Mystics & Statistics

Our expanded media outreach

We have typically only cross-posted this blog to Twitter (now X). We sometimes cross posted to Facebook and Linkedin, but have not been able to do that regularly.

We are trying to expand out media outreach, especially as it is clear that there is not a single central town square. So our social media outreach includes:

X: The Dupuy Institute (TDI) (@dupuyinstitute) / X

Bluesky: @dupuyinstitute.bsky.social — Bluesky

Threads: (2) Christopher Alan Lawrence (@dupuyinstitute) • Threads, Say more

Facebook: (20+) Facebook

LinkedIn: The Dupuy Institute | LinkedIn

Right now, we are regularly cross posting to X, Bluesky and Threads. We may expand that.

EMA versus RMA

Working on more than two books at the moment (not sure this is the best idea). Just proofing a chapter in one book on the Russo-Ukrainian War and noted the following paragraph I had written about the war. Is this meaningful dialogue or am I just stepping in it?

It has been claimed by one the authors that “Any war that lasts longer than six weeks becomes a war of attrition.”[1] This appear to be the case with this war. Six weeks of the dynamic maneuver warfare that made this modern military campaign looks vaguely like the revolution in military affairs (RMA) that some theorists had postulated. It had now ended. We now had transitioned into the next stage of the war, which looked much more like the typical day-by-day grind between extended front lines that more defined World War II. Eventually this would devolve down to something that looked more like World War I, leaving the RMA theorists surprisingly silent.[2]

 

[1] See Battle for Kyiv, page 204.

[2] Having worked in the U.S. defense analytical community for decades, we were all too familiar with the claims of the RMA theorists and their willingness to declare that warfare of the future was going to be nothing like the warfare of the past. As our specialty at The Dupuy Institute was analysis of historical data, this was particularly frustrating as they seemed dismiss the 3,300 years of military history as irrelevant, replaced by their appreciation of new technology and its proposed revolutionary impact on the battlefield. If anything has been established by the now extended war in Ukraine, is that there has not been a revolution in military affairs. New technology is clearly a factor in the war, but it is, shall we say, an evolution in military affairs (EMA) vice an RMA. As the author Jim Storr stated in a conversation in 2023 “Much of the story of the war in Ukraine is a story of old lessons learned again.”

Now, the shop inside the pentagon that supposedly taking the lead on the RMA was OSD Net Assessment, under the leadership of Dr. Andrew Marshall. The Dupuy Institute was contracted to them to evaluate some aspects of the RMA and did a study for this office on “Measuring the Value of Situational Awareness (2004).” This was a study of the combat effects of superior situational awareness based upon a detailed examination of 295 World War II division-level engagements. So at least Andy Marshall (nicknamed “Yoda”) had not dismissed the value of historical analysis and was willing to fund such work. Many of the other RMA theorist did not show such wisdom. Our report on situational awareness is available from The Dupuy Institute and is also summarized in two chapters in the book War by Numbers (2017).  

 

The Five TMCI Reports

The Military Conflict Institute (TMCI) was founded in 1979 by Trevor N. Dupuy, Dr. Donald S. Marshall at University of California, Berkely, and General George S. Blanchard. These guys: Trevor N. Dupuy – Wikipedia and George S. Blanchard – Wikipedia.

The TMCI closed shop in 2020, in part due to its membership aging out: TMCI is officially closing this year – The Dupuy Institute

 

We have blogged about them before:

The Three TMCI Reports – The Dupuy Institute

Two other TMCI Reports – The Dupuy Institute

They did publish five reports. We have posted the links to four of the reports on this blog. The fifth one was just forwarded to me by someone who follows our blog. It is a 22-page paper called “The Classics of Military Thought: Appreciations and Agenda” by John E. Tashjean. It is here: Defense Analysis 1987-sep vol 3 iss 3 Tashjean John E – The classics of military thought_ Appreciations and agenda_ 1987 101080_07430178708405304 – libgenli

The TMCI is the inspiration behind the HAAC:  October’s Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC) 8 – 10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute and HAAC 2024: Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8-10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute

The Fourth HAAC is tentatively scheduled for 21-23 October 2025.

The Japanese Gifu and Chinese Zhuhai Airshows, 2024

Continuing with a weekly post from Geof Clark, an American currently residing in Japan:

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Title: Japanese Gifu and Chinese Zhuhai Airshows, 2024


Image credit @AfbR681dzgszG1a
https://twitter.com/AfbR681dzgszG1a/status/1858810386805649512/photo/4

Recently, I attended an airshow at the Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces (JASDF) air base in Gifu Prefecture. According to the JASDF, about 65,000 people attended. This included many interesting aircraft, including F-15Js & F-2s fighters, KC-767 tanker, C-1 & C-2 cargo aircraft, and a USMC F/A-18C from the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni, among others. It was very impressive, however, the majority of these aircraft are decades old, and while they have been modified and improved over the years, the fundamental capabilities are unchanged. The JASDF and Japanese Maritime SDF (JMSDF) have both invested in F-35A and F-35B stealth aircraft in more recent years, but these were not on display in Gifu.

Perhaps the most modern kit on display was probably the XASM-3. This is a standoff anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) which allows the F-2 aircraft to launch a maritime strike on enemy vessels from outside of their air defense envelope.

“Japan started full-scale development of a missile called XASM-3 in FY2010 that can be operated by (JASDF) F-2 fighter jets. The XASM-3 was an air-launched anti-ship missile (ASM) that cruised at supersonic speeds (above Mach 3) thanks an Integral Rocket Ramjet engine. It had a range of about 200 km (108 nautical miles).”


Four J-20s banks left of the show center. (Image credit: Rin Sakurai)

In contrast, the annual Chinese airshow at Zhuhai this year was very impressive. According to CCTV (the state-operated military news outlet), 600,000 people attended, and new contracts worth 280 billion yuan (about $38.6 billion) were signed. On display a number of impressive new aircraft and capabilities for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), from Russia, and available for possible export. The Aviationist has a good list of capabilities revealed. The following list & commentary is by no means exhaustive, but it gives an idea of these capabilities:

• PLA Air Force (PLAAF) – The Shenyang FC-31 prototype has been accepted by the PLAAF and commissioned as the J-35A stealth fighter. A smaller and probably less expensive stealth fighter to complement the J-20A, which is already in service. Is this part of a “high/low mix” with Chinese characteristics? Some claim that some smoke plumes seen illustrate the ongoing challenges China faces trying to match Western & Russian engine capability & quality.
• PLAAF – a J-20 “four ship” (four aircraft) put on a great flying demonstration, and a twin seat J-20S mock-up was on display. I saw one comment on X (twitter) claim that this was the first 5.5 generation fighter, as it is the first twin seat stealth fighter, which purports to better enable the concept of operations (CONOPS) of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA). These are the fancy U.S. terms for the rear seat occupant managing flights of drones that accompany or are in close proximity (i.e. line of sight) to the J-20S aircraft. The USAF is progressing with plans for CCA, to be used with the F-22, F-35, possibly F-15EX and ultimately the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) “family of systems”. How much will a second person in the cockpit matter?
• Rosoboronexport (Russian state owned enterprise for arms exports) – an Su-57 (well, actually a T-50 prototype, thanks Millenium 7 …) gave an impressive flight display, complete with stunning acrobatics. The export statistics brochure data for both Su-57E and Su-75 Checkmate are linked here. There was also an announcement that the Su-57E has its first export contract, and speculation that Algeria is the most likely purchasing country, although others are possible … and indeed it might be the next in a long line of contracts that did not materialize …
• The Russian Knights put on an impressive display, returning to Zhuhai after an eight year absence. They flew in formation and solo demonstrations of Su-30SM and Su-35S. While this was certainly impressive, the Flanker family has had some challenges in Ukraine, and we will explore this in detail in a separate blog post soon.
• The PLAAF displayed their J-16D variant of the Flanker, and the PLA Navy (PLAN) displayed a similar J-15D, both of which are dedicated electronic warfare (EW) variants. Many military analysts comparing these to an EA-18G Growler, which might be apt for the J-15D, since both are carrier-borne, but the J-16D is a dedicated EW platform for the PLAAF, and the last time the U.S. Air Force (USAF) has such a platform was the EF-111A, which was retired in 1998.
• PLAN also displayed the J-15T naval variant, now equipped to be launched by catapult by the PLANS-18 (CV-003) Fujian aircraft carrier (CV), and probably future PLAN CVs, as well as being backward compatible with the existing ski-jump CVs. This will provide the capability to launch more rapidly with a much greater payload weight, possibly heralding a maritime strike fighter role, in addition to the air defense role. Other elements of the future air wing are expected to include a naval version of the J-35A mentioned above, and a fixed wing airborne early warning and control (what the U.S. calls AWACS) aircraft with the possible designation of KJ-600 As a side note, the Fujian has departed for sea trial number 5.
A plethora of un-crewed platforms that were also on static display including …

o CH-7, a peer competitor to US-made RQ-180, “ready to meet navy’s demand for maritime missions”. With a “debut at the airshow in 2018, it was being designed to be a stealth armed reconnaissance UAV that can play a strategic role in combat, so it was bigger and able to conduct strike missions to eliminate a strategic target. However, six years on, the CH-7 project has experienced a change … to [an] advanced tactical drone that is able to conduct various missions due to the development of modern warfare and the changing demand of clients”, Cao Ran of Aerospace CH UAV told the Global Times at the airshow.
o CH-9, a larger sized armed reconnaissance drone
o CH-3D, a smaller, lower cost drone
o CH-YH-1000, a cargo drone
o SS-UAV, or “Smart configuration Support Un-crewed Aerial Vehicle”, is a large, modular drone which according to Jane’s Defense might “undertake multiple missions, including maritime strike, long-range cargo transport, and surveillance.” There was speculation that it might also act as a mothership for multiple “attritable” drones in a swarm.

There are other systems which play a big role in aerial warfare, including the HQ-19 and DF-1000, which we will blog about soon!

Thanks for reading and for your comments!

Ukraine’s nuclear weapons

My primary focus at the moment is writing books, currently wrapping up two and well into the next. A chapter in the new book on the Russo-Ukrainian War is called Defense Budgets and International Aid. It starts as follows:

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          The United States and other members of NATO started providing military and financial aid in small amounts to Ukraine from the moment in declared its independence. Private aid agencies also did, including George Soros’ Open Society Foundation. Ukraine actually declared its independence in August 1991, but the government of the Soviet Union was still officially ruling over all fifteen nations in the Soviet Union. That Soviet government collapsed on 25-26 December 1991, ending the almost 70 year existence of the Soviet Union. Ukraine was clearly a free and independent county at that point.

            Ukraine had considerable armed forces at that time, inheriting its share of the large Soviet Army and even inheriting a nuclear force of 176 ICBMs and 33 heavy bombers with a total of 1,734 nuclear warheads. It was the third largest nuclear power in the world. The break-up of the Soviet Union had left behind four nuclear armed states: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. It became the policy of the west disarm these three new nuclear armed states (but not Russia) and it was in the interest of Russian to also do so. As a result, in 1994 Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear weapons and on 5 December 1994 Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. It was also signed by the two major nuclear powers, the United States and Russia and also the nuclear power United Kingdom. The other two nuclear powers, China and France. provided weaker individual assurances in separate documents. The end result was that between 1993 and 1996, the three former Soviet states gave up their nuclear weapons, mostly passing them back over to Russia.

            The signatories to the Budapest Memorandum also agreed that (to quote directly from the treaty, the bolding is ours):

  1. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britian and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.
  2. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britian and Northern Ireland, and the United Sates of America reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
  3. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the Principles of the CSCE Final Act, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

There were three other related points 4) addressing enforcement through the security council, 5) a commitment not to use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state, and 6) that the signatories will consult if a situation arises. [1] The memorandum was signed by Leonid D. Kuchman (Ukraine), Boris N. Yeltsin (Russia), John Major (UK) and William J. Clinton (U.S.). Needless to say, from 2014-2024, Russia has not adhered to these first three points.

 

[1] The text of memorandum is here: volume-3007-I-52241.pdf (un.org)

 

Ukraine to develop nukes ?

Ukraine once had nukes. It gave them up in the 1990s in exchange for an agreement with the U.S., Russia and UK securing their borders and sovereignty. That did not work out so well (will probably do a post on this later).

Now, Zelenskyy has recently talked about Ukraine developing a nuclear weapon. It was supposedly first addressed in his meeting with Donald Trump on 27 September. It was also addressed in at a European Council summit in Brussels on 17 October.

See:

Ukraine capable of developing nuclear weapons within few months

Zelenskyy: We need NATO or nukes … and we want NATO – POLITICO

Ukraine Issues Nuclear Ultimatum to NATO – Newsweek

Later discussion:

Is Ukraine ‘months away’ from building a nuclear bomb? – Firstpost

Under what conditions Ukraine could raise its nuclear status and attempt to defend itself? — Popovych

Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry denies that Ukraine plans to make nuclear weapons

Could Zelensky use nuclear bombs? Ukraine’s options explained

May post more on this later.

Modern Air Combat Data

We are going to hand the forum over to Geoffrey Clark for one day a week. Mr. Clark has posted here before and presented at the last two HAACs. He will end up doing a series of posts each Wednesday on Modern Air Combat Data. This is his introductory post:

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Air Combat Data, modern Air Warfare, Ukraine and AI

Many are following the war in Ukraine, with intense detail. I have attempted to gather meaningful statistics for a cliometrical analysis, to add some analytical rigor to the debates about the relative effectiveness of the new F-16 aircraft recently deployed by the Ukrainian Air Force. I’ve been looking at the sources available for this type of analysis, for example the Wikipedia page, or the Statista comparison page, and I have been sorely disappointed in what is currently available.  There is a wealth of information available about what was lost, including serial numbers, etc., but the process by which it was lost, or the why, is so far simply not available. This type of information is typically not shared at all for years or decades after a conflict, as it might compromise the effectiveness of the related Air Forces in a future conflict. This is why there remains ongoing analysis of the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts, as new information emerges, and allows for the better correlation and cross-checking of Claims and Losses.

I’m following in the footsteps of John Stillion, referencing his famous RAND “clubbing baby seals” brief on the F-35, as well as his more accessible work at CBSA, Trends in Air-to-Air Combat (2015). I’ve been gathering the detailed claims and losses data for air combat in the jet age. Sometimes, this data is made openly available by the participating Air Forces and Air Defense Forces, but often comes from some less than official sources, like hobbyist websites, or even ejection seat manufacturer websites. Nonetheless, with proper scrutiny and comparison across sources, it can produce some important insights into the air combat process, and thereby give some predictive power for future conflict in the air.

It is also important to get the first-hand narratives by the pilots, airmen and soldiers involved in the conflict. I believe this is exceedingly important to understand the context of the combat situation and what was known at the time that decisions were made, and how this led to the outcomes. The idea that AI based on LLMs with a lot of data (from the internet? From a bunch of air combat games or simulations?) can produce a fighter pilot like capability to make decisions in the heat of battle … is fraught at best. A clean, curated, reliable, accurate dataset is needed now more than ever. I’ve recently watched a presentation by Admiral Grace Hopper from 1982, excellent foresight into data processing and information flows! In order to train future AI agents effectively, the relative value of actual combat data from real war must be prioritized much more than data from exercises, and especially above simulation data, and “internet” data, whatever that is.

Therefore, I’ll start a series of blog posts to explore this topic, as I progress through the analysis of data available on various conflicts in the 20th and 21st centuries. I’ll develop some primitive AI agents for air combat and simulate air combat based upon this solid data foundation. I’ll also postulate various what-ifs and wargame scenarios, both in the air domain, and multi-domain combat scenarios.

I’m pleased this year to be able to attend in person the HAAC 2024 conference to present these ideas and get some insight and support from the other attendees. 

Thanks for reading, and for your comments!

U.S. Military Contractors in Ukraine

Not sure how significant this story is, but it came out this weekend, so I thought I would repost it: Biden administration to allow American military contractors to deploy to Ukraine for first time since Russia’s invasion.

I gather this came about because of the need to provide maintenance and logistic support for the F-16s and Patriots, even though the F-16 are provided by Holland, not by us (the cost to Russia of shooting down flight MH-17 on 17 July 2014).  Of course, one of arguments against deploying F-16s to Ukraine was the maintenance and support issues. This probably helps to solve that problem, but potentially puts American contractors in danger (although I am guessing the majority of the people employed on these American contacts will not be from the USA). They are talking about a few dozen to a couple of hundred contractors working in Ukraine (I will go with the higher figure).

I suspect Russia will take issue with this, although there were Soviet citizens in Hanoi providing air defense assistance during the Vietnam War.

The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud ?

Below is a link to a 2008 article by William F. Owen called “The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud.” Definitely worth a read no matter where you stand in the debate. This is a debate I am aware of, although I tend to stay out of. It is difficult in some discussions to add much of quantitative value, although I do have a chapter on Surprise in War by Numbers that people discussing maneuver warfare or MDO (multi-domain operations) should take a look at.

Anyhow the article is here: The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud | Small Wars Journal

William F. Owen will be presenting an update of this article at the Fourth HAAC in October 2025. Hopefully it will be in person but he cannot confirm that yet.

One of the best articles I have read in the last year was by William F. Owen called the False Lessons of Modern War. I have blogged about it before: The False Lessons of Modern War – The Dupuy Institute. Would strongly recommend reading that article. 

Project SKYSWEEPER

This is a new blog post from TDI associate Chip Sayers, who has able to make the Third HAAC in person this time:


Project SKYSWEEPER

Armed First-Person Point of View (FPV) drone use in war zones has become a major topic of discussion in the last number of months and news this week of multiple breaches of security at U.S. military bases in the homeland have brought home the point that we need a general strategy for use against drones anywhere, but that also works in U.S. airspace.  In a war zone, a solution could be relatively straight-forward in that use of “lethal force” on the battlefield is expected.  That doesn’t hold true for use in U.S. airspace.

While this photo is almost certainly for propaganda purposes — it beggars’ belief that such small drones could lift off while burdened so outrageously — this photo does generally illustrate the armed FPV drone concept.

This FPV quadcopter sports twin M-72 -class light anti-tank weapons fixed to fire straight down on unsuspecting armored vehicles. 

The title of this post is an homage to the scale model I built as a 9-year-old of a US Army M-51 “Skysweeper” 75mm automatic antiaircraft gun. The Skysweeper had revolver magazines giving it a rate of fire of 45 rounds per minute, and an on-mount gun-laying radar and fire-control computer that ensured its proximity-fused shells would be placed with deadly accuracy. A similar system could put paid to the drone threat in areas where firing artillery is acceptable. 

In the 1990s, Oerlikon created Advanced Hit Efficiency And Destruction (AHEAD) ammunition for its line of 35mm antiaircraft guns. AHEAD, when fired, passes through three coils on the end of the gun’s barrel.  The first two measure the muzzle velocity of the round and compares that to the measured range of the target from its fire-control computer. The third sets the shell’s fuse to burst at the optimal point to damage the target. AHEAD rounds carry a payload, depending on the shell, of between 152 and 860 tungsten projectiles that can effectively shred anything in its path.

This proof plate from an AHEAD round detonation should be terrifying to anyone on the receiving end of its wrath, especially low-flying aircraft — manned, or unmanned.

A Gepard Flakpanzer. The 35mm AAA system is self-contained with search and target tracking radars, fire-control computer and guns on a turret with a Leopard tank chassis.  Note the coils at the ends of the gun barrels for programming AHEAD rounds.

The German Gepard 35mm Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun (SPAAG) has been sent to Ukraine and, according to reports, the Gepard has proven to be highly effective against Russian drones. NATO countries have managed to scrape together 52 Gepards to cover potentially 1,100 kilometers of frontage, leaving an average density of one Gepard for every 20 kilometers in a simplistic, but illustrative calculation. Ammunition has also been a problem because Switzerland — the country of origin — objected to “violating their neutral status” by selling it to combatants. It begs the question of what they thought their weapons and ammunition were going to be used for — Fourth of July celebrations?  NATO has obtained through hook and by crook a quarter-million rounds, but that’s less than 4.4 minutes of fire, across the force. 

However, AAA is of no use against drones operating in U.S. airspace.  This brings to mind “the Battle of Palmdale” when a Navy drone went rogue and overflew Los Angeles in August 1956. Air Defense Command interceptors attempted multiple times to down the drone with unguided rockets, only to have the rockets’ high-explosive warheads wreak havoc on the ground below.

As we saw in last year’s shootdown of a Chinese balloon which crossed the entire breadth of the Continental U.S. (or CONUS), once the aircraft enters U.S. airspace, we must be concerned with wreckage crashing on the good citizens of Muleshoe, TX or other sparsely populated points of the country. Gone are the days when USAF Air Defense Command envisioned using rockets with nuclear warheads in U.S. airspace to defend against Soviet bombers with much larger nuclear payloads aboard. In last year’s incident, once the decision was made to finally bring down the Chinese balloon, USAF interceptors were held back until the balloon had cleared the U.S. coast, but not so far as to cause the wreckage to land in deep water.  While the high-altitude interception went off like clockwork (believe me, it was not as easy as it looked) we obviously need a means of dealing with threats that don’t risk causing physical harm to bystanders.

In Southeast Asia, reconnaissance drones were used in large numbers to photograph denied areas of North Vietnam.  Usually, they were launched from DC-130 motherships, flew over their North Vietnamese objectives, and were recovered over the South China Sea by waiting CH-3 helicopters that snared the drones’ recovery parachutes, lest they be damaged on landing. The system proved incredibly reliable with one source claiming that in 2,700+ attempts, over 2,600 were successful — a remarkable recovery rate.

A USAF C-119J demonstrates the parachute recovery technique.

USAF CH-3 helicopter with a Ryan AQM-34R Lightning Bug reconnaissance drone in tow.

The sad end of a happy warrior (he’s seemingly smiling). The North Vietnamese took the drone threat seriously and VPAF interceptor pilots were given full victory credit for shooting down a drone.

In a similar manner, helicopters or small cargo planes could use capture nets to sweep up drones fairly cheaply. Obviously, this would require a fairly permissive air defense environment, such as that found in U.S. airspace, Israel and parts of Ukraine. It is a simple, but likely effective technique when used appropriately. The most difficult part of this scheme is having the helicopter (or cargo plane) on station when drones are in the air.  Aircraft could be put up preemptively when the likelihood of drone incursions is high and aircraft available for other missions — such as aircrew recovery — could be ready as quickly as attaching the catch apparatus to an external cargo hook. In Israel’s current situation, one could envision a lot of helicopters and other aircraft being very busy, indeed. However, by using aircraft already on hand, there would be little sunk cost other than aircrew training.

Another approach would be to jam the drone’s control signal. This, of course, would not work on drones that have an autonomous guidance system similar to the U.S. Lightning Bugs flying over North Vietnam, though that carries its own set of issues. Rather infamously, the Lightning Bug that was to provide the final reconnaissance for the raid to free prisoners from the North Vietnamese POW camp at Son Tay in 1970 went astray because the drone turned to soon and didn’t see that the camp had been flooded by monsoon rains and evacuated. In any event, jamming drones in the CONUS could potentially interfere with civilian bandwidths, causing the same kind of complaints that caused sonic booms to be banned over the U.S. mainland. Nevertheless, relatively low-powered jammers that could be located in the center of a large military installation might still be useful.

High-power microwave generators can be highly directional and could interfere with a drones electronics to the point that its circuit boards are “fried,” knocking the aircraft out of the sky. While purpose-built HPM weapons may appear on the battlefield in the very near future, the primary radar of the Lockheed F-35 Lightning II is believed to be capable of performing such duties and are becoming operational at such rates that they could be tasked for this under certain circumstances.

Air defense lasers may be an ideal weapon for dealing with drones, but they have been long promised and thus far failed to achieve operational status. Whatever their issues, particle beam weapons are probably further out on the technology horizon than lasers.  In the meantime, laser “dazzlers,” designed to temporarily blind pilots, have been out there — and effective — since the Falklands War, 42 years ago. Laser dazzlers could at least keep the drones from getting good optical reconnaissance data and deter amateurs from overflying facilities that may easily ruin their drone’s optics (whether or not they really can).

While we wait for these perfect weapons, rather more primitive arms may just fill the bill: just prior to WWII, the British developed an antiaircraft weapon the consisted of a multiple rocket launcher where the rockets trailed cables to ensnare German Stukas trying to bomb Royal Navy capital ships at sea. A similar system might be effective against drones that would be brought down by hitting or being hit by the streaming cable. Better still would be if they could successfully boost a net into the air. This approach would be particularly attractive as the threat drones are generally relatively slow and are unlikely to see such an attack unless it is launched from directly in the drone’s flight path. It would also be a relatively low threat for accompanying infantry. Such a “monkey catcher” could be mounted in pairs on an armored vehicle’s turret. On the platoon or company command net, the order “drone left,” “drone forward,” or “drone right,” the unit’s vehicles could slew their turrets to face the threat and each fire a net in that direction. An individual monkey catcher might not have a high probability of success, but multiples firing from different angles would have a much higher chance of knocking down the offending drone.

At some point, laser air defense weapons will mature and be fielded, ending the current threat. Until that time, “out-of-the-box” thinking may provide a more near-term solution to the threat we face today.