Mystics & Statistics

The original Battle of Kursk (4 July – 23 August 1943) was actually the single largest battle in World War II. This one is a lot smaller.

One will note that this map (from the book Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka) does include Sudzha, just to the northeast of Sumy.

Now I have blogged about this second Battle of Kursk before on 15 August: The Second Battle of Kursk – The Dupuy Institute. My concluding remarks were: “Anyhow, this was a clever move by Ukraine…Its impact has probably been overrated by many commentators.”

So, over the last three weeks, the Ukrainian control in and around Kursk has expanded slightly, from about 1,000 square kilometers (about the size of Fairfax County) to around 1,300 square kilometers. It is clear that Ukraine has taken all it can or wants to, and it now settled into a holding operation.

Around 28 August, the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Ukraine had 5,000 troops inside of Kursk oblast. This sounds about right. I gather the offensive was initially conducted on 6 August by two brigades, the 22nd Mechanized Brigade and the 82nd Air Assault Brigade, with the 80th Air Assault Brigade added early on to the mix by 10 August (when they reported capturing a T-80 at Sudzha). Now Wikipedia lists nine Ukrainian maneuver brigades in their order of battle, but I really don’t buy into that. If they had two-three reinforced brigades involved and partly or mostly committed, then one would end up with 5,000 or so troops deployed forward. It does seem to line up. I don’t know why they would need to or want to commit more.

Russia has not pulled any troops from its rather slow advance on Pokrovsk. they may have pulled some from around Kharkiv.  Russian has at least 557,000 ground troops (see previous blog post for details) with at least 450,000 of them deployed in Ukraine. That gave them 102,000 or so troops in the rear, they could shift to contain and battle up the Ukrainian Kursk oblast penetration. This should be enough, even though their quality is suspect (I assume more of the troops in the rear are still training up). Around 5 September, Zelenskyy (President of Ukraine) claimed that Russian had moved 60,000 soldiers into the Kursk region. I suspect this figure is high, although it is possible. 

The only real surprise so far in the lack of urgency on the part of Russia in reducing this penetration. They have clearly moved troops in the area, containing the breached area, but so far have not done any major attacks to reduce the penetration. Perhaps this is because they are using only partly trained rear elements and recent conscripts, and really don’t want to conduct failed attacks and run up the losses.  

So, not much has changed around Kursk and things have only changed slowly around Pokrovsk. I will go into that in a later blog post. 

Got a couple of more blog posts coming out this week on the subject.

The Battle of Kursk (1943) was the largest battle of World War II. I have three books out on the subject (the big book, The Battle of Prokhorovka and Aces at Kursk). There are two more planned (The Battle of Tolstoye Woods and The Tank Fields of Prokhorovka). I also have one book out in the war in Ukraine (The Battle for Kyiv), one that we are about to submit another to the publisher (The Siege of Mariupol) and several more planned. I have also done a couple of hundred blog posts on the Russo-Ukrainian War. So, I guess as measured by page count, I am kind of an expert. Still, this doesn’t mean that I have any unique knowledge or understanding as to what is going on right now in Ukraine; but let me take a shot at it.

Now, this Second Battle of Kursk is nowhere near the size of the first one, but like the first one, it is also really not at Kursk. In fact, this seems to be a fairly small affair, involving elements of two Ukrainian brigades and so far no significant Russian forces. The area involved is the size of Fairfax County. Ukraine has taken around 1,000 square kilometers. This is not particularly significant, making up less than 0.002% of Russia. It is not a region of any particular economic value. The population of the main village in the occupied area, Sudzha, is last reported as 5,127.  The whole Sudzha district (which is 996 sq. kilometers) is 26,964 (2010 census and is now probably less).

This operation is just a classic case of hitting them where they ain’t. There was a reason Russia was not defending this border area. Ukraine also does not directly defend large parts of its border areas. What I assume both sides do (and this is an assumption) is to hold a couple of regiments or brigades back in central locations, ready to move towards the border if need be. So far, it does not appear that Russia is doing even that. I suspect Ukraine is, and it may have been some of those forces around Sumy that were used to conduct this operation. So a large extended masking operation probably was not needed, the forces used were already nearby. But, neither side has a continued fortified border to the northwest of Kharkiv, so these little land grabs are possible by either of them. They are relatively meaningless militarily.

But, it could result in an expansion of the front. Right now, the front has been effectively 700 kilometers in length (see: The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long – rev. 1 – The Dupuy Institute). This excludes all that area to the northwest of Kharkiv, including Sumy to Chernihiv. It also excludes the Kakhovka Reservoir and the part of the Dnipro River going down from there to Kherson. So, it is possible, by expanding the front to include the entire border between Ukraine and Russia, that we could end up with a 1,200 kilometer front line. Who benefits from that?  

Right now Russian has about 450,000 troops located in Ukraine (Ukrainian estimate, Putin says 617,000). I am guessing that Ukraine has 300,000 to 400,000 opposite them and engaged with them. Ukraine supposedly has more than 700,000 mobilized, but I gather many are still training and holding down inactive or rear areas (like, for example Sumy and Chernihiv). The Russian Army, according to Wikipedia (IISS estimate for 2024 is the source) consists of the “Ground Forces” of 500,000 (including 100,000 conscripts) and the airborne forces of 45,000 (2023, source TASS). Their naval infantry are 12,000. So, 557,000 ground troops. There are also air force, navy and rocket forces for a total armed forces strength of 1,320,000 (December 2023, AP). Also see: Density of Deployment in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute. Theoretically, if Ukraine has 700,000 mobilized (as the president was claiming in 2023), then Ukraine could gain an advantage by stretching out the front line. I really don’t think that is the case. 

So what is the Ukrainian objectives? Are they going to set up a Kursk Peoples Republic or hold the territory? I doubt it. I assume over the next week or two, Russia will build up its force in the area, and I suspect the most likely answer is that Ukraine will declare victory and go home, withdrawing from the area as the pressure increases.

The problem is that if you hold this Fairfax County-size piece of property inside of Russia, you not only have to commit one or two or three brigades to holding the area, but you have to also secure the left and right flanks of this area with ground troops. This is at least a brigade on each flank. So now, we are talking about 3 to 5 or more brigades committed to this effort. The Ukrainian army is only around 40 to 60 or so brigades active (I have not attempted to do a count in over a year). Are they really going to commit 10% of their ground forces to hold this little area. I doubt it.

So, I suspect Ukraine will withdraw. Still, the operation does three things for them:

1. Propaganda value.
2. They have captured over 100 Russian prisoners which they can later exchange. Ukraine had thousands captured in 2022 and have never held enough Russian prisoners to exchange for all the people Russia holds. This helps.
3. They force the Russians to more seriously protect these border regions, which they obviously were not doing. This ties down more forces from a ground army of 557K that has 450K in Ukraine.

Anyhow, this was a clever move by Ukraine, but hardly a brilliant piece of operational art, as quite simply, no significant Russian forces were enveloped and destroyed. In the end, winning large extended conventional wars is usually done by destroying armies. This does not do that. Its impact has probably been overrated by many commentators. 

Also see: 

The Russo-Ukrainian War is still a limited war – The Dupuy Institute

Area Taken in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute

Just saw some great graphics from @War_Mapper that is worth repeating (dating goes from Feb. 2022 to July 2024).

His map as of 1 August is here: 

Now, he is saying that for the month of July there was a net gain of around 177 square kilometers (68 square miles). This is kind of like taking an area the size of 17% of Fairfax County or almost all of Washington DC. 

A numerical count is provided here:

This from November 2023 to July 2024 totals 776.59 square kilometers (300 square miles). This is almost 75% of the area of Fairfax County. Or, to match it up to a state, it is almost 0.2% of the state of California or 12% of the state of Delaware. Not earth shaking, but nibbling. As it is, Russian currently controls 17.72% of Ukraine.

For the record, @War_Mapper provided a number of maps that were used in my book The Battle for Kyiv and provided one map for our upcoming book The Siege of Mariupol.