Category Russia

The Current Ukrainian Offensive

Ukrainian offensives do get my attention because I believe that to negotiate a peace settlement that does not permanently surrender 20% of their country Ukraine will probably need to start retaking some of that ground. They really have not reclaimed any more of their own territory since November 2022.

But they are on the offensive again. Curiously, just before the Trump inauguration. To quote twitter account @timkmak from yesterday (bolding is mine): (1) Tim Mak on X: “Here’s what we are reading today: Ukraine has launched a new offensive in Kursk region, the Russian Defence Ministry said. Ukrainian officials have indicated this is part of a larger operation. This follows territorial setbacks for Ukraine in the Kursk region in recent months. https://t.co/CEMHisnLqv” / X

“Ukraine has launched a new offensive in Kursk region, the Russian Defence Ministry said. 

Ukrainian officials have indicated this is part of a larger operation.

The follows territorial setbacks in Ukraine in the Kursk region in recent months.”

Other people are reporting that Ukraine has taken Berdin and has gone 2.7 kilometers past the Russian zero line (Def Mon on X: “Ukrainian forces likely went about 2.7km past the Russian zero line. https://t.co/WDFs2bGxZU” / X and Def Mon on X: “The developments in Kursk oblast looks something like this. We do not know if Ukraine managed to consolidate positions. We think we have geolocated UA units inside Berdin and Novosotnitskii. Geos: https://t.co/RNty0eKLQL https://t.co/ouerMmm9y4” / X).

Reports that this is a significant attack (“AT LEAST a 6 brigade attack): david D. on X: “im tracking about 10 “attacks” by ukr forces around kursk and north Belgorod. keep in mind that some will be real attacks, and some will be feints to draw in russian forces. russians are saying this is AT LEAST a 6 brigade attack… things will be clear later today expect” / X

There are reports of significant Russian losses (which must always be taken with a grain of salt): Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | on X: “BURN RATE: In the last 48 hours in Kursk Oblast, the Russian army lost up a battalion of North Korean infantry and VDV paratroopers. Since AUG, Moscow has deployed 50K troops to Kursk Oblast: approximately 38K are assessed as killed, wounded, missing or surrendered.” / X

Some maps of the area:  Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | on X: “UKRAINE’S KURSK OFFENSIVE: Latest from the BBC. https://t.co/QLSOk09HmP https://t.co/8xx9goK4kl” / X and Aurora Borealis 🤫 on X: “katsaps report the loss of the village of #Berdin, #Kursk region. https://t.co/QBeVLm9C81” / X and david D. (@secretsqrl123) / X and MAKS 24 🇺🇦👀 on X: “🔼🇺🇦 AFU managed to advance 8 km in the Kursk region, according to Russian voenkors. Map from ISW 🗺️👇👀 https://t.co/ebSfskuV9p” / X.

Anyhow, more to come, but all these reports must be taken with a grain of salt.

The Kursk offensive in August of 2024 was an interesting exercise but fundamentally did not retake any of their own territory and did not take enough of Kursk province to give them a lot they could trade off. It did not fundamentally change the situation on the ground, which is what was needed to give them advantage at the negotiation table. Unconditional surrender is very rare. Most wars end in a negotiated settlement.

The strength and loss figures being reported represent some fraction of reality. I do not know what that is (is it 1/10th or is it 9/10s?). I seriously doubt that the people posting these figures know that either, although some may indicate otherwise.

I was very disappointed in the failed Ukrainian offensive in early June 2023. For the sake of negotiating a positive resolution to the conflict, they really needed to take ground. I thought the Kursk offensive was a good stunt, but only that. Still, they have turned it into an extended fight that may yet yield dividends. If this offensive in Kursk is the start of a series of offensive that extend to Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Lugansk provinces, then this could become very significant. We shall see.

A key element in warfare is surprise (I do have a chapter on that in my book War by Numbers). If I can predict what Ukraine is going to do, that is not a good sign, as so to can the Russians. Therefore, if the Ukraine General Staff is doing their job right, they should be taking both Russian and me by surprise. That they appear to be doing. 

Dupuy’s Verities vs the Russo-Ukrainian War

So, we have had almost three full years of conventional war in and around Ukraine. Back in the 1970s- 1980s Trevor Dupuy assembled a list of factors (or verities) that influence and describe conventional combat. They covered combat in three different areas. They were 1) The Timeless Verities of Combat (13 verities), 2) Combat Attrition Verities (29 verities), and 3) Combat Advance Rates (15 verities).

They are listed below in these three posts:

The Timeless Verities of Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Trevor N. Dupuy’s Combat Attrition Verities – The Dupuy Institute

Trevor Dupuy’s Combat Advance Rate Verities – The Dupuy Institute

They are listed in detail in my book War by Numbers, although I edited a few for brevity.

They are listed in detail in Trevor Dupuy’s 1987 book Understanding War. They are also listed in his 1980 book Evolution of Weapons and Warfare.

They have been around for a while. I think they are a significant list and of course have been coded into his combat models the QJM and TNDM, which actually have proven track record of making good predictions. I do think they have been underutilized and underappreciated by the wider defense community.

Anyhow, my questions for the community that reads our blog is:

1. Which of these verities have been re-confirmed by war in Ukraine?, and
2. Which of these verities have been called in doubt by the war in Ukraine?

Interested to see the responses.

 

 

 

P.S. Some related links:

TDI Friday Read: Principles Of War & Verities Of Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Offensive Action – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Power Of Defense – The Dupuy Institute

The Combat Value of Surprise – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Utility Of Defense – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Initiative – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Fortification – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Advantage Of The Offensive – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Requirements For Successful Defense – The Dupuy Institute

A Comment On The Importance Of Reserves In Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Surprise – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Effects of Firepower in Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Inefficiency of Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Combat Power =/= Firepower – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Complexities of Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Response to Question on Dupuy’s Combat Attrition Verities – The Dupuy Institute

Average Losses per Day in Division-level Engagements on the Eastern Front in 1943 – The Dupuy Institute

People keep referencing us on the 3-to-1 Rule – The Dupuy Institute

Last Six Blog Posts – The Dupuy Institute

Shout out to Echoes of Past – The Dupuy Institute

These are all the posts you get if you click on the category “Dupuy’ Verities”:  Dupuy’s Verities – The Dupuy Institute

Aces at Kursk and Soviet Kill Claims

The following 2019 blog post is getting some attention lately on military history forums: So What Was Driving the Soviet Kill Claims? – The Dupuy Institute

This was drawn from my original 1,662 page Kursk book and was repeated in my new book Aces at Kursk: Aces at Kursk: The Battle for Aerial Supremacy on the Eastern Front, 1943: Lawrence, Christopher A: 9781399081436: Amazon.com: Books

It is fully discussed in those two books.

I will be presenting on Aces at Kursk at WWIIDF on Wednesday, 8 PM, 19 February.  See: World War II Discussion Forum | Home.

 

The Shot Heard Around the World

Another blog post from William “Chip” Sayers:

—————-

Week before last, Russia launched what was probably a small number of RS-26 Rubezh Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) at the city of Dnipro in Ukraine.[1] There are a number of interesting points to this incident, as well as a number of misconceptions.  Let’s try to make sense of this strike.

First, a lot of cages have been rattled over the fact that this is the first time an IRBM has been fired in anger.  The reason why this is a cage-rattling event is that IRBMs in general are a nuclear weapons delivery system, and the launch of an IRBM could, in theory, trigger a nuclear response by an interested party on the other side.  This goes to the Cold War doctrine of “launch on warning” — in other words, to launch one’s own nuclear missiles when the enemy’s incoming missiles are detected on radar (“warning”), but before they have struck their targets. 

Under this scenario, Russia might launch a small number of IRBMs at Ukraine, and when US sensors detected this, the American President would mistakenly interpret this as a nuclear attack on the United States and launch the US nuclear arsenal at Russia.  At this point, the Russians would then launch their nuclear missiles and we all go to hell in a little rowboat.  I’m not certain as to why this might happen, particularly — as in this case — if the IRBMs are armed with something other than nuclear warheads.

Frankly, Putin was apparently fairly confident that such a limited strike would not trigger global thermonuclear war and, in this case, we crossed that threshold with no discernable harm.  Unfortunately, it was a real threshold and Putin now has the leeway to use this new class of weapon with impunity.  So, let’s unpack some facts about the weapon Putin used to fire this particular shot across the West’s bow.

The first thing to understand is that the SS-26 Rubezh — or “Oreshnik,” as Putin called it — is not an operational missile.  Development of the system began in 2008, based on a two-stage version of the RS-24 Yars ICBM, with the first test launch in 2011.[2]  The missile’s first successful test flew 5,800km, which technically qualified it to be called an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), i.e., a missile designed to strike the United States.  However, all subsequent test flights have been to much shorter range, betraying its true purpose as an IRBM designed to attack European cities and therefore making it a violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.  It is not surprising that the missile that triggered the effort that culminated in the INF treaty — the SS-20 — was, itself, a cut-down version of a 1970s-era ICBM. [3]  Interestingly, all four missiles are from the same design bureau, so everything old really is new again.

It was the SS-26, along with other blatant violations, that caused President Donald Trump to withdraw the United States from the INF treaty in 2019.[4]  Ironically, Russia suspended the SS-26 program, apparently due to the lack of adequate funding.[5]  We can’t be entirely sure that Russian Rocket Forces general who announced the suspension was telling the truth, as opposed to misleading the West with disinformation.  Nevertheless, it seems plausible that the RS-26 program was suspended, and that a small number of the test missiles have been in storage awaiting more funding to complete testing. 

It is further plausible that, in anticipation of the US and NATO allies removing restrictions on Ukrainian use of Western weapons, Putin wanted an escalatory response to chill NATO and prevent further attacks on Russian soil.  The unprecedented RS-26 shot fills that roll exactly.  It remains to be seen as to how successful that signal will turn out to be.

So, what exactly did we see last week?  Video images appear to show six distinct events with 4-6 ground impacts with each event.  Of note, the reentry vehicles (RVs) or submunitions, as they’ve been described, did not appear to be explosive.  We will discuss that in more detail, in a moment.  The RS-26 has been commonly described as having four Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles, or MIRVs.[6]  Some analysts believed Putin’s statement that this was a single missile traveling at Mach 10 with six MIRVs, each with four to six submunitions.  One went so far as to make a rough estimate that one of these submunitions, weighing 100kg, would deliver the equivalent energy of a Mk 84 2,000lb bomb through kinetic energy, alone.[7]  Is this possible?  Yes.  Is it likely, No.

As we learn more about this attack, we may find that it was, indeed, a single missile.  However, my immediate reaction was that this was six missiles with four Multiple Reentry Vehicles (MRVs), each.  As the name somewhat obliquely implies, MRVs and not independently targetable, but rather are fired as a barrage at a single area target.  Certainly, if they were MIRVs, their independent targeting capability was wasted.  More to the point, ballistic missiles are all about throw-weight, and a MIRV Post-Boost Vehicle (PBV), or “bus” — the final maneuvering stage that drops off MIRVs on trajectories toward different targets — is a heavy and complicated piece of machinery.[8]  Having a MIRV bus on a missile that was loaded with MRVs is a huge waste of throw-weight: it would be better to download the bus and use the extra weight allowance for more, or larger MRVs.  According to CSIS, the RS-26 has a total warhead lift capability of 800kg.[9]  If CSIS’s estimate is accurate, the missile could never lift 3,600kg of MIRVs — unlikely even with the bus offloaded.  

Particularly unlikely seems to be the idea that these were MIRVs with submunitions.  What would be the point?  This would only add complexity and unnecessary weight to the missile.  No missile has ever been tested with multiple reentry vehicles that split open to release submunitions.  A reentry vehicle designed to split open seems like a summons to disaster — a seam between parts of the aeroshell sounds like an invitation for hot plasma to enter the RV during reentry.  More to the point, what purpose could submunitions possibly serve?  Why not make each submunition an RV of its own and forego the extra complexity of packaging them into a larger MRV?

Putin claimed that there is no way to defend against the RS-26.  He referenced the missile’s Mach 10 hypersonic speed and implied that it had Maneuvering Reentry Vehicles (MaRV) to evade defenses.  Generally speaking, the longer-ranging the ballistic missile, the higher the speed of the RVs.  Yes, travelling on the end of an IRBM, the RVs will come downhill at Mach 10, or better.  No, what we saw in the video did not reflect MaRVs — and it is highly unlikely that all of the elements that have been claimed for the missile (MaRVs with submunitions, etc.) could be combined.

Hypersonic speeds are nothing new, nor particularly remarkable.  The Soviet’s SS-1c SCUD SRBM dating back to the late 1950s reached hypersonic speeds, but even Patriot SAMs were able to shoot them down.  Hypersonic missiles with MaRVs can be a problem for missile defenses, though maneuvering decreases accuracy and bleeds off speed, so there are limits to what they can do.  Mach 10 non-maneuvering warheads are certainly not easy targets, but most experts acknowledge that the US Army’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles are technically capable, the Navy’s SM-3 are capable, and the Army’s Ground-Based Midcourse Defense missile are certainly capable of shooting down the RS-26.  So, Putin’s boast that there is no defense against the RS-26 rings hollow.  

In sum, the use of the RS-26 in Ukraine marks a provocative, though not revolutionary event.  Putin risked much in using an IRBM in combat for the first time, but the weapon did not visibly achieve much on the ground, and probably cannot easily be reproduced, given its likely status as a developmental program that has been suspended.  This was almost a move of desperation to signal Putin’s unpredictability and willingness to use measures that test the limits of rationality.  We shouldn’t be impressed.

 

[1] What is RS-26 Rubezh intercontinental ballistic missile or ICBM, range and can Russians really launch it?, Indiatvnews.com, 21Nov24, https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/world/what-is-rs-26-rubezh-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-or-icbm-range-and-can-russians-really-launch-it-dnipro-2024-11-21-962729.  Accessed 23Nov24.

[2] Stefan Forss, “Russia’s New Intermediate Range Missiles – Back to the 1970s,” Atlantic Council, April 6, 2017

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/russia-s-new-intermediate-range-missiles-back-to-the-1970s.  Accessed 24Nov24.

[3] https://russianforces.org/blog/2013/12/more_news_about_rs-26_missile.shtml.  Accessed 24Nov24.

[4] https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/25/russia-violating-1987-nuclear-missile-treaty/ Accessed 25Nov24;

[5] https://russianforces.org/blog/2018/04/by_cancelling_rs-26_russia_kee.shtml  Accessed 24Nov24; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/20/trump-us-nuclear-arms-treaty-russia Accessed 25Nov24.

[6] RS-26 Rubezh, Wikipedia, Accessed 26Nov24.

[7]  “Now I’m Really Scared: The New Oreshnik Missile Attack on Dnipro,” Millenium7* History Tech, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iL7Hb0fcpbU.  Accessed 25Nov24.

[8] Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee, Ballistic And Cruise Missile Threat 2017, 9.

[9] Missiles of the world — Russia — “RS-26 Rubezh,” Missile Threat – CSIS Missile Defense Project, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-x-31-rs-26-rubezh/   Accessed. 27Nov24.

Modern Missiles – Russian, Chinese and American, Part 1

First of a series of blog posts from Geoffry Clark on modern missiles:

—————

Modern missiles – Russian, Chinese and American, Part 1

 

Mentioned in the previous post on the Zhuhai Air Show (see The Japanese Gifu and Chinese Zhuhai Airshows, 2024 – The Dupuy Institute), the Chinese PLA have revealed two new systems in 2024, the HQ-19 and DF-100. These systems are different types of missiles, generally known as Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM) and Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSM), respectively.

Image Credit: truexanewsua/Telegram

 

There was also a very notable development regarding SSMs in Ukraine recently; on November 22, 2024, the Russian Federation tested a new missile named “Oreshnik” (meaning “hazel”, referring to the shape of the luminescence of the re-entry vehicles). As reported by Voice of America:

Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate reported that the Oreshnik missile was launched from Russia’s Kapustin Yar 4th Missile Test Range in the Astrakhan region. The missile traveled for approximately 15 minutes before striking the city of Dnipro. The missile was equipped with six non-nuclear warheads, each containing six submunitions, and it achieved a speed of Mach 11 during its flight.

There is some confusion and debate about the classification of this missile, whether it was an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), or an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). This is just a matter of range category, which is just anachronistic jargon from the Soviet Cold War and arms control negotiations and treaties. Since that time, the U.S. has withdrawn from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) in October 2018, many claim since China is unbound by any arms control, and the U.S. saw a need to develop such mid-range ballistic missiles.

Then, in a video address by Russian President Vladimir Putin said:

There are “no means of countering such weapons today. Missiles attack targets at a speed of Mach 10, which is 2.5 to 3 kilometers per second. Air defense systems currently available in the world and missile defense systems being created by the Americans in Europe cannot intercept such missiles. It is impossible.”

This high mach number is really what sets this type of missile apart. By comparison, the Chinese DF-100 missile (also known as CJ-100, and also by NATO as CH-SSC-13 Splinter) has a similar range to the Oreshnik (also known as the RS-26 Rubezh – The War Zone has a good explanation for the lineage), but these two missiles have very different speeds; the DF-100 is supersonic at about mach 4. The speed of these missiles – subsonic, supersonic, hypersonic – is directly proportional to the difficulty of interception.

So, there is debate about whether many advanced systems such as the American THAAD and certain missiles (especially the Standard Missile 3) from the Aegis system may be able to intercept such missiles. One new contender for this category is the Chinese HQ-19 SAM, which was apparently derived from the HQ-9, which was itself derived from the S-300 SAM of Russian design and build, and also widely used in the Ukraine War by both sides.

Image credit: VLS_Appreciator via twitter: https://twitter.com/VLS_Appreciator/status/1844408468452802602

 

HQ-19 at Zhuhai airshow 2024. (Image Credit: Twitter/David Wang)

 

I’ll briefly mention a few more important recent events which shed light on the state-of-the-art of missile defense.

A USAF awards ceremony on November 12 provided a number of details about how USAF squadron of F-15Es that was forward deployed to Muwaffaq Salti air base in Jordan, in order to defend Israel.  Ward Carroll reports:

During the Iranian attack on Israel on April 13, 2024, the 494th Fighter Squadron launched 14 Strike Eagle sorties, including six aircraft scrambled at a moment’s notice, while base defenses simultaneously neutralized enemy threats overhead. Ultimately those F-15Es (along with those previously mentioned base defenses) successfully engaged and destroyed more than 80 kamikaze UAVs, out of more than 300 drone and missiles intended to strike Israel.

Apparently, this air defense effort included U.S., U.K., Israel and Jordan.  What was public knowledge was the success of the Iron Dome, but there were apparently many other assets operating together to attrit the drones and missiles in their trajectories from Iran to targets in Israel. 

And, finally, the statistics published by the Ukrainian Defense Forces about the Russian missiles used, and the rate at which they were intercepted.

Screen capture of video address by General Oleksandr Syrskyi via Odessa Journal.

 

Through the translation provided by the Odessa Journal, and through the identification of these missiles and the Harpoon V Admiralty Trilogy Annexes, I’ve attempted to describe these missiles in more detail.

Missile Name

Missile Code

NATO Code

GRAU Code

Type

Flight path

Range nmi

Speed kts

Weight kgm

Signature

Missiles

Intercepted

Rate %

Kinzhal

Kh-47M2

 

39K5

ASM

Ballistic

1080

4016

3800

Vsmall

       111

               28

25%

Kalibr

 

SS-N-27

3M14

SSM

Cruise

865

600

 

Vsmall

       894

             443

50%

X-555/101

Kh-555

AS-15

 

ASM

Cruise

1620

400

1700

Vsmall

    1,846

          1,441

78%

X-555/101

Kh-101

AS-23A

 

ASM

Cruise

2160

400

2500

Stealthy

Oniks

P-800

SS-N-26

3M55

SSM

Cruise

165

1650

 

Vsmall

       211

               12

6%

Zircon

 

SS-N-33

3M22

SSM

Cruise

187

3150

 

Stealthy

           6

                 2

33%

Iskander-K

 

 

9K720

SSM

Ballistic

500

5053

4615

Small?

       202

               76

38%

Iskander-M

KN-23

 

9K720

SSM

Ballistic

500

5053

4615

Small?

    1,300

               56

4%

X-22/32

Kh-22

Burya

 

ASM

Cruise

~200

2003

5900

Small

       362

                 2

1%

Kh-32

 

 

ASM

Cruise

485

2160

5800

Vsmall

X-35

Uran

SS-N-25

3M24

SSM

Cruise

65

580

 

Vsmall

         15

                 1

7%

Tochka-U

 

SS-21

9K79

SSM

Ballistic

~120

3500

2000

Small?

         68

                 6

9%

X-25/29/31/35/58/59/60

Kh-25

AS-10

 

ASM

Direct

5

1360

295

Vsmall

    1,547

             343

22%

Kh-29

AS-14B

 

ASM

Direct

8

792

690

Vsmall

Kh-31

AS-17

 

ASM

Cruise ?

86

1690

~700

Vsmall

Kh-35

AS-20

 

ASM

Cruise

71.5

560

520

Vsmall

Kh-58

AS-11

 

ASM

Direct

66

2065

650

Vsmall

Kh-59

AS-18

 

ASM

Cruise

~150

~550

930

Vsmall

Kh-60

AS-?

 

ASM

 

 

 

 

 

S-300/400

SA-N-6a/b

 

 

SAM

Ballistic ?

~50

3885

 

Vsmall

    3,008

               19

1%

Other

?

 

?

 

 

 

 

 

 

         57

                 –

0%

 

There are reports that Russian Armed Forces are amassing large stockpiles of these missiles for future strikes.

In Part 2 of this analysis, I plan to give a few examples of these types of intercepts and illustrate the odds using the Harpoon V game system.

Thanks for reading, and for your comments!

EMA versus RMA

Working on more than two books at the moment (not sure this is the best idea). Just proofing a chapter in one book on the Russo-Ukrainian War and noted the following paragraph I had written about the war. Is this meaningful dialogue or am I just stepping in it?


It has been claimed by one the authors that “Any war that lasts longer than six weeks becomes a war of attrition.”[1] This appear to be the case with this war. Six weeks of the dynamic maneuver warfare that made this modern military campaign looks vaguely like the revolution in military affairs (RMA) that some theorists had postulated. It had now ended. We now had transitioned into the next stage of the war, which looked much more like the typical day-by-day grind between extended front lines that more defined World War II. Eventually this would devolve down to something that looked more like World War I, leaving the RMA theorists surprisingly silent.[2]

 

[1] See Battle for Kyiv, page 204.

[2] Having worked in the U.S. defense analytical community for decades, we were all too familiar with the claims of the RMA theorists and their willingness to declare that warfare of the future was going to be nothing like the warfare of the past. As our specialty at The Dupuy Institute was analysis of historical data, this was particularly frustrating as they seemed dismiss the 3,300 years of military history as irrelevant, replaced by their appreciation of new technology and its proposed revolutionary impact on the battlefield. If anything has been established by the now extended war in Ukraine, is that there has not been a revolution in military affairs. New technology is clearly a factor in the war, but it is, shall we say, an evolution in military affairs (EMA) vice an RMA. As the author Jim Storr stated in a conversation in 2023 “Much of the story of the war in Ukraine is a story of old lessons learned again.”

Now, the shop inside the pentagon that supposedly taking the lead on the RMA was OSD Net Assessment, under the leadership of Dr. Andrew Marshall. The Dupuy Institute was contracted to them to evaluate some aspects of the RMA and did a study for this office on “Measuring the Value of Situational Awareness (2004).” This was a study of the combat effects of superior situational awareness based upon a detailed examination of 295 World War II division-level engagements. So at least Andy Marshall (nicknamed “Yoda”) had not dismissed the value of historical analysis and was willing to fund such work. Many of the other RMA theorist did not show such wisdom. Our report on situational awareness is available from The Dupuy Institute and is also summarized in two chapters in the book War by Numbers (2017).  

 

Ukraine’s nuclear weapons

My primary focus at the moment is writing books, currently wrapping up two and well into the next. A chapter in the new book on the Russo-Ukrainian War is called Defense Budgets and International Aid. It starts as follows:

——-

          The United States and other members of NATO started providing military and financial aid in small amounts to Ukraine from the moment in declared its independence. Private aid agencies also did, including George Soros’ Open Society Foundation. Ukraine actually declared its independence in August 1991, but the government of the Soviet Union was still officially ruling over all fifteen nations in the Soviet Union. That Soviet government collapsed on 25-26 December 1991, ending the almost 70 year existence of the Soviet Union. Ukraine was clearly a free and independent county at that point.

            Ukraine had considerable armed forces at that time, inheriting its share of the large Soviet Army and even inheriting a nuclear force of 176 ICBMs and 33 heavy bombers with a total of 1,734 nuclear warheads. It was the third largest nuclear power in the world. The break-up of the Soviet Union had left behind four nuclear armed states: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. It became the policy of the west disarm these three new nuclear armed states (but not Russia) and it was in the interest of Russian to also do so. As a result, in 1994 Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear weapons and on 5 December 1994 Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. It was also signed by the two major nuclear powers, the United States and Russia and also the nuclear power United Kingdom. The other two nuclear powers, China and France. provided weaker individual assurances in separate documents. The end result was that between 1993 and 1996, the three former Soviet states gave up their nuclear weapons, mostly passing them back over to Russia.

            The signatories to the Budapest Memorandum also agreed that (to quote directly from the treaty, the bolding is ours):

  1. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britian and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.
  2. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britian and Northern Ireland, and the United Sates of America reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
  3. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the Principles of the CSCE Final Act, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

There were three other related points 4) addressing enforcement through the security council, 5) a commitment not to use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state, and 6) that the signatories will consult if a situation arises. [1] The memorandum was signed by Leonid D. Kuchman (Ukraine), Boris N. Yeltsin (Russia), John Major (UK) and William J. Clinton (U.S.). Needless to say, from 2014-2024, Russia has not adhered to these first three points.

 

[1] The text of memorandum is here: volume-3007-I-52241.pdf (un.org)

 

Ukraine to develop nukes ?

Ukraine once had nukes. It gave them up in the 1990s in exchange for an agreement with the U.S., Russia and UK securing their borders and sovereignty. That did not work out so well (will probably do a post on this later).

Now, Zelenskyy has recently talked about Ukraine developing a nuclear weapon. It was supposedly first addressed in his meeting with Donald Trump on 27 September. It was also addressed in at a European Council summit in Brussels on 17 October.

See:

Ukraine capable of developing nuclear weapons within few months

Zelenskyy: We need NATO or nukes … and we want NATO – POLITICO

Ukraine Issues Nuclear Ultimatum to NATO – Newsweek

Later discussion:

Is Ukraine ‘months away’ from building a nuclear bomb? – Firstpost

Under what conditions Ukraine could raise its nuclear status and attempt to defend itself? — Popovych

Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry denies that Ukraine plans to make nuclear weapons

Could Zelensky use nuclear bombs? Ukraine’s options explained

May post more on this later.

U.S. Military Contractors in Ukraine

Not sure how significant this story is, but it came out this weekend, so I thought I would repost it: Biden administration to allow American military contractors to deploy to Ukraine for first time since Russia’s invasion.

I gather this came about because of the need to provide maintenance and logistic support for the F-16s and Patriots, even though the F-16 are provided by Holland, not by us (the cost to Russia of shooting down flight MH-17 on 17 July 2014).  Of course, one of arguments against deploying F-16s to Ukraine was the maintenance and support issues. This probably helps to solve that problem, but potentially puts American contractors in danger (although I am guessing the majority of the people employed on these American contacts will not be from the USA). They are talking about a few dozen to a couple of hundred contractors working in Ukraine (I will go with the higher figure).

I suspect Russia will take issue with this, although there were Soviet citizens in Hanoi providing air defense assistance during the Vietnam War.

Project SKYSWEEPER

This is a new blog post from TDI associate Chip Sayers, who has able to make the Third HAAC in person this time:


Project SKYSWEEPER

Armed First-Person Point of View (FPV) drone use in war zones has become a major topic of discussion in the last number of months and news this week of multiple breaches of security at U.S. military bases in the homeland have brought home the point that we need a general strategy for use against drones anywhere, but that also works in U.S. airspace.  In a war zone, a solution could be relatively straight-forward in that use of “lethal force” on the battlefield is expected.  That doesn’t hold true for use in U.S. airspace.

While this photo is almost certainly for propaganda purposes — it beggars’ belief that such small drones could lift off while burdened so outrageously — this photo does generally illustrate the armed FPV drone concept.

This FPV quadcopter sports twin M-72 -class light anti-tank weapons fixed to fire straight down on unsuspecting armored vehicles. 

The title of this post is an homage to the scale model I built as a 9-year-old of a US Army M-51 “Skysweeper” 75mm automatic antiaircraft gun. The Skysweeper had revolver magazines giving it a rate of fire of 45 rounds per minute, and an on-mount gun-laying radar and fire-control computer that ensured its proximity-fused shells would be placed with deadly accuracy. A similar system could put paid to the drone threat in areas where firing artillery is acceptable. 

In the 1990s, Oerlikon created Advanced Hit Efficiency And Destruction (AHEAD) ammunition for its line of 35mm antiaircraft guns. AHEAD, when fired, passes through three coils on the end of the gun’s barrel.  The first two measure the muzzle velocity of the round and compares that to the measured range of the target from its fire-control computer. The third sets the shell’s fuse to burst at the optimal point to damage the target. AHEAD rounds carry a payload, depending on the shell, of between 152 and 860 tungsten projectiles that can effectively shred anything in its path.

This proof plate from an AHEAD round detonation should be terrifying to anyone on the receiving end of its wrath, especially low-flying aircraft — manned, or unmanned.

A Gepard Flakpanzer. The 35mm AAA system is self-contained with search and target tracking radars, fire-control computer and guns on a turret with a Leopard tank chassis.  Note the coils at the ends of the gun barrels for programming AHEAD rounds.

The German Gepard 35mm Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun (SPAAG) has been sent to Ukraine and, according to reports, the Gepard has proven to be highly effective against Russian drones. NATO countries have managed to scrape together 52 Gepards to cover potentially 1,100 kilometers of frontage, leaving an average density of one Gepard for every 20 kilometers in a simplistic, but illustrative calculation. Ammunition has also been a problem because Switzerland — the country of origin — objected to “violating their neutral status” by selling it to combatants. It begs the question of what they thought their weapons and ammunition were going to be used for — Fourth of July celebrations?  NATO has obtained through hook and by crook a quarter-million rounds, but that’s less than 4.4 minutes of fire, across the force. 

However, AAA is of no use against drones operating in U.S. airspace.  This brings to mind “the Battle of Palmdale” when a Navy drone went rogue and overflew Los Angeles in August 1956. Air Defense Command interceptors attempted multiple times to down the drone with unguided rockets, only to have the rockets’ high-explosive warheads wreak havoc on the ground below.

As we saw in last year’s shootdown of a Chinese balloon which crossed the entire breadth of the Continental U.S. (or CONUS), once the aircraft enters U.S. airspace, we must be concerned with wreckage crashing on the good citizens of Muleshoe, TX or other sparsely populated points of the country. Gone are the days when USAF Air Defense Command envisioned using rockets with nuclear warheads in U.S. airspace to defend against Soviet bombers with much larger nuclear payloads aboard. In last year’s incident, once the decision was made to finally bring down the Chinese balloon, USAF interceptors were held back until the balloon had cleared the U.S. coast, but not so far as to cause the wreckage to land in deep water.  While the high-altitude interception went off like clockwork (believe me, it was not as easy as it looked) we obviously need a means of dealing with threats that don’t risk causing physical harm to bystanders.

In Southeast Asia, reconnaissance drones were used in large numbers to photograph denied areas of North Vietnam.  Usually, they were launched from DC-130 motherships, flew over their North Vietnamese objectives, and were recovered over the South China Sea by waiting CH-3 helicopters that snared the drones’ recovery parachutes, lest they be damaged on landing. The system proved incredibly reliable with one source claiming that in 2,700+ attempts, over 2,600 were successful — a remarkable recovery rate.

A USAF C-119J demonstrates the parachute recovery technique.

USAF CH-3 helicopter with a Ryan AQM-34R Lightning Bug reconnaissance drone in tow.

The sad end of a happy warrior (he’s seemingly smiling). The North Vietnamese took the drone threat seriously and VPAF interceptor pilots were given full victory credit for shooting down a drone.

In a similar manner, helicopters or small cargo planes could use capture nets to sweep up drones fairly cheaply. Obviously, this would require a fairly permissive air defense environment, such as that found in U.S. airspace, Israel and parts of Ukraine. It is a simple, but likely effective technique when used appropriately. The most difficult part of this scheme is having the helicopter (or cargo plane) on station when drones are in the air.  Aircraft could be put up preemptively when the likelihood of drone incursions is high and aircraft available for other missions — such as aircrew recovery — could be ready as quickly as attaching the catch apparatus to an external cargo hook. In Israel’s current situation, one could envision a lot of helicopters and other aircraft being very busy, indeed. However, by using aircraft already on hand, there would be little sunk cost other than aircrew training.

Another approach would be to jam the drone’s control signal. This, of course, would not work on drones that have an autonomous guidance system similar to the U.S. Lightning Bugs flying over North Vietnam, though that carries its own set of issues. Rather infamously, the Lightning Bug that was to provide the final reconnaissance for the raid to free prisoners from the North Vietnamese POW camp at Son Tay in 1970 went astray because the drone turned to soon and didn’t see that the camp had been flooded by monsoon rains and evacuated. In any event, jamming drones in the CONUS could potentially interfere with civilian bandwidths, causing the same kind of complaints that caused sonic booms to be banned over the U.S. mainland. Nevertheless, relatively low-powered jammers that could be located in the center of a large military installation might still be useful.

High-power microwave generators can be highly directional and could interfere with a drones electronics to the point that its circuit boards are “fried,” knocking the aircraft out of the sky. While purpose-built HPM weapons may appear on the battlefield in the very near future, the primary radar of the Lockheed F-35 Lightning II is believed to be capable of performing such duties and are becoming operational at such rates that they could be tasked for this under certain circumstances.

Air defense lasers may be an ideal weapon for dealing with drones, but they have been long promised and thus far failed to achieve operational status. Whatever their issues, particle beam weapons are probably further out on the technology horizon than lasers.  In the meantime, laser “dazzlers,” designed to temporarily blind pilots, have been out there — and effective — since the Falklands War, 42 years ago. Laser dazzlers could at least keep the drones from getting good optical reconnaissance data and deter amateurs from overflying facilities that may easily ruin their drone’s optics (whether or not they really can).

While we wait for these perfect weapons, rather more primitive arms may just fill the bill: just prior to WWII, the British developed an antiaircraft weapon the consisted of a multiple rocket launcher where the rockets trailed cables to ensnare German Stukas trying to bomb Royal Navy capital ships at sea. A similar system might be effective against drones that would be brought down by hitting or being hit by the streaming cable. Better still would be if they could successfully boost a net into the air. This approach would be particularly attractive as the threat drones are generally relatively slow and are unlikely to see such an attack unless it is launched from directly in the drone’s flight path. It would also be a relatively low threat for accompanying infantry. Such a “monkey catcher” could be mounted in pairs on an armored vehicle’s turret. On the platoon or company command net, the order “drone left,” “drone forward,” or “drone right,” the unit’s vehicles could slew their turrets to face the threat and each fire a net in that direction. An individual monkey catcher might not have a high probability of success, but multiples firing from different angles would have a much higher chance of knocking down the offending drone.

At some point, laser air defense weapons will mature and be fielded, ending the current threat. Until that time, “out-of-the-box” thinking may provide a more near-term solution to the threat we face today.