the ground it not particular significant militarily or even economically, it is part of what appears to be a permanent expansion of the Russian border, fought over each square kilometer at a time (there are 2.59 square kilometers of a square mile). 

Just for the record, Pokrovsk is large town with a population of 60,127 in 2022. It is 56 kilometers (35 miles) northwest of Donetsk and is the administrative center of the Pokrovsk Raion. The Pokrovsk Raion has an area of 1,316 square kilometers (508 square miles) and a 2022 estimated population of 386,451. In the 2001 census 87% of the people were Ukrainian, 11% were Russian. In the town of Prokrovsk it was 75% Ukrainian, 22% Russian. The composer Sergie Prokofiev (1891-1953) was born here (at Sontsivka) and died in Moscow the same day as Stalin. He is buried at Novodevichy Cemetery (along with Khrushchev and half the senior commanders at the Battle of Kursk, see my big book for their grave pictures).

So, @Warmapper has been faithfully tracking this offensive for a while. It is listed in Wikipedia as starting 18 July 2024 and is still going on. This is date of the capture of the small village Prohres. There was an offensive going on before that, starting with the Battle of Avdiivka (10 October 2023 – 17 February 2024) and continuing up to the capture of Prohres. Let us crib some maps from Warmapper for a moment:

This map is dated 24 August 2024. The part in blue is the pre-February 2022 border of the DPR. One can see their push from the border near Avdiivka toward Pokrovsk. This is an advance of around 40 kilometers. Not exactly earthshaking and not all done this year.

Here is the advance as of 30 August (zoomed in):

The real danger is if the Ukrainian Army is getting so ground down as be unable to hold the line and Russia achieves a penetration. This was probably a more serious concern a month ago, but with Russia slowing, it is looking less likely. Also, the weather will get colder and sometime in November, operations will have to halt. So, if Ukraine can hold for the next two months, then it is probably good until spring 2025. It is debatable at this point if Russia will get to Pokrovsk, let alone take it.

I am not sure I am going to put together a blog post on losses in the Pokrovsk campaign like I did for Kursk (see: So what have the Russians lost around Sudzha? – The Dupuy Institute). 

So what have the Russians lost around Sudzha?

Warspotting is a site that takes all those reports and photographs of tanks, IFVs and other vehicles and equipment destroyed, and plots them to a map. They are here: Map ∙ WarSpotting — documented material losses in Russo-Ukrainian war

They do report for August and September of 2024 a number of Russian vehicles in and around Sudzha. There is probably a way of posting the map to the blog, but let me describe what we are seeing (as of the evening of 9 September 2024):

  1. There are two vehicles destroyed from March 2024 in the western part of the oblast, and two in May and June near Korenevo and seven near Sudzha dated May and June. These eleven wrecks are not part of this battle.
  2. In the west three pontoon links reported destroyed on 8 September across the Seym River.
  3. There are 11 wrecks around Budki from August & September: A Gaz-66 on 31 August 2024 near the Seym River, three pontoon links across the Seym River reported destroyed on 7 September, four KrAZ-255 and two pontoon links reported destroyed on 28 August, a KamAZ 6×6 truck reported destroyed on 28 August 2024. Clearly some clever selective targeting.
  4.  4 wrecks: Further to the southeast down the Seym River is a KamAZ 8×8 truck that is part of the pontoon bridging units. It was reported destroyed 20 August 2024. To its north is a KamAZ 6×6 truck, also reported destroyed 20 August 2024. North of there is a BMP 1 or 2 and BMP-2M “Berezhok’ reported destroyed on 24 August 2024. 
  5. Further north there are eight wrecked trucks in Oktyabrskoye on highway E38 This includes seven KamAZ 6×6 and one Ural-4320, all dated 8 August 2024. 
  6. Outside of Korenevo are nine wrecks:  two Ural-4320 dated 12 August and 7 September, KamAZ 6×6 dated 12 August, Ural-43206 dated 2 September, UAZ-452 dated 18 August, BTR-82A(M) dated 7 September, unknown T-80 OBr. 2022 tank variant dated 23 August, T-90 “Proryv’ tank reported captured on 19 August (see picture), BTR-82AT dated 17 August 2024.
  7. Clustered around Sudzha are 18 wrecks: one KamAZ 6×6 dated 7 August, KA-52 “alligator” attack helicopter dated 10 August, six T-80BVM Obr. 2022 tanks dated 6, 8 (captured), 9 and 10 August, two KamAZ 6×6 tractor unit dated 6 August, GAZ “Tigr-M’ dated 8 August, two BTR-82A(M) dated 14 and 21 August, two Ural-4320 dated 7 and 16 August, two BMP-3 dated 13 August, and one unknown vehicle date 5 September 2024.
  8. Note that two T-80s are designated to be from the 4th Tank Division (First Guards Tank Army) and one is designated as taken out by the 80th Air Assault Brigade.  

This is a total of 53 wrecks (including eight pontoon links) and includes eight tanks, eight IFVs, and one APC.

Warspotting does not record Ukrainian losses.

Now Naalsio (@naalsio26) is also tracking losses for both sides during this operation. They are reporting on Twitter:

                                     Russian losses                        Ukrainian losses
6-13 August               22 (4 tanks)                              29 (4 tanks, 8 IFVs)
As of 15 August         +5 (+2 tanks, +3 IFVs)       +22 (+4 IFVs)
As of 20 August        +13 (+5 tanks, +2 IFVs)     +14 (+4 IFVs)
As of 27 August        +19 (+3 tanks, +3 IFVs)     +22 (+5 tanks, + 7 IFVs)
As of 3 September  +12 (+1 tank)                          +19 (+2 tanks, + 6 IFVs)
As of 9 September  +12 (+1 IFV)                            +17 (+6 IFVs)
Total losses:            83 (15 tanks, 9 IFVs)       123 (11 tanks, 35 IFVs)

There is a discrepancy in Russian losses between Warspotting with 53 items destroyed/captured including 8 tanks, 8 IFVs and Naalsio with 83 items destroyed/captured including 15 tanks, 9 IFVs.

 

See: (1) Naalsio on X: “#Kursk Offensive confirmed equipment losses as of 13 August 2024 In summary: 29 Ukrainian 🇺🇦 losses vs. 22 Russian 🇷🇺 losses This list includes all losses in Kursk Oblast, Russia and Sumy Oblast, Ukraine since the offensive began on 06 August 2024. Spreadsheet showing the https://t.co/Uc2NOpLMoZ” / X